



Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar
in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies

PROCEEDINGS



Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa

29-31 October 2009

The Lounge, New Residence, 90 University Private



Sponsored by
the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation

The Chair also thanks
the School of Political Studies,
the Faculty of Social Sciences
the Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies and
the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter
for their support



*2009 Danyliw Seminar
Opening Reception*

Resto-Pub Jazzy, University Centre
29 October 2009, 6.00-7.00 PM



Andrew Danyliw of the
Danyliw Foundation



Irena Makaryk, Vice-Dean of Graduate
and Postdoctoral Studies



The Hon. Ihor Ostash, Ambassador
of Ukraine to Canada



François Houle, University of Ottawa Provost



Tetiana Kostiuchenko, Olena Petrenko and Julia Kysla, who presented papers at the Seminar



Students from the University of Toronto



Nykolai Bilaniuk (Ottawa) and Patrice Bensimon (Paris)



2009 Danyliw Seminar Attendees

Agafonov, Anton (MA Student, U of Ottawa)
Aksim, Martha (CIDA, Ottawa)
Aksim, Rudi (CIDA, Ottawa)
Antropov, Sergey (Russian Embassy, Ottawa)
Bennett, Andrew (EDC, Ottawa)
Bernardo, Lianne M. (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Best, Ulrich (UBC, Vancouver)
Byczak, Michel (Montreal)
Campbell, Marilee (Office of Sen. Raynell Andreychuk, Ottawa)
Clayton, Doug (Slavic Languages, U of Ottawa)
Cmoc, Modest (Ottawa)
Daschko, Yuri (Toronto)
Dembinska, Magdalena (Political Science, U of Montreal)
Demers, Jean-Marc (Ottawa)
Dombrovska, Anna (Ottawa)
Evsikov, Egor (Department of Defense, Ottawa)
Fallis, Amy (MA Student, NPSIA, Carleton U)
Fedorowycz, Daniel (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Fyson, Raina (Ottawa)
Gauthier, Réal (Montreal)
Gengalo, Borys (UCPBA, Ottawa)
Gladu Michel (Government, Ottawa)
Golubova, Anna (BA Student, U of Ottawa)
Grytsenko, Zoia (Ottawa)
Haras, Uliana (EDC, Ottawa)
Hawrylyuk, Alexandra (CBC International, Montreal)
Hedenskog, Jakob (Visiting Scholar, U of Toronto)
Hingston, Bill (Ottawa)
Hrycenko-Luhova, Zorianna (Montreal)
Huk, Katherine (MA Student, U of Toronto)

Ivanov, Yaroslav (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Karpishka, Roman (Ottawa)
Karpishka, Stephanie (Ottawa)
Kostash, Elizabeth (Ottawa)
Kostiuk, Michael (Ottawa)
Kowalchuk, Oksana (Trident International, Ottawa)
Krolczyk, Jakub (MA Student, U of Ottawa)
Kudelia, Serhiy (Jacyk Postdoctoral Fellow, U of Toronto)
Kuryliw, Valentina (Toronto)
Lahey, Daniel (Government, Ottawa)
Litvin, Olga (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Luhovy, Teresa (Ottawa)
Makaryk, Irena (Vice-Dean Graduate and Postdoctol Studies, U of Ottawa)
Maliki, Hashimu (PhD Student, U of Ottawa)
Mashtalir, Anastasiya (Ottawa)
McLaren, Jeffrey (Ottawa)
Mokrushyna, Halyna (Ottawa)
Mokrushyna, Nadia (Ottawa)
Momryk, Myron (Ottawa)
Mugan, Yashar (Ottawa)
Opar, Alexandra (Ottawa)
Patsiurko, Natalka (Sociology, Concordia U)
Peleschuk, Daniel (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Pruchnicki, Linda (CBIE, Ottawa)
Radchenko, Olga (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Robinson, Paul (Graduate School of Public Affairs, U of Ottawa)
Rodal, Alti (Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative, Ottawa)
Romaniuc, Anatole (Ottawa)
Savka, Roman (Slavic Languages, U of Ottawa)
Sawchuk, Andriy (Ottawa)
Senyk, Nadia (Ottawa)
Seredynska, Olena (PhD Student, U of Toronto)
Shulakewych, Markian (Ottawa)
Shumovsky, Helen (Ottawa)
Shumovsky, Ted (Ottawa)
Sienik, Denys (Embassy of Ukraine in Canada, Ottawa)
Survilla, Joanna (Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile, Gatineau)
Telka, Stephan (Ottawa)
Tomiuk, Bohdan (UCPBA, Ottawa)
Torbakov, Igor (Finnish Institute of International Affairs)
Tsapovski, Yarko (Ottawa)
Werhun, Natalia (MA Student, U of Ottawa)
Zakaluzny, Roman (Ottawa)

*Interns of the Canada-Ukraine
Parliamentary Program 2009*

Bilonizhka, Ira (Ukraine)
Bits, Roman (Ukraine)
Bogun, Alex (Ukraine)
Grynevich, Maria (Ukraine)
Hud, Mary (Ukraine)
Hudyma, Khrystyna (Ukraine)
Kostina, Arina (Ukraine)
Kovalchuk, Yaroslav (Ukraine)
Kovalenko, Anna (Ukraine)
Kozachuk, Kateryna (Ukraine)
Krasnoshtan, Iryna (Ukraine)
Lubkovych, Yurii (Ukraine)
Marets, Peter (Ukraine)
Seiran, Aliiev (Ukraine)
Shapka, Evhen (Ukraine)
Shpak, Sophiyka (Ukraine)
Shvediuk, Valeria (Ukraine)
Sokolskyi, Artem (Ukraine)
Sorokivska, Khrystyna (Ukraine)
Soshenko, Yuriy (Ukraine)
Viatchaninova, Ievgeniia (Ukraine)
Yevchuk, Sofiya (Ukraine)
Zakrynytska, Svitlana (Ukraine)
Zinchuk, Andriy (Ukraine)



2009 Danyliw Seminar Panelists

- Allina-Pisano, Jessica** (U of Ottawa, Canada)
Arel, Dominique (U of Ottawa, Canada)
Avioutskaa, Viatcheslav (École des dirigeants d'entreprises, France)
Balmaceda, Margarita (Seton Hall University, US)
Bazylevych, Maryna (SUNY Albany, US)
Bensimon, Patrice (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, France)
Doran, Marie-Christine (U of Ottawa, Canada)
Goujon, Alexandra (U de Dijon, France)
Grabowski, Jan (U of Ottawa, Canada)
Himka, John-Paul (U of Alberta, Canada)
Himka, Eva (U of Toronto, Canada)
Hrynevych, Vladyslav (Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine)
Karatnycky, Adrian (Atlantic Council of the US, New York)
King, Charles (Georgetown U, US)
Kostiuchenko, Tetiana (U Mohyla Academy, Ukraine)
Kysla, Iuliia (Central European U, Hungary)
Melnyk, Oleksandr (U of Toronto, Canada)
Patsiurko, Natalka (Concordia U, Canada)
Paxson, Margaret (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, US)
Petrenko, Olena (Ruhr U of Bochum, Germany)
Potichnyj, Peter (McMaster U, Canada)
Ruble, Blair (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, US)
Rudling, Per (U of Alberta, Canada)
Shevel, Oxana (Tufts U, US)
Struve, Kai (Martin-Luther-U Halle-Wittenberg, Germany)
Way, Lucan (U of Toronto, Canada)

2009 Danyliw Seminar Discussants



Allina-Pisano, Jessica (U of Ottawa, Canada) ■ 1

Grabowski, Jan (U of Ottawa, Canada) ■ 2

Vladyslav Hrynevych (Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies,
Kyiv, Ukraine) ■ 3

Charles King (Georgetown U, US) ■ 4

Paxson, Margaret (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, US) ■ 5

Blair Ruble (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, US) ■ 6

Per Rudling (U of Alberta, Canada) ■ 7

Lucan Way (U of Toronto, Canada) ■ 8



*Chair of Ukrainian Studies
Seminar Staff*



- Adjagbe, Mathieu** (PhD Student, Political Science) ■ 1
Couture-Gagnon, Laurence (Coordinator, MA Student, Political Science) ■ 2
Grenier, Félix ((PhD Student, Political Science) ■ 3
L'Heureux, Marie-Hélène (MA Student, Public Affairs) ■ 4
L'Heureux, Martine (BA Student, Political Science) ■ 5
Nikolko, Milana (Visiting Research Fellow) ■ 6
Ratelle, Jean-François (PhD Student, Political Science) ■ 7
Roseberry, Philippe (PhD Student, Queens U) ■ 8
Schmidt, Christine (BA Student, Political Science) ■ 9
Thibault, Hélène (PhD Student, Political Science) ■ 10
Yablonska, Anya (MA Student, Communications) ■ 11



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FINAL PROGRAM

Moderator: **Dominique Arel**
(Chairholder, U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

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Thursday 29 October

Session I, 1.30-5.00 PM

- **Alexandra Goujon** (U of Dijon, France, goujona@club-internet.fr)

The Memory of Nazi Punitive Actions in Belarus and Ukraine:

The Khatyn Case in Comparative Perspective

Discussant: ■ **Per Rudling** (U of Alberta, Canada, parudling@ualberta.ca)

- **Iuliia Kysla** (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, yukoochka@gmail.com)

Partisan Leader Lialia Ubyyvovk: The Creation of a New Soviet Ukrainian Hero/ine

Discussant: ■ **Vladyslav Hrynevych** (Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine, milovlada@ukr.net)

Coffee break, 3.30-4.00 PM

- **John Paul Himka** (U of Alberta, Canada, john-paul.himka@ualberta.ca)

- **Eva Himka** (U of Toronto, Canada, eva.himka@utoronto.ca)

Absence and Presence of Genocide and Memory: The Holocaust and the Holodomor in Interviews with Elderly Ukrainian Nationalists in Lviv

Discussant: ■ **Dominique Arel** (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)



Session II, 5.00-6.00 PM

Special Presentation

- **Adrian Karatnycky** (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the US, fhpres@aol.com)

Ukraine at a Crossroads: Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or a Surprise?

Opening Reception, 6.00-7.00 PM

Resto-Pub Jazzy, University Centre
85 University St., 1st Floor

Friday 30 October

Session III, 9.00 AM-12.30 PM

Screening and discussion of the documentary *The Holocaust by Bullets* [*La Shoah par balles*] Directed by ■ **Romain Icart** (France), 2008

■ **Patrice Bensimon** (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France, p.bensimon@yahadinunum.org) *The Politics of Jewish Sites of Memory in Ukraine*

Discussant: ■ **Sofia Grachova** (Harvard U, US, sofia_grachova@yahoo.com)

Coffee break, 11.15-11.30 AM

■ **Kai Struve** (Martin Luther U, Halle-Wittenberg, Germany, kai.struve@geschichte.uni-halle.de)

Mass Executions and Pogroms against Jews in Eastern Galicia during Summer 1941

Discussant: ■ **Jan Grabowski** (U of Ottawa, Canada, jgrabows@uottawa.ca)



Session IV, 1.30-3.30 PM

Presentation and discussion of the autobiography *My Journey*, (Litopys UPA, Series “Events and People”, Book 4, Toronto-L’viv, 2008)

Directed by ■ **Peter J. Potichnyj** (McMaster U, Canada, peter.potichnyj@litopysupa.com)

■ **Olena Petrenko** (Ruhr U Bochum, Germany, olena.petrenko@yahoo.de)

Women in the Armed Ukrainian Underground, 1942-1954

Discussant: ■ **Margaret Paxson** (Kennan Institute, DC, paxsonml@yahoo.com)

Coffee break, 3.30-4.00 PM



Session V, 4.00-6.00 PM

■ **Oxana Shevel** (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

The Memory of the OUN-UPA in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Marie-Christine Doran** (U of Ottawa, Canada, Marie-Christine.Doran@uottawa.ca)

■ **Dominique Arel** (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Ukraine, the War, and the Principle of Collective Responsibility

Saturday 31 October

Session VI, 9.00-10.00 AM

- **Oleksandr Melnyk** (U of Toronto, Canada, alex.melnyk@utoronto.ca)
Archives, Repression, and the Politics of Historical Knowledge in Ukraine, 1942-1944
Discussant: ■ **Charles King** (Georgetown U, US, kingch@georgetown.edu)

NEW RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UKRAINE



Session VII, 10.00 AM-12.00 PM

- **Viatcheslav Avioutskii** (Ecole des dirigeants et créateurs d'entreprises, Paris, France, avioutskii@yahoo.fr)
The Consolidation of Business Clans in Ukraine
Discussant: ■ **Blair Ruble** (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, US, blair.ruble@wilsoncenter.org)
- **Margarita Balmaceda** (Seton Hall U, US, balmacma@shu.edu)
Rents of Energy Dependency and Energy Policy and Political Development in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania
Discussant: ■ **Lucan Way** (U of Toronto, Canada, lway@utsc.utoronto.ca)



Session VII, 1.00-3.00 PM

- **Tetiana Kostiuchenko** (U Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine, tetiana.kostiuchenko@yahoo.com)
The "Komsomol Economy" Twenty Years Later
Discussant: ■ **Wsewolod Isajiw** (U of Toronto, Canada, isajiw@hotmail.com)
- **Maryna Bazylevych** (SUNY Albany/U of Indiana, US, mb2885@albany.edu)
The Informal Economy in the Ukrainian Health Sector
Discussant: ■ **Jessica Allina-Pisano** (U of Ottawa, Canada, jallinap@uottawa.ca)





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Thursday 29 October

DISPUTED MEMORIES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR



Session I



■ **Alexandra Goujon** (U of Dijon, France)

*The memory of Nazi Punitive Actions in Belarus and Ukraine:
The Khatyn Case in Comparative Perspective*

Professor Goujon's presentation addressed the memory of Nazi punitive actions in Belarus and Ukraine by comparing the memorialization of burned villages in both countries. By comparing the villages of Kortelisy and Koriukivka in Ukraine and Khatyn in Belarus, she seeks to analyse the varying memories of burned villages during World War II. Her analysis explores the relationship between victimization and memory, discussing how the memory of burned villages plays a crucial, or by contrast, marginal role in the historiographical victimization of Ukraine and Belarus. Her goal is to show the processes that are at work in victimization memory, both in terms of its role in nation building, as well as in the adoption of demarcation or stigmatization strategies of political actors. The connection between victimization memory and commemorative memory is therefore decisive, since it focuses on the way in which political and social actors use and make visible the memory of the burned villages in the public space.

Goujon explained that victimization memory is one of the most important aspects of nation-building in a state. Therefore, it is necessary for post-Soviet states to produce such memory in order to legitimize the existence of the nation and its future development. Nation-building in the post-Soviet states involves the process of legitimization through past moments of death that, paradoxically, become founding moments for the nation. From this perspective, the uses of memory in Belarus and Ukraine differ significantly. Indeed, the memory of burned villages reveals different Soviet and post-Soviet memorial strategies in each of these countries. In Belarus, memory is centered on the victimization of the nation, represents the starting point of national rebirth, and is used in stigmatizing domestic and external adversaries of the political regime. The Belarusian authorities nationalize the memory of the burned villages of Khatyn, as well as the victimization memory that will always be intrinsically linked to the Second World War. By focussing on Khatyn, victimization memory becomes exclusive. It marginalizes or pushes aside certain important historical facts and the sites of memory connected to these, including the massacres of the 1930s by the NKVD and the genocide of Jews during World War II. The nationalization of Khatyn fits with what could be called memorial authoritarianism, demonstrating the manner in which memory is used to legitimize the political regime of Lukashenka. Thus, Goujon draws a link between the memorialisation of Khatyn and national identity.

In contrast, national victimization memory in Ukraine does not incorporate the burned villages. Monuments in the immediate post-war years concentrated on the memory of the partisans. Monuments dedicated to the fighting partisan in Koriukivka or the mourning partisan in Kortelisy serve to commemorate the massacres. Goujon explained that the actual Kortelisy and Koriukivka memorials are anchored in local history. She explained that in Ukraine the memorial sites recognize mainly military victims and not civilian victims. They do not attempt to represent the Ukrainian people as a whole. If there is no national memorial site commemorating the villages burned in Ukraine, it is because Ukrainian authorities, unlike their Belarusian counterparts, did not create such a site.

The Belarusian idea of a memorial complex, unlike the single monuments in the burned villages of Ukraine, makes it possible to combine local and national memory. Professor Goujon explained that after Yushchenko came to power, he insisted primarily on the memorialisation of the famine of 1933 (with regard to civilians) and on nationalist combatants and the Red Army (with regard to the military aspect). This dual memory emphasizes coexistence rather than competition, at least in official memorial policy. The focus on the famine leads to a certain memorial disequilibrium. Therefore, these memorial differences have a direct impact on the historical knowledge of the events in question. Khatyn is the subject of official study. Historical study of Khatyn allows for the accentuation of its role in the national historiography of the country and, at the same time, the revival of the memorial complex. The restoration of the complex in 2004, in which the head of state played a personal role and to which history publications were supposed to contribute, halted the decline in the number of visitors to Khatyn since independence. In Ukraine, the Institute of National Memory, established in 2006 on the personal initiative of the president, seeks to produce “just and objective historical knowledge” on the forgotten events of Soviet historiography, such as the famine and the Ukrainian national liberation movement. Goujon concluded that this Ukrainian

memorial strategy runs the risk of “forgetting” the villages of Kortelisy and Koriukivka and their victims.

The discussant Per Rudling, from the University of Alberta, focused on inclusive and exclusive memory. He explained that even if Ukraine and Belarus suffered similar experiences during World War II, both countries approach the memory of these events quite differently. Lukashenka adopted a modified version of the Soviet narrative and Yuhshenko — the version of the Ukrainian diaspora. However, both memorialisation approaches present in-group and out-group themes which insist on Slavic and national suffering rather than the suffering experienced by other groups. Thus, there is a relative silence about the Holocaust, the suffering of the Poles, and in the case of Ukraine, a difficulty to recognize the victims of the nationalist groups during the war. For Rudling, the key to solving the issue might be a non-ethnic commemoration of historical events and suffering.

During the general discussion, Lucan Way, Per Rudling and Oxana Shevel spoke of the necessity of analyzing the strategic reasons put forward by Soviet and local governments in emphasizing certain historical narratives, the reasons why they chose these locations, and the reasons for why they were built. Alexandra Goujon, Dominique Arel, and Margarita Balmaceda discussed the role of memorialisation in Ukraine and Belarus during the Soviet period. Coming from an anthropological perspective, Margaret Paxson asked to what extent the use of memorial sites really accomplish what states expect from them? Jessica Allina-Pisano questioned the politicization of suffering and dead bodies and suggested that we should further disaggregate the idea of national commemorations.



■ **Julia Kysla** (Central European University, Hungary)
*Partisan Leader Lialia Ubyyvovk: The Creation
of a New Soviet Ukrainian Hero/ine*

Julia Kysla’s paper analyzed the politics of memory in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the post-war period by examining the case of a Poltava underground group, and in particular, one of its most prominent figures, Olena Ubyyvovk (nicknamed Lialia). The Poltava group numbered 20 persons and was primarily engaged in the distribution of information (of mainly ideological character) among the urban population. In May 1941, all main participants of Ubyyvovk’s organization were arrested by the Germans and later on executed. Already before the end of the war, the story of this group served as an example of Soviet patriotism and later became instrumentalised by the authorities. This case study is to be understood in the broader context of the post-war “unification” of the memory of World War II.

Kysla argues that various state agents and institutions, as well as writers, were involved in the creation of narratives and stories about the patriots, and played a crucial role in the pro-

duction of the public discourse on the war. Soviet officials soon realized the importance of mythologizing the partisans and underground activists who, by their very existence, served to enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet state. The codification campaign, which began in 1944, was aimed at providing a solid documentary basis for the state's claim about an all-people's war. But the creation of mythical resistors and patriotic heroes was done by the suppression of many of their actual experiences and memories. For instance, examples of mass desertion, panic and captivity were not included in the narratives. This is what happened in the case of the Poltava resistance groups, as shady areas and falsifications in archive materials reveal a story different than the one publicised by the authorities, both on the account of the detention of the group, as well as Lialia's active role in the resistance. Ideological twistings and story retellings created the heroine Lialia that history knows, a mythologized and "dehumanized" Lialia. This is an inseparable part of the official master-narrative intended to mobilize the population behind the Soviet victorious empire.

The discussant, Vladyslav Hrynevych, first emphasized the fact that such research on collective memory is very important, and although Kysla's research deals with a micro-myth, this is part of a larger myth about World War II in the Soviet Union. Although the process of demystification started in Russia, little work is currently being done in Russia on this matter, whereas in Ukraine, it is a growing field of research.

Hrynevych raised three questions in relation to this discussion: (1) why was the myth around World War II created? (2) who created those myths?, and (3) what are the societal impacts of these myths? He highlighted the different stages in the myth creation and pointed out that Stalin, who was mainly interested in fostering his own victorious image, did not play a significant role in this regard. The Khrushchev period was especially prolific, as the authorities wanted to expunge the negative wartime images in Ukraine, and in particular, the images of collaboration and treason in light of the fact that 92% of Ukrainians stayed in occupied territory during the war. Portraits of mass desertion and surrenders into captivity were to be replaced with the myth of victory.

First, the alleged number of partisans has increased over time, from 200,000 to 500,000, which is more than the number of partisans in Belarus. In 1943, as the issue of the war became uncertain, more partisans appeared. There can be parallels made between the creation of similar myths in France with De Gaulle and the resistance. Indeed, for De Gaulle, France all but rescued itself. Today's myths conveyed in Ukraine are similar to Soviet myths since World War II continues to be called the Great Patriotic War and there is a remaining heroic perception of the Red Army.

As for who created the myth, Hrynevych suggested that it was the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the bureaucrats who were not present in the occupied area. Contrary to the argument presented in Amir Weiner's book (*Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, Princeton, 2001) the creation of myths is a top-down enterprise, not a popular one. Hrynevych points out that although Kysla effectively demonstrated the creation of myths, it should be noted that such myth creation not only took place during Stalin's time,

but after as well. For Hrynevych, it is interesting to see how Lialia became such a monument for the Soviet institutions and for the youth who were taught Lialia's story.

Oxana Shevel pointed out the process of dehumanization and the reason why there is still no interest from the authorities to look at the war from an individual perspective. She argues that it demonstrates a fundamental mistrust of individual's loyalty, which is still prevalent in today's society, both in the political positions of Yushchenko and the old guard. No one is interested in personal stories because it would humanize the heroes and destroy the myths which would in turn run the risk of having no heroes left! It also raises the question of how to construct the idea of the Nation.

Oleksandr Melnyk reminded us to be careful in equating "official narratives" with those narratives that appear in the newspapers, since there were two domains in the Soviet Union: one official and one public. The official domain was closed for public communication, especially in cases of verification of partisan matters. Many of these issues were discussed by state officials from different organizations but never made public. It thus created ambiguities that have to be recognized. Research must distinguish between these two types of material. Furthermore, Melnyk recalled from his own research that many groups in Ukraine had porous borders and it is not clear what were their political allegiances, which were in fact rather flexible following the evolution of the fights between the Soviets and the Germans. Therefore, some groups disappeared from narratives and this should be accounted for as well.

Finally, Margaret Paxson highlighted the fact that individual stories with all their contradictions and inconsistencies have a very important subversive power. The reason why we don't hear about these elements of the stories is because they are of no use to the states themselves. Instead, they serve to give access to an enormity of emotions and human suffering that this period created.



■ **John-Paul Himka** (U of Alberta, Canada)

■ **Eva Himka** (U of Alberta, Canada)

Absence and Presence of Genocide and Memory : The Holocaust and the Holodomor in Interviews with Elderly Ukrainian Nationalists in Lviv

Eva and John-Paul Himka, a father-daughter team, undertook a series of interviews of elderly Ukrainian nationalists between 70 and 90 years old. The interviews were carried out in Lviv by Eva in May 2009, and contacts were found through her late great aunt who was active in Ukrainian community life. The interviews were undertaken in order to uncover existing memory of the Holocaust as it occurred in Ukraine. At the seminar, the duo provided a summary of the accounts of several interviewees, and drew attention to the common themes present in many of the responses received.

Interviewees told of their memories of the Holocaust in Ukraine and the events that they witnessed and experienced. For example, Anna Stefanivna was a leading activist in the Shkola organization and emphasized the need for education about Ukrainian culture. Dmytro Onuferko was conscripted to work in Germany during the German occupation and was eventually sent to a series of concentration camps.

For the authors, the accounts of the Ukrainian nationalists interviewed revealed a homogeneity in memory of the Holocaust, forming what the authors refer to as a “collective memory.” Several common themes were discussed. In regards to the “First Soviets,” or the Soviet administration of 1939-41, many interviewees expressed hope that these soldiers would liberate Ukraine. This hope, however, was soon disappointed due to massive arrests and deportations undertaken by Soviet soldiers. Interviewees gave accounts of the brutal NKVD murders of the summer of 1941, including the political prisoners of Solianuvatka who were shot and subsequently thrown down a mineshaft. (The father of Petro Potichnyj, one of the Danyliw 2009 panelists, was among them). All but one interviewees made the claim that the only victims of the NKVD murders were Ukrainians, completely excluding Poles and Jews, and none of the interviewees mentioned the violence (pogroms) against the Jewish population that ensued.

The Germans, for many interviewees, were a lesser evil than the Soviet soldiers. However, a similar story was told in that hopes for a German liberation were dashed as German soldiers would arrest and execute prisoners, ration food, and deport Ukrainians for forced labor in Germany. The interviewees stated that the main Soviet collaborators were Eastern Ukrainians; Western Ukrainians did not cooperate with the Soviets, but rather were the holders of true Ukrainian culture.

Several of those interviewed stated that they did not have much first-hand knowledge of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust and suggested that the Jews themselves were largely passive during their extermination. Some stated that had the Jews wanted to escape their fate, there were many opportunities they could have taken advantage of.

Interviewees described prewar Jewish-Ukrainian relations as conflict free, all the while claiming that Jews during this time tended to abuse their economic power. Many interviewees gave the impression that they had not been particularly fond of the Jews prior to the war and connected Jews to communist ideologies, claiming that they collaborated with the Soviets. All of those interviewed stated that Ukrainians were not guilty in the persecution of Jews and that many actually helped in their rescue. In addition, it was universally denied that Ukrainian police had anything to do with the Holocaust.

Regarding conflict between Ukrainians and Poles, interviewees stated that it was the Poles who first began the violent conflict, and that any Ukrainian aggression against Poles was carried out in self-defense. Interviewees spoke openly about the Holodomor, drawing similarities to the Holocaust. One individual stated that the slow starvation of the Holodomor was a worse fate to face than the shooting deaths faced by Jews.

John Paul Himka reflected on this collective memory and illuminated points of contradiction between factual evidence and the memories of those interviewed. For example, while Ukrainian police were remembered as honorable and patriotic, by Jewish accounts, they were brutal oppressors, involved in the liquidation of Lviv's Jewish population. Furthermore, according to the collective memory of interviewees, only the Germans and the Poles were responsible for carrying out violence against Jews; however the pogroms contradict such memories.

The discussant, Sofia Grachova, a doctoral student in History at Harvard University, could not attend the Seminar due to illness, but her written comments were read by Dominique Arel. Grachova centered on methodological and historical issues raised by the paper. Regarding methodology, Grachova notes that the results of the interviews were largely unsurprising and predictable given the characteristics of the interviewees: they all had common experiences of conflict with Soviet authorities. In addition, since 1991, they have been active in patriotic activities, and they have all undergone nationalist indoctrination which has confirmed their real-life experiences.

Ultimately, Grachova points out that Eva and John-Paul Himka's paper demonstrates the unreliability of Ukrainian nationalist memories regarding Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Holocaust. She states that such a collective memory could constitute a "history of forgetting." The questions that the authors raise with their paper are significant: how should such a distorted memory be interpreted, and what purpose does the study of memory serve when it denies the occurrence of well-documented events? How does one draw the links between memory and history?

In response to the question of how to draw the links between memory and history, John-Paul Himka pointed out that there is a distinct relationship between them: that while some of what the interviewees said was indeed false, there were certain memories given that are known to be true. Therefore, to a certain degree, these memories constitute the testimonies of victims. Lucan Way asked the authors whether they knew of when the collective memory of the interviewees was formed. The authors responded that such formation can be traced back to 1943 at which time a document was produced by Ukrainian authorities stating that Ukrainians must take care to tell their proper history: that they didn't undertake any pogroms. This marked the beginning of the falsifications and came at a point when Ukrainians realized they were going to lose the war. It is known that in 1943 and 1944, Ukrainians were killing Jews, all the while saying that they weren't killing Jews. Therefore, divergent memory was created right in the midst of the war.

Margaret Paxson pointed out that while memory can be used to construct history, the reverse is not true: history does not construct memory. While memory does refer to historical events, it is primarily about society and how social groups function. Collective memory reveals something about how the conceptualization of history works. So in defense of "the study of things that didn't happen," it is important to account for collective memory.

In regards to the predictability of responses from interviewees, Jessica Allina-Pisano pointed out the changing nature of memory, stating that discourse which started out stating “that didn’t happen,” has moved to “okay maybe it happened but we didn’t do it” to “okay it happened, but it was their fault.” Such a dynamic and changing nature of memory may allow for an agreement of facts to eventually emerge.

Session II

Special Presentation



■ **Adrian Karatnycky** (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of US)
Ukraine at a Crossroads: Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or a Surprise?

In this presentation, Adrian Karatnycky discussed Ukraine’s political future and the implications of the country’s upcoming presidential elections. According to Karatnycky, there are a number of factors that have profoundly transformed the Ukrainian political context in recent years. First, the elections will have a significant effect on Ukraine’s economic situation. Second, the issue of national memory seems to have become a point of consensus among all of the principal presidential candidates. Finally, a certain sense of national identity seems to have been formed by Ukrainian leaders which can be identified as the result of the five years of leadership under the current presidential team, among other factors, in the form of “political memory.” Even the election of the candidate Yanukovych would therefore be characterized by a certain continuity in this regard.

The political-economic situation, on the other hand, is not as straightforward in Ukraine but is marked by a “crossroads:” the economy has fallen by 40% and the national currency has dropped by 40-50% in value in the past year. This context has led political candidates to undertake populist campaigns and has resulted in a very aggressive rhetoric between candidates. However, on the level of political-economic positions, there is a significant convergence among the main candidates towards a classic center-right platform that is business-friendly, strongly pro-market in economic terms and which downplays the importance of relations with Russia. These positions are important, but the candidates should maintain a particular emphasis on independence and national interests if they wish to convince the nationalist majority in Ukraine. The movement toward convergence is also the result of increasing sentiment towards Ukrainian state interests and by the importance of national debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international donors.

In the past months, polls have indicated that there are no foregone conclusions in the upcoming election. Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are the main candidates with real chances of winning. However, these two candidates do not bring together the majority of votes in the polls. Several socio-economic elements are to be considered in predictions and analysis of current positions. Business interest in the energy industry, which has a very nationalist political agenda, must first be taken into consideration in light of the past energy crisis with Russia, in order to understand the positions of various political leaders. Furthermore, the dynamics

present in regional clans in Ukraine must also be understood. Finally, many issues related to Ukrainian identity must be considered. First, the polarization of national identities has created space for moderate internal cultural differences. In this regard, one could say that politicians are aiming to become national figures, rather than representing regional particularities. Finally, accession to NATO is no longer an urgent project for the majority of presidential candidates. As such, we can in some sense speak of an absence of geopolitical issues in the region, as there is currently a certain fatigue from expansion of the European Union and NATO into Eastern Europe.

According to Karatnycky, the Orange Revolution may partially explain recent developments in Ukrainian politics. This event could permit sustained change in the rules of the game of Ukrainian politics. Today, no candidate or political force can afford to violate the election rules to a large extent. The rules of a democratic electoral battle seem to have been well accepted by all candidates and their teams.

However, the similarity of positions of major political candidates cannot be explained by the Orange Revolution but by a combination of factors: the acceptance of a “sense of sovereignty” and a similar meaning of Ukrainian national interest and adherence to common representations of national identity and national memory. Today, all major candidates hold a similar discourse in regards to foreign policy and national identity. Considering the situation, all the candidates face the challenge of bridging the gap between the nationalist discourse and the political situation in the east. Furthermore, any innovative or ambitious proposal would be severely limited by the economic situation.

The failure of the pro-Western platform of Yushchenko has necessitated a return to a more centrist program. Furthermore, the “need of Ukrainian nationalism” makes it impossible to provide strong pro-Russian political leadership. Even Yanukovich has a centrist platform for the next election. No matter which candidate is elected in the forthcoming elections, the politico-economic direction taken by the government will be about the same. Much will depend, in fact, on negotiations with the IMF and other international lenders. Finally, the political choice of Ukrainians will therefore primarily be based on a question of ‘leadership style’, rather than on the basis of real alternatives in terms of politico-economic direction.

Session III

Screening of the documentary **The Holocaust by Bullets** (La Shoah par balles)
Directed by Romain Icart (France), 2008



■ **Patrice Bensimon** (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France) *The Politics of Jewish Sites of Memory in Ukraine*

Following the screening of the Icart documentary on the identification of sites of Holocaust local massacres in Ukraine, by a team led by the French priest Patrick Desbois, the Danyliw Seminar continued with Patrick Bensimon's presentation on the politics of Jewish sites of memory in Ukraine. Bensimon, a PhD candidate at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, notes that among the different republics composing the pre-World War II Soviet Union, Ukraine contained the most numerous Jewish population, (i.e., five million of 51 percent of the entire Soviet Jewish population). The Jewish presence was such that not even the war and the following period of denial could erase once and for all sites of Jewish memory.

Bensimon distinguishes between three types of sites of memory: the memorials to the Jewish victims of the Second World War, the old community buildings (synagogues, baths, Talmudic schools, Jewish hospitals) and the burial sites of charismatic rabbis that have become pilgrimage sites for religious Jews. The "management" or non-management of these sites by the Ukrainian state being a quite recent phenomenon, the question, asks Bensimon, is to know whether Ukraine is ready to integrate these sites of memory into the pantheon of national memory. Moreover, the small number of Jews remaining in Ukraine and the fact that this population is rapidly aging speaks to the urgency of a renewal of the Ukrainian state's approach to such sites. The cornerstone of an understanding of such approach, notes Bensimon, is intimately tied to the authorities' attitude towards the Holocaust.

Some important distinctions are warranted. Jewish memory, or more precisely Jews themselves, must be distinguished whether they form the national Ukrainian Jewish community, or whether they belong to the diaspora (mostly American and Canadian), for whom the Ukrainian experience stopped with the Second World War. A further distinction involves distinguishing between individual and group relationships towards sites of memory. Importantly, Bensimon notes that the Jewish community living in Ukraine seems to entertain very little individual relation to sites of memory. A final distinction involves distinguishing memory sites as symbols for national and minority cultures from memory sites as religious memory, the latter being linked to pilgrimage activities.

For Jews that left Ukraine before, during or just after World War II, remarks Bensimon, Ukraine is not necessarily the natural territory of reference. Many of these Jews left what

they regarded as Poland, Russia or the USSR, leading to only a thin reference to Jewish sites of memory as anchored in present-day Ukraine. For the contemporary Jewish Ukrainian community, on the other hand, the Holocaust and the Second World War do not constitute such a fundamental marker, especially given the long period of non-recognition and evasion that characterized the Soviet period. The priority for the Jews, notes Bensimon, is not “memorialization” but rather the more pressing issue of the recognition of a contemporary Jewish social and cultural life by the Ukrainian state and population. Finding sites for prayer or reclaiming the use of synagogues defines the current Jewish Ukrainian day-to-day much more accurately than the construction and maintenance of memorials or commemorative plaques.

Bensimon then proceeds to the analysis of the relation between Jewish sites of memory and different Ukrainian actors. The financing of these sites of memory, in Ukraine, depend on the Ministry of Culture, but intervention by the ministry cannot proceed without the action of other local organs such as museums, cities, local historical commissions or religious organizations. This complex process is compounded by the fact that very few projects for the maintenance of Jewish memory sites are actually undertaken by the state. The data collected by Bensimon suggests that over 70% of projects are funded by the Jewish community and the foreign funding supporting it. In fact, the main effort is indeed provided from abroad. No state commission is in charge of Jewish sites of memory and there exist precious little connection between state and Jewish diaspora action. Indeed, the diaspora financed initiatives seem to cater strictly to Jewish demands (domestic or foreign) and articulate few links with the larger Ukrainian “memorialization” project.

The case of the Yanovska and Belzec camps, as well as the Lysynychy Forest are telling examples. A large proportion of the 160,000 Lviv Jews were executed there, and their bodies were subsequently unearthed and burned as part of the cover-up “Operation 1005”. Yet, there is no monument commemorating these murderous events. Local authorities surveyed by Bensimon stated either that they did not know that such events happened there, or that they did not know that only Jewish victims died there. Paradoxically, Jewish pilgrims surveyed by the author also seemed poorly informed about the significance of many of the sites of Jewish memory, concentrating nearly exclusively on the tombs of charismatic rabbis.

This, concludes Bensimon, leads to and sustains a gulf of misunderstanding and disconnection between various efforts of “memorialization”, by the Ukrainian state and local Ukrainian populations, by the local Jewish community, by the North American diaspora and by ultra-Orthodox Jews. These various projects and initiatives do not feed into one another and sustain a vision of Jewish life and memory in Ukraine as non-Ukrainian. These incoherencies and insufficiencies must be corrected, says Bensimon, to talk about a truly Jewish Ukrainian heritage, rather than a Jewish heritage in Ukraine.

A short question period followed Bensimon’s presentation. Dominique Arel and Jan Grabowski asked whether the Ukrainian state put any restriction and conditions in the way of historical research on Jewish Memory, keeping in mind that such restriction seem present in Russia. Bensimon noted that while the Ukrainian state did not engage in direct “memor-

ialization” of Jewish sites, it did not lay any fundamental obstacle in conducting research. Peter Potichnyj then summed up much of scholarly advice on the need for a greater understanding between diaspora and Ukrainian Jews, and the Ukrainian population itself, on the question of each group’s sufferings at the hands of both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (Holodomor and Holocaust). Such understanding, notes Potichnyj, can only be reached by greater educational emphasis on these historical traumas.



■ **Kai Struve** (Martin Luther U, Halle-Wittenberg, Germany)
*Mass Executions and Pogroms against Jews in Eastern Galicia
in Summer 1941*

Professor Kai Struve seeks to analyze the wave of violence that occurred against Jews when the German army invaded the territories that had been occupied by the Soviet Union since September 1939 or Summer 1940. He analyzed the motives and contexts of anti-Jewish violence in Eastern Galicia during World War II. His analysis looked at the various actors that were implicated in the main violent event in the region, in Lviv, and sought to describe and disaggregate the various aspirations, perceptions, expectations and strategies of collective actors.

Struve started by giving an exhaustive description of the atrocities committed against civilians and mostly against the Jews in Galicia during the summer of 1941. He also described how the NKVD executed inmates in prisons in Western Ukraine just before the German army entered Galician territory. Altogether, probably 20,000-24,000 prison inmates were murdered in the territories of eastern Poland, mostly Ukrainians, but also Poles and Jews. Struve documented a link between Soviet NKVD crimes and the atrocities committed against the Jews when the German army and Ukrainian battalions entered Galicia. He argued that mistreatments and murders of Jews were conducted mostly by members of the local militia and local civilians, but also by German soldiers. He added that there was no agreement that had been struck between the OUN and the German occupation forces regarding pogroms.

Local civilians and Ukrainian militias forced Jews to go to the prisons, to confront the murdered inmates and to pull out the corpses from the cells or from mass-graves, to clean them and to pull carts from the prisons to the cemeteries. Jews were mocked, humiliated and beaten, and the violence became a ritual that put the guilt for the Soviet crimes on the Jews. The view that Jews not only were the main supporters and beneficiaries of Soviet rule in 1939-1941, but that Jews basically represented the core of Bolshevism and of the Soviet regime in general was prevalent within the higher ranks of the Nazi regime and its police forces. This view was also shared by many officers of the German armed forces, and constituted a decisive factor for the development of the German course of action against the Jews during the first weeks of the war, paving the way for the policy of all-out murder that was adopted during August and September of 1941. From a German perspective, Jews held a different importance for the war against the Soviet Union than in previous wars.


Struve explained that the anti-Jewish violence of the summer 1941 was a symptom of the fact that this region was a contested space between empires, ideologies, nations and religions. Different conflicts focused in specific ways on the Jews during this short period of time. The anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as communists was not isolated from other anti-Semitic prejudices. Nevertheless, the view that Jews had supported the Soviet occupation in the area, had participated in and benefited from the suppression and persecution of other national groups and, more generally, had constituted in a way the “core” of the Soviet regime, was a perception that was widespread among the local population as well as the local nationalist political activists and was also shared by the Germans. Struve concluded that the radicalization of violence in summer and fall 1941 in Galicia was not the result of Soviet crimes against civilians, but the result of the identification of “Bolsheviks” and “Jews” as the same target. Therefore, the war against the Soviet Union also became a war of annihilation against the Jews.

The discussant, Professor Jan Grabowski, from the Department of History at the University of Ottawa, suggested that the sense of fear and terror present during this period could be used to study the Holocaust in a different way. He proposed to use the archives of thousands of testimonies of Jews who experienced violence in Eastern Galicia in 1941 to contextualize Struve’s work. He discussed the mutilations on inmates, which would have been committed by Ukrainian militias to incite the population to riot against the Jews. He also brought up the method in which the Jews were punished, tortured and murdered in the prisons. Grabowski agreed with Struve about the fact that Jews were killed because they were associated with Bolshevism but he also adds that they were killed because they were Jews and especially because there were no penalties for doing so.

During the discussion, Karatnycky brought forward the argument that Ukrainian nationalist were mostly concerned with establishing a Ukrainian state and thus he disagreed with the idea that their attention was strictly turned against the Jews. He also questioned whether or not there existed a coherent structure to these massacres involving all Ukrainian nationalists. Jessica Allina-Pisano pointed out that we should focus on the victims and their suffering and not the memory of responsibility and the memory of our relatives. John Paul Himka discussed the difference between our perception of the Ukrainian state now and how Ukrainian nationalists perceived it at that time. Potichnyj, Himka, and others suggested that the local population and local leadership were not always responsible for mobilisation and collaboration with German occupation forces.

Session IV

*Presentation and discussion of the autobiography **My Journey** (Litopys UPA, Series “Events and People”, Book 4, Toronto-Lviv, 2008)*



■ **Peter Potichnyj** (McMaster U, Canada)

Peter Potichnyj began his presentation with an explanatory note on why he decided to write “My Journey” and why this was specifically written in English, stating that his motives arose from the desire to share his past with his grandchildren and to be able to explain to them his family history. Potichnyj’s power point presentation mainly consisted of images and photographs of the area in which he was born in and had lived.

Potichnyj was one of a set of triplets and both of his parents were teachers. At the age of 11 he lost his father who was executed under accusations of being a dangerous nationalist. His father’s body was disposed of in a salt-mine, Potichnyj explained, and was never found. One of his slides depicted a monument in Salina, where prisoners from Peremysh, along with his own father, were brought for execution. Another “memory of broader significance,” Potichnyj recounted, was the Preobrazhenska church in Lviv, which he had attended seven days a week as a little boy, as it was mandatory at that time. These circumstances are discussed in the first part of “My Journey” which is divided into a trilogy, Potichnyj explained, in a similar vein to his life as a triplet.

The second part of the book accounts for Potichnyj’s time in the United States, his service at the Marine Corps during the Korean War, followed by his university life in the United States. Potichnyj then moved to Canada and pursued an academic career. He explained in his presentation that he is not a historian and therefore chose to begin his story later on in the historical timeline, starting when Ukraine was a part of Poland in the interwar period. Those were the times, the author explained, when people in Ukraine began to fight for what they believed in and wanted to be a part of the liberation struggle. The UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) was formed during the war and had strong links to the larger society which gave the movement power. In his presentation, Potichnyj compared this situation to the war in Afghanistan since the tactics of the UPA forces were somewhat similar to those which we see being employed today.

Potichnyj then went on to discuss the importance of distinguishing clearly between “UPA” and “OUN-UPA,” stating that the use of the latter seems to be very fashionable in the academic world. The basic difference, he says, is as follows: the OUN was a political organization, whereas the UPA was a military organization. Potichnyj believes it is incorrect to refer to the organization as the OUN-UPA as each organization has a different history and terms of recruitment.

Potichnyj came from an area located west of the new international border between Poland and the Soviet Union, as determined in Yalta. At the end of the war, ethnic Ukrainians in this area were targeted for murder or deportation. He joined the UPA in 1945, at the age of 14,

after his entire village was wiped out by Polish insurgent forces. Potichnyj talked about the impact that the UPA had on him, stating that it was a meaningful time and served to make him into a better person. To demonstrate his point, Potichnyj explains that he once used to hate everyone but Ukrainians but that the UPA forced this hatred to disappear and taught him to fight for an independent Ukraine and to protect Ukraine from enemies, regardless of the nationalities of those enemies.

Potichnyj's powerpoint slides guided the audience through the UPA movement as it took shape in Poland. He briefly mentioned that he believes it to be a mistake to have sent raids to Czechoslovakia, and states that breaking the teams into smaller groups and giving them much better equipment would have made an important difference. Potichnyj expressed his disappointment of having lost so many men in that operation.

An argument that Potichnyj made at the end of his speech was for the importance of Litopys UPA – the chronicle of the insurrection that he had been editing in the past decades — as the most trustworthy original source of information, stating that each volume of Litopys now does have an English introduction, but needs to be made available in full in English language as well. Concluding the speech, Potichnyj stressed that the war was started by two men who were not interested in the good of the people but rather in genocide, and while one was punished in history, the other was exempt. This, Potichnyj finds, has been absolutely unacceptable.

In the discussion, Dominique Arel, asked the speaker to describe the chain of events that led him into joining the underground movement. The answer to the question raised was simple, as Potichnyj explained, in that his family experienced a great deal of oppression throughout this time, and joining the underground was the only possible way to survive, escape and protect his family. Events in his life occurred so that it was by accident and chance that most of his family remained alive when his village was destroyed.

Margarita Balmaceda wanted to hear more about the editorial process of the Litopys volumes and if there were other publications to compete with Litopys. Potichnyj answered that the documents were published in two series: the basic series (46 volumes), and the new series (13 volumes), which are based on archives in Ukraine and are published unaltered. He also explained that the documents are being accounted for according to territory. That is, as many documents as possible are collected from one territory, and are then compiled along with an introduction, which serves to describe the volume to the reader. Overall, he stated, the approach is very objective and what must be kept in mind is that when the documents from underground sources are published, they are not mixed with the Soviet sources. It is then up to the researchers to seek different resources from Poland or Russia. Potichnyj concluded his presentation by encouraging all to be very careful when talking about the involvement of Ukrainians in any kind of violent action, and to conduct diligent research using many resources on this very complex matter.



■ **Olena Petrenko**

(Ruhr U Bochum, Germany)

Women in the Armed Ukrainian Underground, 1942-1954

Throughout this session, Mr, Adrian Karatnychy, Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council of the US discussed the situation between Ukraine and NATO in the aftermath of the NATO Summit that was held in December of 2008. Mr. Dominique Arel, director of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies of the University of Ottawa, discussed the impacts that the 2008 August war between Russia and Georgia might have on the upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The panellists expressed three distinct positions concerning the current political conditions in Ukraine which consist of the following: The Russian-Georgian conflict has not had any foreseeable impacts on Ukrainian public opinion with regards to the proposed support of joining NATO, and it is very probable that Ukraine will receive a Plan of Action (MAP) from NATO in the near future, and that the political instability in Ukraine is caused by a deep structural problem resulting from ongoing competition between two executives in power at head of the state.

The conflict that took place in August of 2008 between Georgia and Russia has been a test for analysing the development of Ukrainian public opinion. According to Professor Arel, following the Russian invasion of parts of Georgia, observers should have expected a crystallization of Ukrainian public opinion and a movement in favour of Ukraine joining NATO. However, this expected outcome did not occur. On the contrary, the parliament, the elites, and the Ukrainian population revealed to be divided in regards to their opinions concerning relations with Russia. Three major political figures, including Mr. Yushchenko, Mrs. Timoshenko and Mr. Yanukovych illustrate this point well as they have all taken opposite positions concerning this matter. In addition, it seems that a good portion of the Ukrainian population would prefer to maintain a rather neutral position in regards to the conflict and increasingly its relations with Russian and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, Mr. Arel notes that due to this, reaching a popular consensus for progress towards Ukrainian membership in NATO will be a difficult task to accomplish in the near future.

With this in context, Mr. Karatnycky notes that it is unlikely that Ukraine will receive a MAP during the next meeting among NATO foreign affairs ministers that will be held in December as well as in the following one next year. In regards to the Alliance, the lack of popular consensus and current instabilities within the Ukrainian political system has prevented it from taking a clear decision with regards to this matter. Moreover, Mr. Karatnycky has observed that the willingness of the population as well as the effects of the global economic crisis seems to put the process of integration on hold among the leading elites in Ukraine.

The multitude of different reactions taken throughout the Ukrainian political class faced with the Russian-Georgian conflict, as a recent issue, demonstrates the internal divisions and instability of the current Ukrainian political system. In essence, Mr. Arel recalls that the

Ukrainian regime entered, this fall, a third constitutional crisis since the election of president Yushchenko. This demonstrates that the Ukrainian political system is struggling through a structural crisis, wherein the principal cause lies in the presence of two executive powers at the head of the state. In addition, Mr. Arel notes that these political crises are produced in an ambiance that is characterized by little respect for the rule of law as well as instability among political actors. Thus, this could lead to dangerous situations.

However, it has also been observed that political actors on the Ukrainian front do not have a history of resorting to violence throughout such conflicts and have a tendency to continue to respect the democratic process. Moreover, in spite of the dividing rhetoric produced by some of the major political figures, none have proposed any form of radical ideological political orientations. In addition, Mr. Karatnycky notes that the government has stayed quite moderate during the recent years; in spite of major changes within the government. This stability can be partially attributed to the large presence of business people in all political groups within Ukraine as well as a certain satisfaction towards economic developments throughout Ukraine. Finally, the anticipated parliamentary elections, following the dissolution of government by president Yushchenko, is subject to strong resistance, particularly from Mrs. Timoshenko – a resistance that observers have difficulty explaining. The assumption made in response to this evokes some of the negative effects the global financial crisis has had in Ukraine, which conversely, enforces larger restraints and divisions among political actors which have appeared in political camps following the Russian-Georgian crisis.

During the question period, Professor Lucan Way noted that since the Orange Revolution, pluralism and democratic competition have been intensified in Ukraine. He also questioned what the panellists think might be the reasons or motivations behind the polarisation of President Yushchenko's political positions throughout the last couple of months. Mr. Karatnycky responded by noting that many of these are short term electoral tactics rather than long term political strategies. In addition, Mr. Arel also notes that he does not believe that President Yushchenko and his political circle viewed his positions to be polarising but that the problem causing the lack of support for his policies can rather be attributed to a problem of comprehension on behalf of the Ukrainian population, mainly due to Ukraine's Soviet history. Moreover, professor Tucker noted that in spite of the negative effects of such a scenario, imposing a pause on the adhesion into NATO by Ukrainian authorities will allow the population to put aside some of the main conflicting disagreement with regards to NATO as well as its relations towards Russia. In this, Mr. Karatnycky agreed by adding that the possibility of this outcome would work in favour for the creation of a technocratic government which would ensure a period of relative stability in its socio-economic developments. However, Mr. King notes that this is contrary to the direction that has been taken by the Alliance during the Bucharest Summit in the fall of 2008; while this was engaged, at least verbally, in favour of a Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO.

Session V



■ **Oxana Shevel** (Tufts U, US)

Political Memory of the OUN-UPA in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine

While the world celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the struggle faced by the old Soviet republics to come to terms with the new political environment was met with significant challenge in the recognition of some as heroes and some as traitors to national independence. In her presentation, Oxana Shevel tackled the divisions that threaten national unity by focusing on the OUN-UPA. As a point of departure, Shevel quoted historian Yaroslav Hrytsak who summarizes this divide well: «For Lviv and Western Ukraine, UPA combatants are heroes, perhaps the biggest heroes in the Ukrainian struggle for independence. But for Eastern Ukraine, the UPA is a group of traitors and collaborators. The UPA is the most controversial phenomenon in the history of Ukraine. Nothing divides our society more.» Shevel seeks to respond to the main question: How can this particular split known as the problem of OUN-UPA in Ukraine be resolved? Shevel supports the importance of de-centering political recognition through the democratization of memory, or even of de-essentializing collective historical memory. The recognition of a collective historical memory contributes to the fragmentation of Ukrainian society and national unity. To support her argument, Shevel conducted a comparative case study of Ukraine and Spain to try to see how the reconciliation process in Spain might be useful in providing solutions to Ukrainian divisions. While acknowledging major differences between the two cases and the impossibility of transposing the Spanish model onto Ukraine, Shevel believes that Spain's refusal to impose a common historical memory on Spaniards and its recognition of the right that citizens have to a personal and familial memory could inspire Ukrainian elites.

Shevel points to the dominant discourses present in Spain and Ukraine respectively. While the Franco supporters saw Republicans as heroes and Communists as villains, historical discourse in Ukraine was predominantly Soviet in that the heroes and bandits were seen in an opposite manner to the Spanish case. While in the Spanish case, there was a political willingness for compromise, or a “pact of forgetting,” no such pact existed in Ukraine. Indeed, in Spain, elites have been able to agree on reforms that have promoted the country's democratization process. In short, the pact of forgetting has forced the victims of the Franco regime into silence, which is ultimately seen to serve the best interests of the nation. It was not until 2007 that the Socialist Party majority was able to pass the Law of Historical Memory. This law recognizes and extends the rights of victims of the civil war and the Franco dictatorship, promotes personal and family memory and takes action to suppress division with the aim of bringing about social cohesion. Shevel supports the neutrality of the law in terms of its political and democratic dimensions as they relate to historical memory since it allows for the existence of any version of memory.

Returning to the case of Ukraine, Shevel noted that Ukraine imposed a common historical memory on its citizens during the process of democratization. According to the author, some segments of the Ukrainian population have been excluded in the restoration of the OUN and UPA. While she recognizes the existence of legislative initiatives in Ukraine, Shevel argues that the law was too selective and discriminatory and thus served to maintain the split in Ukrainian society.

Can the OUN-UPA problem be solved by following the Spanish model? Shevel argued that Ukraine will not be able to follow the Spanish model due to the belief that Ukrainian players hold in a shared memory, and that such memory is necessary to ensure national unity. However, Shevel also argues that the Spanish model can inspire Ukraine in the sense that it encourages the abandonment of a monolithic version of national memory. She believes that the propensity of elites to force an official memory down the throats of the Ukrainian people means that memory has become an official source of tension and ultimately weakens national unity.

The theory of democratic consolidation claims that economic progress is a prerequisite for the democratization of memory. This view is supported by the Spanish model. In keeping with this argument, Shevel believes that the democratization of memory may itself become the basis for national unity in Ukraine. She argues in favor of a normative assessment of the events of the past by individuals and groups without the need to submit to a simplistic official truth. But Shevel warns against any glorification of the OUN-UPA whose members were involved in violence against civilians. It is at this point that the comments of Marie-Christine Doran, the discussant, are relevant.

Indeed, after stressing the scientific nature of Shevel's paper, Doran raised three issues related to the reconciliation process, the feasibility of comparing the Ukrainian and Spanish cases, and the consequences of a dogmatic application of the Spanish model as seen in Latin America. Doran argued that reconciliation encourages impunity and carries with it the seeds of social destabilization. For Spain, it was less a question of rehabilitation than the acceptability of state violence. On the second point, Doran believes that the issue of responsibility in mass state violence was more pertinent in the Spanish case. Finally, violence in Latin America has its roots in impunity connected to the reconciliation process. In this context, rather than an official recognition of the fighters of the OUN-UPA, she recommends a broad public debate around the violence committed by both parties. Subsequent interventions would be in line with the democratization of memory.

In the general discussion, Vladyslav Hrynevych, pointed out the problem of identity by focusing on Russian domination that has increased the difficulty of building a Ukrainian identity. In a similar vein, Margarita Balmaceda explained the power held by electoral actors in post-Soviet societies in the formation of memory and the manner in which such actors used these interests to selfish ends.



■ **Dominique Arel** (U of Ottawa, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, Canada)
Ukraine, the War, and the Principle of Collective Responsibility

Dominique Arel concluded the day with a presentation on memory and the concept of collective responsibility. He argued that there are three dimensions of memory: as a morality play, as a witness to history, and as an interpretative paradigm. A morality play is black and white—the good versus evil or the innocent victims versus the guilty enemy, and often leads to the essentialization of ethnic groups. Arel brought up the example of Orendour-sur-Glane, a French village destroyed by a German SS division in 1944. The fact that several of the murderers were Alsatians, and this citizens of France in 1939, is blocked out. Collective memory implies that ethnic groups are organic beings. Essentialization often comes from the state, but it can also come from collective memory. In Ukraine, we see a clash between Eastern and Western memories, which both make claims to be authentic. Memory as witness to history insists on the unreliability of collective memory. Indeed, people did not often experience for themselves the historical events but learned from or internalized collective narratives.

Historical memoirs and the oral histories of non-politically engaged people might help with memory construction, but Arel proposed a third possibility to that end, which he defined as an interpretive paradigm, that is, the manner in which scholars, historians, and even individuals can reshape the past without falling into the trap of essentialization, suggested that the idea of an interpretative paradigm is divided in two points. First, we should use the metaphor as an heuristic tool to understand historical events from a new angle. This would be useful in understanding the debate surrounding Father Patrick Desbois and the coining of the term “Holocaust by Bullets” or “Shoah par balles”. The metaphor of Auschwitz as the epitome of evil might certainly be true, but Arel explained that Auschwitz was the second part of the Shoah, while Ukraine experienced the first, claiming 1.5 millions victims. By coining “Holocaust by Bullets”, it seems that a shift occurred from an industrial and impersonal Auschwitz, to the example of Baby-Yar in Ukraine and the site of massacres at the micro-level of violence. This could be referred to as a shift to a micro-level genocide. Arel explained that the coining of the term “Holocaust by Bullets” might help us in rethinking our understanding of World War II. The same point could be made about the Holodomor and how it helps to understand famine no longer as a “natural” phenomenon in modern history.

Arel then postulated that it additionally helps us in understanding the shift from a state-centric approach based on national interest to a micro-level approach examining human rights. The study of the Holocaust transformed during the 1970s and 1980s from essentialization to a human-rights and civilian victimization approach. This shift leads us to think about the principle of collective responsibility which was used all over the Soviet Union by different actors including the German forces, partisans, NKVD, Red Army, OUN, UPA, and Polish forces among others. Arel stated that the principle of collective responsibility is indefensible in any context if one’s level of analysis includes individual or non-state actors in the process of nation building. He explained that events need to be put in the context of how actors understood the situation. Many factors such as disloyalty, justice, and fear could be analyzed,

but even in these cases, the principle of collective responsibility is indefensible. It is ethically, morally and also politically indefensible if your point of analysis is human rights. Finally, he concluded that it is additionally indefensible to represent perpetrators as collectively responsible.

During the discussion, Professor Arel and other contributors discussed the ethical questions surrounding insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the responsibility of partisans and other actors. Discussion emerged about the difference between individual and collective responsibility in different cases such as in Ukraine and Canada. Jessica Allina-Pisano brought up the importance of the distinction of collective responsibility and argued that we should also be discussing whether or not individual victims were armed while engaged in active resistance. Charles King talked in favor of self-imposed collective responsibility. He agreed on the point of collective responsibility in the context of an armed conflict. However, as it relates to national tradition, he does not see how we can move forward. We should not analyze the case of Ukraine, Poland, the Soviet Union and what was done in the name of national tradition differently than we have done for Germany. King agrees on the fact that we should look at individual moral responsibility but we don't need to move away from collective responsibility. Arel addressed these points by discussing non-resistance, engagement in political violence, collective rights and collective memory, self-imposed collective responsibility, and deportation in the name of the state. He explained that the use of the principle of collective responsibility is indefensible when we talk about mass violence. The responsibility of the current generation is more of a civic responsibility vis-à-vis groups that speak in the name of a national group.



Saturday 31 October

Session VI



■ **Oleksandr Melnyk** (U of Toronto, Canada)
Archives, Repression, and the Politics of Historical Knowledge in Ukraine, 1942-1944

The paper by Oleksandr Melnyk, a doctoral student in History at the University of Toronto, had two objectives. The first was to specify the role of the UGA NKVD (Department of State Archives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in the process of wartime repression. The second was to highlight the significance of this institution in the politics of historical knowledge in the USSR during World War II. Melnyk argued that Soviet archivists provided vital informational support for the punitive organs of the Soviet state in the process of identifying "war criminals," "collaborators," and other "enemies of the people" by collecting and surveying captured archival documents. These archivists played a

crucial role in defining the contours of wartime repression and in selecting specific targets. In addition, they were very much involved in the official politics of history. The most important contribution of these professionals was in the creation of the “Archive” of the occupation, which has ever since been used not only by the Stalinist propaganda establishment and Soviet historians, but also by many contemporary scholars both in Ukraine and abroad.

In 1942, “Circular No.1”, as it came to be known among Soviet archivists at the time, required that all the documentation of the Nazi occupation authorities and of auxiliary administrations discovered in the newly “liberated” territories, as well as materials of Bolshevik organizations and partisan units, be immediately secured to be used in their subsequent criminal-investigative and scholarly uses. Melnyk explained how the punitive organs handled the information supplied by the UGA NKVD. It appears that the so-called Special Department of the NKVD/MVD of the USSR and its regional offshoot played a particularly important role in the daily functioning of the machinery of repression in the USSR. In addition to NKVD/NKGB (People’s Commissariat of State Security) investigations, other types of informational work during the war included party and NKVD/NKGB- conducted verifications of partisan units and underground groups, the creation of the so-called “Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities of German Fascists and their Henchmen,” and the “Commission for the Study of History of the Great Patriotic War.”

The Soviet modernist imperative of rendering societal structures legible and free of “enemy elements” combined all of these ventures with an impetus placed on producing and selectively putting into the public space “knowledge” about the experiences of certain groups of Soviet citizens for the purpose of political education. The objective of fostering the politically conscious Soviet individual was to be achieved by familiarizing the public with the examples of the Soviet country’s tragic yet glorious wartime past. Ultimately, both repressive and productive impulses converged around the overarching goal of winning the war and legitimating the Communist party rule and Stalin’s leadership in the process.

Melnyk mentioned a second objective of the Soviet authorities which consisted of disguising Soviet war crimes as Nazis atrocities. The massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest in the spring of 1940 is one such emblematic case of falsification of historical records. For if the Nazis were enemies of the “Soviet people” and by extension of humanity as a whole, it was only logical to conclude that the Soviets, as the enemies of the Third Reich, were the saviours of humanity.

Melnyk then presented the case of the preparation of the brochure “Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalists as Agents of German Fascism” in order to illustrate the rather paradigmatic method of the UGA NKVD in dealing with the past. After investigating the matter, it was decided that the results would not be published. The decision was dictated by the appearance of new data about the attitude of “Nationalists” towards the war and Nazi occupiers and its factual “mistakes.”

Melnyk concluded by saying that while it is true that in order to function, the Stalinist state relied on cooperation, willing or coerced, of a wide strata of Soviet society, it is also true that

contributions by different agents were a priori asymmetrical. In this sense, the experiences of the personnel of the UGA NKVD are very instructive. Given their numerical strength, their role both in the domain of state directed repression and in the realm of the politics of history in the USSR during World War II was disproportionate to their numbers.

Charles King, who served as discussant, pointed out the layering of information that one may find when working on archives. In his reading, Melnyk's paper addresses three issues. The first is the key role of archivists and state agents in securing the memory of the Second World War and in the post-war repression. The work of these people was critical in the way the war was conceptualized by the Soviets and the way they arrested alleged collaborators. The second issue is the apparent clash between the archivists' sense of professional ethics versus the political instrumentalisation by the authorities of the knowledge they secured since they see themselves as protectors of knowledge. Finally, King recognized that the paper offers a great insight of the politics of historical knowledge. The enormous amount of archival material represents snapshots of the reality of the time which might actually be richer than the real lived experience, which is sometimes the opposite of what we think. For example, historians who write about the Russian revolution will look at documents and write about the Russian provisional government that produced so many documents about itself, while at the same time, people living in that era might not even know that such provisional government ever existed.

King then argued that although the paper is very good at investigating particular cases, it is important to have more arguments and draw more conclusions. The information that was produced served many more purposes besides repression. There exists a clash between two archive-obsessed societies: the Nazis and the Soviets and the shape of information that was recaptured ended up influencing at great length the nature of the post-war society. After the war, these documents were used for other purposes as well. For example, they were used to claim property rights in occupied cities. Jewish evacuees and returnees who were on a Nazi list in 1941 used these very lists to claim property rights after the war. Finally, King brought our attention to a critical social situation mentioning that for the last thirty years, people had been shaping information in a certain way, whether it was in the context of denouncing neighbours or responding to census. Society was involved in this ritualistic manner of reporting information that represented actionable intelligence that could be used by State agents.

Melnyk responded by saying that archivists also think in historical terms and for them the war was a grandiose historical event that has to be documented. This is why clashes with the authorities take place. The NKVD only needed information for repression purposes and could get rid of the documents afterwards, whereas the archivists wanted to protect knowledge. He acknowledged that documents can be used for different agendas but on the issue of denunciation, Melnyk says that the paper specifically challenges the perception that Soviets were relying mainly on archived documents for denunciation and that in fact such documents were not the primary vehicle for repression.

Jan Grabowski reminded us that we have to properly understand the primary evidence that is left behind. We are left with a very partial view because many documents were destroyed.

Evidence has been preserved not only for identifying people and for repression but also as materialistic and mainly real estate documents.

Vladyslav Hrynevych mentioned the fact that a partisan commission was created in Kyev in 1944 and opened an exhibition on partisans but the Soviets closed it in the late 1940s. Hrynevych suggested that Stalin was not interested in glorifying the partisans, as such an endeavor was not very useful for him. On that matter, Alexandra Goujon added that Stalin did not want partisans to become powerful and did not want the myth of the partisans to allow them to gain power.

Dominique Arel asked the speaker to discuss the dynamics of rural versus urban Commissions. Melnyk responded that the two main differences are that not as many high profile people were involved and that in rural areas, the collection of information was not as efficient. Finally, Iuliia Kysla asked a question about the autonomy of the archivists prior to 1938, before the KNVD took over, to which Melnyk responded that before 1938, the NKVD would send requests and archivists would respond, but after that, the take over led to a complete assimilation and the dismissal of many employees.

Session VII

New Research on the Political Economy of Ukraine

■ **Viatcheslav Avioutskii** (École des dirigeants et créateurs d'entreprises, Paris, France)
The Consolidation of Business Clans in Ukraine

(Forthcoming)



■ **Margarita Balmaceda** (Seton Hall U, US)
Rents of Energy Dependency and Energy Policy and Political Development in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania

During her presentation, Balmaceda discussed a book project that allowed her to analyze the relationship between pension systems and energy policies in three countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The project has enabled the author to evaluate how these states have managed their relations of energy dependent nations with external actors. Balmaceda's approach has particularly helped to shed light on the manner in which researchers generally understand the relationship of energy dependence and the role that dependent countries play in such relations. Rather than taking for granted that the three states in question are passive actors and are solely influenced by their energy supplier, Russia,

the analysis has instead demonstrated the manner in which these states and their elites have used their positions of energy dependence in different ways.

The energy policies of these three countries have been relatively different over the last two decades. In Ukraine, despite an official policy of diversification, the country's capacities have never fully been used and all efforts at consensus have been abandoned or abused. In Belarus, the author noted large discrepancies during the period under study, at the level of national energy policy. In fact, from the early 1990s to 2006, no energy diversification policies were put into action. On the other hand, throughout this period, the state strongly defended its economic autonomy by protecting firms in the energy field from takeovers by foreign interests (mainly Russian capital). In Lithuania, official policy has tended towards diversification since the early 1990s. However, this approach has not been very efficient for various political and economic reasons.

Within this context, an important question emerges as to why in a country like Ukraine where energy dependence is so great, the political elite did nothing to change the situation. To answer this question, the author proposes the need to better understand the connection between energy dependent relationships and energy rents. Balmaceda divided this issue into three categories: the processes of extraction, distribution and reintroduction of energy rents into the political economy of the country in question. On the level of extraction, energy rents should be divided into two categories: internal and external. In Ukraine, the potential for extracting energy rents is huge due to the level of domestic consumption and high intensity of transit that takes place between Ukraine and Europe. While Ukraine may be poor in terms of energy outputs, it is rich in terms of (possibilities for) energy rents.

Extending this analysis to the other countries in question, we see that in Belarus, the main source of rents are external and are much less substantial than in Ukraine, and in Lithuania, the potential for internal or external rents played a lesser role than in Ukraine and Belarus. At the distribution level, Ukraine has been characterized during the period from 1995 to early 2000 (during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma), as a system of equal distribution between various internal political-economic clans. This system was mainly managed by the president and allowed him to remain in power. In Belarus, rents were paid to the government but also partly to the presidential administration in order to strengthen the hierarchy within the political system. Finally, in Lithuania, as the level of energy rents was much lower, they were distributed to fewer actors.

The issue of the reincorporation (recycling) of rents in the energy system and within domestic economic policy is also one of the main components that explains the internal dynamics of the three countries. In Ukraine, the distribution of important energy rents would, according to the author, "produce" the main political actors on the national political scene. As a result, diverse power structures in Ukraine are formed which explain internal political instability in the country as well as the inability of political elites to agree on, inter alia, a national energy policy. In Belarus, President Lukashenka's ability to use and centralize a significant portion of these rents would allow the energy industry to solidify his political power. Finally, in

Lithuania, given their lower levels in comparison to Ukraine and Belarus, energy rents do not have a major impact on national politics.

In conclusion, while energy rents exist in many countries that are poor in energy resources, Ukraine is a special case in that its high rents make it easier for politicians to appropriate these rents, a phenomenon that is fed by the absence of real attempts to address problems within established elite circles. This analysis has allowed for the understanding of how and why, in countries where large external energy rents were available, the political elite was unwilling to act to promote energy diversification. This project has also helped to deepen knowledge about the phenomenon of the «resource curse» which is also generally associated with rent-seeking. Finally, according to the author, only an external shock or rapidly rising energy prices could help change Ukraine's energy dependent situation.

Session VIII



■ **Tetiana Kostiuchenko** (U of Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine)
The 'Komsomol Economy' Twenty Years Later

The paper, co-authored with Mychailo Wynnyckyj, was presented by Tetyana Kostiuchenko. She started her report with a citation from the inauguration speech of President Yushchenko which begins “*We will establish a democratic government -- honest, professional and patriotic...*”. Has the Ukraine lived up to this promise? The purpose of the paper was to answer this question by showing the extent to which there has been a circulation of political elites in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. According to the authors, the old Soviet-trained elite is still alive and thriving in Ukraine. Their argument is derived from Wilfredo Pareto's theory of understanding revolution as a process of constant circulation of power elites, by which the ruling elite is replaced by a new but related ascendant political class. The authors argued that what keeps elite members in power are their networks of informal relationships that derive from a common background, political experiences and shared history.

The authors set their particular analysis within a time frame that spans 2002 to today. Their analysis of changes in the membership of Ukraine's political elite over time shows that Yushchenko's implied promise, as noted above, to change the composition of the government was only partially kept. After the 2006 Parliamentary elections which were supposed to weed out members of the old regime, 198 deputies and ministers (i.e. 39% of the total elite) from the previous pre-Orange Revolution elite remained in power positions while 271 Kuchma-era elite members (53.2% of the total) were replaced. In the aftermath of the 2007 early parliamentary election campaign, 62 additional Kuchma-era political elite members were replaced, but 121 newcomers from 2006 were also circulated. From the presented analysis, one can conclude that although some elite circulation did occur in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, former CPU and Komsomol functionaries were not replaced by a non-“communist” counter-elite during the course of Yushchenko's presidency. On the con-

trary, although the number of former CPU leaders who held high office in Ukraine during the Kuchma era diminished after 2004, given that biographical analysis shows that there is a prevalence of former Komsomol activists over former CPU activists within the current political elite (44 Komsomol and 36 CPU actors identified), the relative power of former Komsomol leaders in post-Orange Ukraine actually increased.

These findings elicited a number of comments from discussant Wsevolod W. Isajiw (University of Toronto) who focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the paper. Isajiw was unable to attend the Seminar due to illness, but his written comments were read aloud. For Isajiw, the authors assume that what keeps elite members in power are their networks of informal relationships that derive from common backgrounds and common experiences. Hence they analyze the informal linkages among the current parliamentarians in Ukraine to assess the differences in the background and mutual ties of those parliamentarians that were elected after the Orange Revolution and those who were in parliament before. If such differences exist, then one can conclude that the Orange Revolution produced what true revolutions should produce, i.e., a circulation of power elites.

First of all, Isajiw argued, the analysis showed one outstanding result: among both the new and the old members of parliament the individuals who were affiliated with the Komsomol during their formative years have gained the top political elite positions in spite of the Orange Revolution. But in another sense, the paper raises more questions than it answers: If the Orange Revolution did not produce a full change in the elite as its end result, was there at least a move toward elite replacement by completely new groups? What happened to them, he asked. What were their biographies and their life trajectories after the Revolution? These questions go unanswered in the paper. More broadly, if the Orange Revolution was not a social-political revolution, then what kind of revolution was it?

A second discussant, Natalka Patsiurko of Concordia University, expressed her respect for the research shown in the paper, but concentrated mostly on methodological problems by suggesting that the authors should have added more details, such as interviews with some ex-Komsomol leaders. Indeed, the paper presentation triggered a very intensive discussion among participants: Maryna Bazylevich, Margarita Balmaceda and Lucan Way all expressed different positions.

In response to these and other questions from the floor, Kostiuhenko emphasized that the five main ties of modern Ukrainian political elite (political, business, civic, kinship, and educational) were what allowed them to maintain their hold on power. In response to the methodological question, she explained that the complete network data included 492 biographies of political elite members, including all 450 deputies of the Ukrainian Parliament plus Ministers of the Cabinet of Ministers and high-level functionaries within the Presidential Secretariat. Their 'life-stories' were collected from several official sources that were considered reliable.

In summarizing the discussion the presenter made a very insightful conclusion: if Ukraine's political elite is to be "cleansed" of its Soviet past, then the importance of 'who you know' will

eventually have to be replaced with a meritocratic system of elite recruitment and circulation. More importantly perhaps, regardless of public promises made during the dramatic events of 2004, such real elite change seems to be a distant promise for today's Ukraine.



■ **Maryna Bazylevych** (SUNY Albany/U of Indiana, US)
The Informal Economy in the Ukrainian Health Sector

In her presentation, Maryna Bazylevych took up the question of the role of the informal economy in the Ukrainian health care system, one of the most corrupt sectors in the country. Her research, which drew from 150 interviews of health care specialists in Ukraine, demonstrates that the general functioning of the health care system involves the use of informal practices. Bazylevych seeks to understand the manner in which practitioners in this system perceive their participation and role in this informal economy.

Ukraine's health sector certainly contains many ills inherited from the Soviet system, and although informal payments for medical services are ubiquitous and accepted by all, they are still very poorly documented. Unstable conditions influenced by state policy as well as the poverty in which the system operates, demonstrate the wider challenges inherent to the health sector despite the existence of state funding. Moreover, an atmosphere of mistrust is present within the population towards authorities, health care personnel, and institutions.

Since health care is not yet available to all, it is easier to resort to informal payments in order to gain access to health care. Despite the handicap that informal practices place on the development of a competitive state system, health care specialists do not perceive the situation as a completely negative phenomenon, since it ultimately allows them to accumulate greater resources. The author views these exchanges between patient and specialist as an interactive process. Rather than a pyramid system, it can be seen as a series of practices and points of contact between professionals and their patients who have access to their expertise.

In Ukraine, this phenomenon is common and does not seem to be hidden from the general population. On the contrary, these practices are generalized and people seem to be informed and unconcerned about the system. Bazylevych argues that the informal system does not come as the direct result of a lack of state resources, but rather, it reflects traditional and generalized practices. Corruption is omnipresent and doctors explicitly state that they must give preferential treatment in order to assure a second source of revenue for themselves.

One of the problems that the author points out is the question of self-representation of doctors in the context of their informal practices. Although informal practices appear to be widespread, the question of a moral dilemma and a lack of professionalism don't seem to be seen as a problem for health care specialists. In addition, she points out, there is still a marked difference between state bureaucracy and the role of health clinics.

Within health care practices, temporality is also important; patients must first invest their time in order to build their confidence in a doctor so that they can then pay for treatment or medication. The doctor must in turn wait for the patient's decision in order to establish the proper context in which to claim payments. The various ways of proceeding from this point reflect the level of quality of treatment given and received.

According to the author, there exists a significant difference between practices in cities and those in areas outside the city. Since salaries of specialists are much lower outside of cities, the need in doctors for a second source of revenue becomes an issue since doctors can earn between 6 and 7 times more by demanding informal payment. Bazylevych also noted the manner in which decisions were made by doctors, and pointed out that in her interviews, while doctors were not hesitant to discuss their practices, the moral dilemma of the situation as well as their financial situations did influence their speech.

Moreover, the author notes a discrepancy between the rhetoric of the state and the fact that doctors are trying to dissociate themselves from political issues of the state. Sometimes, even doctors would criticize the ideas of reforms in the health system, and some expressed fear in the cessation of informal practices. Finally, based on the feedback obtained in her interviews, Bazylevych found that the state had virtually ceased to exist in the health care sector, and without informal practices (possibly regulated by the state), this could cause increased harm and inequality within the population.

In the discussion that followed, Jessica Allina-Pisano brought up the observation that informal practices will certainly continue to function indefinitely, since the state is allowing for their continuation by doing nothing about the situation. She drew a parallel to the Soviet era in which informal practices exploited the weaknesses of the system and in which the media allowed for the continuation of these practices through systematic critiques, not only of the health care sector, but of doctors as well. These trends, she argued, can be applied to other political areas as well.

In regards to Bazylevych's field work, Allina-Pisano wanted to know the contexts and places in which her interviews took place, and the influence this might have had on responses. The discussant proposed that the effect of specialist interests such as the pursuit of career advancement and other personal ambitions should be studied in depth to examine their connections to informal practices.

Allina-Pisano then pointed out an additional article that the paper raised concerning the evolution of training for doctors in Ukraine. Was there a difference, she asked, between doctors who received their training before the fall of the USSR and those who were trained after? Has this factor affected informal practices? Next, Allina-Pisano discussed the manner in which doctors demanded informal payments, specifically in their calculations in weighing known costs and consequences. She also recommended a more detailed research into the decision-making processes of physicians and patients who would accept the offer of the specialist and the manner in which these deals are communicated between parties and the factors that lead them to trust in an illegal practice. The discussant noted that the moment

at which both parties share this bond of trust also reflects respective benefits, which must be explained in the research.

The final issue raised by Allina-Pisano related to the political function of these practices: What is the relationship between authorities and doctors in light of this phenomenon? Do the authorities protect doctors and patients in these practices? To answer these questions, it would be important to assess the reactions of authorities, and while the author assumes that everyone seems to accept such practices, she wanted to know why there are people who fear the consequences of informal bargains or denounce the phenomenon.

The discussion was then opened to the public. Questions that emerged mainly concerned the means to eradicate the problem as well as the cultural value of these practices in Ukraine. Margarita Balmaceda wondered if this problem exists in other public sectors, and if so, what solutions could be formulated to improve wages and reduce corruption. Oxana Shevel asked whether the attitude of doctors towards patients is improving and wanted to know if the existence of private insurance and new training programs could possibly reduce informal practices.

Bazylevych responded that while private insurance does exist, it does not work effectively, especially at the level of repayments. Moreover, despite statistics showing the improvement of health care services in Ukraine, these services are still lacking at a technological level and the expertise of physicians still poses several problems. New doctors are, however, more liberal than in the past, but also understand that their patients do not always have the means to resort to legal health services.

To conclude, Margaret Paxson commented on the motivations and traditional practices that must be considered in understanding informal services, particularly outside of cities, where it is the only solution for many people who are faced with a lack of resources. Decisions are made during times of illness, and this is the reality in many villages of Ukraine.