



Fourth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar
in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies



Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa

23-25 October 2008

The Lounge, New Residence, 90 University Private



Sponsored by
the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation

The Chair also thanks
the School of Political Studies,
the Faculty of Social Sciences
the Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies and
the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter
for their support



*2008 Danyliw Seminar
Opening Reception*

Resto-Pub Jazzy, University Centre
23 October 2008, 6.30-7.30 PM



The Hon. Ihor Ostash, Ambassador
of Ukraine to Canada



Andrew Danyliw (Danyliw Foundation)
and Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies)



Gary Slater, Dean of the Faculty
of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies



Lise Filiatrault and Chantal Labelle
(CIDA, Ukraine Division)



Richard French, Former Minister
in the Government of Quebec



Andrew Danyliw and Andrew Robinson, Former Ambassador of Canada in Ukraine



2008 Danyliw Seminar Attendees

- Adjagbe, Mathieu** (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Agafonov, Anton (MA Student, U of Ottawa)
Allard, Anne (Director, Development Office, U of Ottawa)
Banyongen, Serge (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Bashuk, Hepburn, Oksana (Ottawa)
Bélanger, Alain (MA Student, U Ottawa)
Bell, Irena (Board of Directors, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U Ottawa)
Bennet, Andrew (Senior Political Risk Analyst, Export Development Canada, Ottawa)
Bilaniuk, Nykolai (Translator, *The Ukraine List*, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, Ottawa)
Blavatska, Larissa (Senior Desk Officer, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa)
Blizniouk, Taras (BA Student, U of Ottawa)
Bradley, Iris (UCPBA, Ottawa)
Brisiuck, Yaroslav (First Secretary on Political Questions, Embassy of Ukraine, Ottawa)
Byczak, Michel (Montreal)
Cherviatsova, Alina (Karazin Kharkiv National U, Ukraine)
Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin (Program Research Officer, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa)
Cholkan, Gregory (Ottawa)
Cirino Rosa Erica (Ottawa)
Clayton, Douglas (Professor, Department of Modern Languages, U Ottawa)
Czechut, Olessia (Montreal)
Dalziel, Alexander (Analyst, Privy Council Office, Ottawa)
Danyliw, Andrew (Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation, Toronto)
Daschko, Yuri (Toronto)
DeBardleben, Joan (Professor, EURUS, Carleton U, Ottawa)
Degraw, Kyle (MA Student, U Ottawa)
DeMaurivez, Halyna (Librarian, U of Ottawa)
Dembinska, Magdalena (Post-Doctoral Fellow, McGill U, Montreal)
Demers, Jean-Marc (Ottawa)
Dombrovska, Anna (Ottawa)

Dool, Tracy (Ottawa)
Filiatrault, Lise (General Director, Ukraine Division, CIDA, Ottawa)
French, Richard (Adjunct Professor, School of International & Public Affairs, U Ottawa)
Fyson, Raina (Ottawa)
Gafarov, Hashim (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Galadza, Peter (Kule Chair, Sheptytskyi Institute, St Paul U, Ottawa)
Golubova, Anna (BA Student, U Ottawa)
Himka, Eva (Ottawa)
Hoegl, Katharina (MA Student, Carleton U, Ottawa)
Horban, Marta (Toronto)
Houle, François (Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, U Ottawa)
Hrycenko-Luhova, Zorianna (Montreal)
Huk, Katherine (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Hula, Volodymyr (Ottawa)
Humchack, Eugenia (Ottawa)
Hunchuck, Suzanne (Ottawa)
Huseby, Erik (Ottawa)
Isajiw, Christina (Toronto)
Ivanchenko, Katherina (BA Student, U Ottawa)
Kodak, Irene (Ottawa)
Kostiuk, Michael (Ottawa)
Kowalsky, Dennis (Agriculture Canada, Ottawa)
Kyzym, Igor (Counsellor, Embassy of Ukraine, Ottawa)
Labelle, Chantal (Director, Ukraine Division, CIDA, Ottawa)
Lane, Todd (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Lermeyer, Gregory (Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa)
Luhova, Adriana (Montreal)
Luhovy, Teresa (Ottawa)
Makaryk, Irene (Vice-Dean, Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies, U Ottawa)
Maliki, Hashimu (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Marlin, Margie (MA Student, Carleton U)
Melnyk, Oleksandr (PhD Student, U of Toronto)
Merklinger, Elizabeth (Ottawa)
Moghan, Yashar (Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ottawa)
Momryk, Myron (Ottawa)
Mongeau, John (Ottawa)
Mutlu, Can (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Mychajlyszyn, Natalie (Library of Parliament, Ottawa)
Nowakiwsky, Orest (Ottawa)
Opar, Alexandra (Ottawa)
Osmak, Ashton (Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ottawa)
Ostash, The Hon. Ihor (Ambassador, Embassy of Ukraine, Canada)
Paré, Jean-Rodrigue (Library of Parliament, Ottawa)



Patsiurko, Natalka (Post-Doctoral Fellow, U of Toronto)
Piaseckyj, Oksana (Ottawa)
Polozhyi, Arseniy (Third Secretary, Consular Affairs, Embassy of Ukraine, Ottawa)
Polyakov, Lana (Program Coordinator, Atlantic Council of Canada, Toronto)
Radchenko, Olga (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Robinson, Andrew (Former Ambassador of Canada in Ukraine, Ottawa)
Robinson, Paul (Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs, Ottawa)
Rodal, Alti (Ukrainian Jewish Encounter, Ottawa)
Rodal, Berel (Ottawa)
Roshchupkin, Valery (Third Secretary, Embassy of Russia, Ottawa)
Ryechkine, Tetyana (Ottawa)
Salomon Arel Maria (Montreal)
Sarty, Leigh (Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa)
Sawchuk, Andriy (Ottawa)
Senyk, Nadia (Ottawa)
Shafiyev, Farid (Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ottawa)
Shahverdiyev, Jeyhund (Ottawa)
Shulakewych, Markian (Ottawa)
Simonyi, André (PhD Student, U Ottawa)
Slater, Gary (Dean, Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies, U Ottawa)
Sloboda, Antin (MA Student, St Paul U, Ottawa)
Sochocky, Christine (Ottawa)
Soroka, Leah (Agriculture Canada, Ottawa)
Strychar-Bodnar, Mark (MA Student, U of Toronto)
Survilla, Joanna (World Congress of Belarusians, Gatineau)
Timesguida, Hocine (PhD Student, School of Political Studies, U Ottawa)
Tobin, Alice (Ottawa)
Tomiuk, Bohdan (Ottawa)
Wynnycky, Roman (Montreal)
Yakautsava, Tatiana (BA Student, U Ottawa)
Yarotska, Yulia (Ottawa)
Zakharova, Olena (Third Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine, Ottawa)
Zürcher, Christoph (Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs, U Ottawa)



Danyliw Seminar Panelists

- Allina-Pisano, Jessica** (University of Ottawa, Canada)
Antonovych, Myroslava (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine)
Arel, Dominique (University of Ottawa, Canada)
Bartov, Omer (Brown University, US)
Carynyk, Marco (Writer, Toronto, Canada)
Catic, Maja (Brandeis University, US)
Denis, Serge (University of Ottawa, Canada)
Dyak, Sofia (Center for Urban History of East Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine)
Grabowski, Jan (University of Ottawa, Canada)
Grachova, Sofia (Harvard University, US)
Heretz, Leonid (Bridgewater State College, US)
Himka, John-Paul (University of Alberta, Canada)
Isajiw, Wsevolod (University of Toronto, Canada)
Jaworsky, John (University of Waterloo, Canada)
Karatnycky, Adrian (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the US)
Katchanovski, Ivan (SUNY Potsdam, US)
Khanenko-Friesen, Natalia (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)
Khromeychuk, Olesya (University College London, UK)
King, Charles (Georgetown University, US)
Murney, Maureen (University of Toronto, Canada)
Paxson, Margaret (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC)
Serbyn, Roman (UQAM, Canada)
Shevel, Oxana (Tufts University, US)
Subtelny, Orest (York University, Canada)
Swain, Adam (University of Nottingham, UK)
Tucker, Joshua (NYU, US)
Varga, Mihai (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
Voznyak, Vitaliy (University of Illinois at Chicago, US)
Way, Lucan (University of Toronto, Canada)

Danyliw Seminar Discussants



- Allina-Pisano, Jessica** (University of Ottawa, Canada) ■ 1
Grabowski, Jan (University of Ottawa, Canada) ■ 2
Heretz, Leonid (Bridgewater State College, US) ■ 3
Himka, John Paul (University of Alberta, Canada) ■ 4
Isajiw, Wsewolod (University of Toronto, Canada) ■ 5
Paxson, Margaret (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC) ■ 6
Shevel, Oxana (Tufts University, US) ■ 7
Subtelny, Orest (York University, Canada) ■ 8
Voznyak, Vitaliy (University of Illinois at Chicago, US) ■ 9



*Chair of Ukrainian Studies
Seminar Staff*



- Bélanger, Marie-Eve** (PhD Student) ■ 1
- Couture-Gagnon, Laurence** (MA Student) ■ 2
- Hugues, Guy** (Photographer, BA Student)
- Grenier, Félix** (PhD Student) ■ 3
- Kovacs, Jerry** (MA Student) ■ 4
- Krolczyk, Jacob** (Assistant Coordinator, MA Student) ■ 5
- L'Heureux, Marie-Hélène** (MA Student) ■ 6
- Mourad, Lama** (BA Student) ■ 7
- Ratelle, Jean-François** (Power-Point Coordinator, PhD Student) ■ 8
- Roseberry, Philippe** (Coordinator, MA Student) ■ 9
- Thibault, Hélène** (PhD Student) ■ 10
- Werhun, Natalia** (Law Student) ■ 11
- Wöber, Siegfried** (Photographer, OSCE, Vienna)





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Thursday 23 October

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE



Session I, 1.30-2.30 PM

Commemorating Deportations

■ **Sofia Dyak** (Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv, Ukraine, sofia.dyak@gmail.com)

In a Place of Displacement: Commemorating Deportations in Lviv after 1991

Discussant: ■ **Jan Grabowski** (U of Ottawa, Canada, jgrabows@uottawa.ca)

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR



Session II, 2.30-6.30 PM

The Famine and the Politics of Genocide Recognition

■ **Maja Catic** (Brandeis U, US, mcatic@brandeis.edu)

Moral Claims and Political Demands: The Politics of Genocide Recognition in Bosnia and Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Charles King** (Georgetown U, US, kingch@georgetown.edu)

[Coffee Break: 3.30 - 4 PM]

■ **Ivan Katchanovski** (SUNY Potsdam, US, ivan.katchanovski@utoronto.ca)

The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides against Ukrainians in Orange Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Wsewolod Isajiw** (U of Toronto, Canada, isajiw@hotmail.com)

Session III, 4-6.30 PM

The Famine and the Politics of Genocide Recognition

■ **Roman Serbyn** (UQAM, Canada, serbyn.roman@videotron.ca)

Raphael Lemkin, the UN Convention of 1948 and the Ukrainian Genocide

■ **Myroslava Antonovych** (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, antonovych@ukma.kiev.ua)

Legal Accountability for the Crime of the 1932-1933 Great Famine in Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Dominique Arel** (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Opening Reception, 6.30-7.30 PM

Resto-Pub Jazzy

University Centre

University of Ottawa Campus

85 University St., 1st floor

Friday 24 October

CONTESTED MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II VIOLENCE IN UKRAINE



Session III, 9-11.10 AM

Understanding Ethnic Violence During World War II

- **Marco Carynnyk** (Writer, Toronto, Canada, mcarynnyk7882@rogers.com)

The 1941 Pogroms in Lviv, Zolochiv, and Ternopil

Discussant: ■ **Leonid Heretz** (Bridgewater State College, US, heretz@bellatlantic.net)

- **Omer Bartov** (Brown U, US, omer.bartov@gmail.com)

Memory, Erasure, and Commemoration in Contemporary Western Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Dominique Arel** (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Session IV, 11.30 AM-1.30 PM

The Contested Memory of Ukrainian Insurgent and Military Formations

- **Sofia Grachova** (Harvard U, US, sofia_grachova@yahoo.com)

Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian Politics of Memory after 2004

Discussant: ■ **John-Paul Himka** (U of Alberta, Canada, john-paul.himka@ualberta.ca)

- **Olesya Khromeychuk** (U College London, UK, olesya_khromeychuk@yahoo.co.uk)

Memory, Identity and the Waffen SS “Galicia” in the Light of the Post-WWII Displacement

Discussant: ■ **Orest Subtelny** (York U, Canada, subtelny@yorku.ca)

THE WAR IN GEORGIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE

Session V, 3-4.15 PM

The December 2008 Elections and NATO Summit

- **Adrian Karatnycky** (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the US; Advisor to Magisters Law Firm, fhpres@aol.com) *Ukraine and NATO on the Eve of the December 2008 Summit*

Discussant: ■ **Dominique Arel** (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

The Impact of the War on the 2008 December Elections in Ukraine

Session VI, 4.15-5.30 PM

The Looming Crimea Question

- **Charles King** (Georgetown U, US, kingch@georgetown.edu)

The “Unfreezing” Conflicts in Transnistria and Crimea

Discussant: ■ **John (Ivan) Jaworski** (U of Waterloo, Canada, jjaworsk@uwaterloo.ca)

Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet: Some Scenarios

Saturday 25 October

THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON UKRAINIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY



Session VII, 10 AM-12 PM

The Clash of Economics and Politics

- **Mihai Varga** (U of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

How Can Trade Union Effectively Represent Workers in Post-Soviet Ukraine?

The Case of Plant-Level Unions in Civil Machine-Building

Discussant: ■ **Serge Denis** (U of Ottawa, Canada, sdenis@uottawa.ca)

- **Adam Swain** (U of Nottingham, UK, Adam.Swain@nottingham.ac.uk)

Performing Corruption in Ukraine

Discussants: ■ **Vitaliy Voznyak** (U of Illinois at Chicago, US, vvozny2@uic.edu)

- **Joshua Tucker** (NYU, US, joshua.tucker@nyu.edu)

Session VIII, 1-3 PM

Economic Transformation and Social Dislocations

- **Maureen Murney** (U of Toronto, Canada, m.murney@utoronto.ca)

The Politics of Gender, Alcohol Consumption, and Addiction in Western Ukraine

Discussant: ■ **Margaret Paxson** (Kennan Institute, Washington, DC, Margaret.Paxson@wilsoncenter.org)

- **Natalia Khanenko-Friesen** (U of Saskatchewan, Canada, natalia.khanenkofriesen@gmail.com)

Oral History of De-collectivization in Ukraine in the 1990s:

Rural Experiences and Perspectives

Discussant: ■ **Jessica Allina-Pisano** (U of Ottawa, Canada, jallinap@uottawa.ca)

Session IX, 3.20-5.20 PM

Elite and Mass Politics

- **Lucan Way** (U of Toronto, Canada, lway@utsc.utoronto.ca)

Deer in Headlights: Authoritarian Skill and Regime Trajectories after the Cold War

Discussant: ■ **Oxana Shevel** (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

- **Joshua Tucker** (NYU, US, joshua.tucker@nyu.edu)

People Power or a One-Shot Deal? The Legacy of the Colored Revolutions

Considered from a Collective Action Framework

Discussant: ■ **Lucan Way** (U of Toronto, Canada, lway@utsc.utoronto.ca)



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Thursday 23 October

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE



Session I

Commemorating Deportations



■ **Sofia Dyak** (Center for Urban History, Lviv, Ukraine)
*In a Place of Displacement: Commemorating Deportations
in Lviv after 1991*

Inaugurating the Fourth Annual Danyliw Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Sofia Dyak, a scholar from the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv, Ukraine, presented her work on the politics of memory, and its importance in the post-Soviet era, particularly in the city of Lviv. Her piece, entitled “In a Place of Displacement: Commemorating Deportations in Lviv after 1991”, addresses the issue of the commemoration of large scale deportations that occurred in the city of Lviv during World War II.

As Ms. Dyak noted in her presentation, “Lviv is a place of displacement.” During the course of the Second World War, it suffered numerous border modifications and alterations to the composition of its population. The latter changes were mainly engendered through mass

deportations, although some cases of mass murder also occurred. More than one hundred thousand Poles were expelled from Lviv between the end of 1944 and the end of 1946, many of which would settle in Poland. A large part of the ethnic Ukrainian population of the city is descendant of Ukrainians that were deported from Poland within the same time frame. The city also served as one of the many sites where Jews were exterminated and deported – more often than not, to death camps.

Due to the presence of newly liberalized public spaces in the post-Soviet era, Lviv has been subject to numerous attempts at memorializing deportations and other tragic events of Ukrainian history, an act prohibited, or at the very least heavily censored, by the Soviet authorities. The commemoration of deportations was particularly problematic since the phenomena still occurred under Soviet occupation, and, therefore, could not be solely attributed to the Nazi era. Ms. Dyak's research focuses on five main projects; only two of which are completed. These ventures are: the monument of Nykyfor; the Monument for Victims of Political Repressions; the Museum of Deported Ukrainians; the Memorial Museum of Victims of Occupation Regimes; and, a monument to Ukrainians deported from Poland. While Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian ethnic groups suffered the wrath of deportation and repression, commemoration in the city of Lviv has been “about keeping ethnic divisions, replicating in a way policies of both Soviet and Nazi occupation regimes that put an end to [the] multiethnic city of Lwów/Lviv.” (Dyak, p.13)

Exemplifying this tendency is the monument of Nykyfor, the single most prominent individual deported during Akcja Wisła. While only indirectly related to the topic of deportation, it raises interesting issues of ethnic affiliation and commemoration. The problem of defining his identity, whether Polish or Ukrainian has illuminated the problem of classifying victimhood in strictly national terms. Two monuments exist in his honor, one in Krynica and one in Lviv, exemplifying the attempt by exclusively national narratives to appropriate the status of victim.

All the monuments mentioned present, or (in the case of those not completed) will seemingly present, a strict national bias with regards to the representation of victimhood. In large part, there is an attempt to downplay or completely erase the suffering of Poles and Jews, in favor of “ethnic” Ukrainians. However, these conclusions remain preliminary since, as mentioned, many of these projects remain unfinished. In addition, the mere nature of museums, as opposed to monuments, Ms. Dyak highlights, allows for adaptability to future contexts, through the presentation of different exhibits, for example. Moreover, there have been some signs of the possibility of bringing in different perspectives during the process of establishing these museums. For example, city councilors have launched an international competition for the architectural design of the Museum of Occupations. This, along with the plural nature of the selection committee can possibly lead to a more critical understanding of history in this museum.

The importance of historical knowledge, as opposed to national knowledge, was highlighted during the ensuing discussion. As Dr. Grabowski, a scholar of the Holocaust and the assigned discussant, noted, there is a danger in chasing after martyrdom and victimhood,

without striving to understand one's history. Ukrainians must come to terms with their past as victims as well as perpetrators of violence. A grave problem arises when the national construct is being built on corroded foundations, half-truths, silences, or outright lies. Based on the premise that a society can be judged by the way in which it treats its minorities, be they religious, ethnic, or other, as a historian, Dr. Grabowski states that one can say that the degree of historical justice can be measured by the place reserved for the minorities in the present historical discourse. He also agrees with Dr. Dyak that much should be done to reconcile the conflicting views of history between Poles and Ukrainians. These two ethnicities, as they still have a significant presence in the countries of the region, will be able to defend their respective positions and negotiate areas of potential compromise in terms of redefining the critical aspects of common history. The greater danger lies in the silence surrounding the extermination of the Jews of Lviv. This population, who was all but entirely annihilated, perceives Lviv as a lieu of German brutality, and Ukrainian and Polish betrayal.

Dr. Omer Bartov of Brown University situated this hero-victim paradigm within a larger European context, where monuments have, he argues, largely taken on this form. These monuments are exclusive by essence, since they attribute a particular and exclusive role to a group at a particular time. Museums, on the other hand, offer much more flexibility. As of yet, they have been as much about forgetting as they have been about remembering, in as much as remembrance has been limited to the ethnic group that now forms the majority. In order to actualize their potential for true commemoration, "they have to frame themselves as history museums and not national museums," noted Dr. Bartov.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa highlighted, there are two interacting traumas taking place in Lviv, and in Ukraine in general: the first being the trauma of the actual events of the War, and the other being the 45 year old suppression of all public remembrance or discussion on the issue. While it can be argued that Ukraine is still in the preliminary stages of memory construction, Dr. Arel cautions of the possibility that these monuments acquire a fixity which will be difficult to alter. Emphasizing the importance of this second form of trauma, Dr. Karatnycky suggests that there is no fundamental problem with a majority group, having been suppressed for so many years, striving to highlight its struggle through exclusive museums, for example. This emphasis should not be equated with a negation of other sufferings. Dyak notes, however, that since spaces exist for the recognition of the deportations and victimization of other ethnic groups, the exclusiveness can not be justified, and ultimately can be equated with negation.



Session II

The Famine and the Politics of Genocide Recognition



■ **Maja Catic** (Brandeis U, US)

Moral Claims and Political Demands: The Politics of Genocide Recognition in Bosnia and Ukraine

Maja Catic addresses the cases of the Bosnian, Rwandan, and Ukrainian genocides through the prism of the legal recognition of genocide. There exists an important link between the recognition of the genocide by both the domestic government and the international community, as represented by the states and the international organizations. This recognition marks a significant step towards the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators, who still coexist within the state.

The international and domestic recognition of genocide can be employed for political purposes. It can be utilized in order to ensure the establishment of a civic state, one that does not rest on an ethnic definition of the nation. Moreover, the quest for international recognition can be used for strategic purposes, in order to buttress the position of certain parties within the political realm or to help them acquire popular support.

Catic's presentation mainly focused on the case of Bosnia. The origins of the conflict date back to the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1992-1993 following the Bosnian war of independence. Hostilities between Serbs and Muslims on the Bosnian territory would rapidly transform into an aggression that would be qualified as genocide by the Muslims of the territory. Since 1993, the case has been brought before the International Court of Justice, which established an ad hoc tribunal to address the question of crimes committed on Bosnian territory during the 1991-1995 war.

The recognition of the genocide was important for the Bosnian Muslim community, whose political representatives had the task of establishing autonomous ethnic republics within a decentralized confederation following the same demarcation lines. Thus, the political goal was to create an autonomous Muslim entity within an independent Bosnian state. However, the only occurrence that was qualified as genocide was the massacre of Srebrenica. The Dayton accords, therefore, do not coincide with the political ambitions of the Muslims. Rather, they impose a central government with expansive powers. Thus, it is evident that the political utilization of the international recognition of the genocide failed to produce the desired results.

In the case of Ukraine, the issue of recognition is different for many reasons. Firstly, the events in Ukraine occurred more than 75 years ago. Therefore, the demands of the survivors

are not at the centre of the question. Furthermore, the quest for recognition is primarily conceptualized within the framework of memorial duty. However, it also serves the interests of the state since it could strengthen the state and nation-building processes that followed Ukrainian independence. Thus, the international recognition of the genocide could constitute a significant step towards the construction of a common Ukrainian history, which could henceforth view itself as a nascent state striving to find its place within the international system. The instrumentalization of the international recognition of genocide is a common thread between the events of Bosnia in the 1990s and of Ukraine in the 1930s. They both serve a fundamentally political goal: creating a national state, in the aftermath of independence.

Discussing Maja Catic's presentation and paper, Charles King noted that the instrumental approach she brings forward can be criticized on three fronts: the selection of cases, the research question, and the methodology.

Firstly, the selection of cases is potentially contentious. How do the cases of Bosnia and Ukraine relate to one another within the context of this argument, and serve as a basis for a comparative study? What does the comparison bring forward? It would undoubtedly be more insightful to relate the cases of Armenia and Ukraine, as they both occurred some time ago, and would therefore allow for an improved analysis of the question of memory and its effect on current politics of domestic and international recognition of genocide. Conversely, the cases of Cambodia and Bosnia would provide a more recent comparison, permitting a study of the instrumentalization of international recognition for short-term political goals.

With regards to the research question, it would be constructive to specify the specific central question and the proposed hypotheses. A number of interesting and valid sub-questions come to mind that would allow for a greater framing of the subject. For example: how is the question of genocide appropriated by the nationalist movements and what is its relation with the national construct in the aftermath of independence? What does the instrumentalization of a narrative on genocide suggest? What does a quest for a strong geopolitical position for the state imply? What variations of state use of genocide will be discussed?

In addition, unanswered questions are brought forward throughout the presentation: if the instrumentalization of genocide at the national level is a strong political weapon, why is its strategic use confined to a limited number of cases? Under what circumstances do states legitimize the use of genocide to advance political goals? Finally, what is causal relation between the political and the demand for international or official recognition of the genocide?

Moreover, with regards to the question of methodology, it would be interesting to restructure the statistics and undertake a truly quantitative study of the question. This element is essential to bolster the analysis of the narrative and could allow for the extraction of broader tendencies amongst the cases studied. The study would benefit by covering a larger number of cases and to utilize statistical analysis, wherein the possibility of answering the above mentioned sub-questions lies.

Questions and comments brought forward during the time allocated for discussion focused around two main axes: the scientific interest for the comparison of the Bosnian and Ukrainian genocides, and the importance attributed to the domestic as well as the international recognition of genocide. Maja Catic affirmed that the use of comparisons has allowed for the understanding of different scenarios that political actors can put in place in order to define genocide, and launch legal action to judge it. She highlights the role that the diaspora can play in this regard, albeit one that is ever-changing and unequal. Finally, she notes that while the countries she compares differ on the fundamental questions of historical international recognition, their national contexts at the time of genocide, as well as the international mobilization engendered by each of the conflicts, they still present some interesting commonalities: the political action in favor of recognition of the genocide, and the instrumentalization of the conflicts by their respective political elites. With regards to the question of domestic and international recognition of the genocide, Catic suggests that domestic recognition is more important than its international counterpart for the construction of the nation-state and the establishment of the rule of law. In fact, the case can be brought before the international court without having established international recognition. Conversely, domestic recognition facilitates the legal and reconciliation processes. In the case of Ukraine, while the state has recognized the genocide, Russian minority groups in the country have yet to be respected in the process.



■ **Ivan Katchanovski** (SUNY Potsdam)
The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides against Ukrainians in Orange Ukraine

In his presentation, Ivan Katchanovski argues that President Yushchenko has pursued policies aimed at domestic and international political and legal recognition of the famine as a genocide of the Ukrainians and of political and judicial rehabilitation of the OUN. In contrast, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, leading opposition parties, opposed both the Orange policy concerning the famine and rehabilitation of OUN leaders. Professor Katchanovski's presentation analyzed whether political factors affect contemporary policies and public attitudes towards Soviet and Nazi genocides in Ukraine. He argued that distinct regional and political cultures of Western and Eastern Ukrainians are the main determinants of policy positions of political leaders and parties and the attitudes of Ukrainians concerning the Soviet and Nazi genocides. This policy ignores the class nature of the totalitarian Communist ideology, which was the official ideology of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party. The analysis of data concerning class composition of arrested persons by the Soviet security service in Ukraine from 1931-1937 provides evidence in favor of the class-based theory of the Soviet genocide in Ukraine. The Soviet version of the Communist ideology envisioned a construction of a communist society by means of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," and this ideology involved elimination, including physical extermination, of social classes that were classified as non-proletarian, such as the upper classes and kulaks. As a result of the Soviet policy, no kulaks and other capitalist and former upper classes continued to exist as socio-economic classes in the Soviet Union, including Soviet Ukraine, by

the beginning of 1939. In contrast, Ukrainians continued to exist as a main ethnic group in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Katchanovski notes that the Bloc “Our Ukraine” consistently supported the President’s policy concerning the legal recognition and commemoration of the famine as a genocide of Ukrainians. Yulia Tymoshenko and her bloc, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), backed many of Yushchenko’s policies concerning the famine. In contrast to the Soviet famine of 1932-1933, President Yushchenko and his Bloc, “Our Ukraine,” did not pursue the policy of legal recognition and public commemoration of the deliberate extermination of a significant part of the Ukrainian population by Nazi Germany as genocide. President Yushchenko acknowledged that during World War II, “Ukraine suffered most among all European countries”. Although Nazi Germany policies concerning Ukrainians are more extreme, compared to Soviet policies, in a magnitude and means of mass murder, they are not recognized, legally defined, or publicly commemorated by the Orange governments as genocide.

The Orange forces, in particular Viktor Yushchenko and the Yushchenko Bloc, “Our Ukraine,” have the strongest support in historically Western regions of Ukraine, which became part of Soviet Ukraine as a result of World War II. The reluctance to recognize the Nazi genocide against Ukrainians reflects pro-Western political values of Western Ukrainians and consideration by Orange politicians that such a recognition would undermine Orange forces, which include nationalist parties. Similarly, the denial of the Soviet genocide in Ukraine by the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine reflects a pro-Russian and pro-Soviet political culture in their Eastern Ukraine strongholds and a fact that such recognition would undermine political standing of these parties and Ukraine’s relations with Russia.

The analysis of the public opinion data reveals that regional political culture is a principal factor of mass attitudes concerning Stalinist genocidal policy in Soviet Ukraine. Western Ukrainians, compared to Eastern Ukrainians, are much more likely to view the artificial famine in the Soviet Union as a genocide of ethnic Ukrainians and to express negative attitudes towards Stalin. In contrast, Western and Eastern Ukrainians tend to express much more uniform attitudes when it comes to recognizing the Nazi policy in Ukraine as genocide.

Professor Wsewold Isajiw, University of Toronto, argued against Professor Katchanovsky’s view. Professor Isajiw explained that there is a problem with the research question and the hypothesis because they appear inconsistent. It isn’t clear whether the author claims that political factors and policies influence public attitude in different regions in Ukraine or whether different values and different regions determine the political factors and the public policies. Part of the problem is that the concept of values and attitudes are never defined in Katchanovski’s paper. There is an important difference between cultural values and attitudes, reminds Isajiw. Cultural values do influence many specific attitudes but specific attitudes are also determined by given historical experiences and the political factors themselves. The term political factor is also not clearly defined in the paper.

Professor Isajiw also claimed that Katchanovski’s definition of genocide is problematic because it is broad enough to include social groups and there is a danger to lose its analytical

value if it is defined too broadly. This leads to the problem of distinguishing between mass murder and genocide. Also, the argument about the Holodomor is problematic because Kulaks were never a social class, and Katchanovski used the term in a derogatory manner. The famine was aimed against all peasants not only kulaks, maintains Isajiw. It is a genocide against Ukrainian peasants. Finally, the surveys don't show a cultural problem but maybe a knowledge problem between the Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine. The surveys are opinions, and not attitudes, a distinction not made by Katchanovski, say Isajiw. But the surveys do show differences in opinions regarding the Soviet and Nazi genocides between Western and Eastern Ukraine. If more people in Western Ukraine vs. Eastern Ukraine consider the famine as genocide, this may in fact reflect a better knowledge of history rather than different in culture, argues Professor Isajiw.

During the discussion Professor Dominique Arel asked the reason why one cannot have both a Soviet and a Nazi genocide recognition policy in Ukraine? And why one doesn't see both projects at the same time in Ukraine? Professor Orest Subtelny argued that Hitler is history, it isn't an issue. Nobody cares and nobody will stand up to defend Hitler. The famine is a very current political issue. Professor Omer Bartov added that there were mass crimes by the German military and German occupation authority in Ukraine but there were also similar actions in Belarus, in Leningrad, in Lithuania and all over Eastern Europe. They were not directly aimed at Ukrainians. Also, there was a huge amount of collaboration with the Nazis. Professor Jon Paul Himka explained that there is a knowledge deficit about these issues and we should be careful with our conclusions, especially about concerning the OUN. Professor Margaret Paxson agreed on this but added that from her point of view there is a deficit of clear analytical language on what one means by genocide and its core definition. Finally, Professor Roman Serbyn brought the point that he is surprised that people say there is not much attention paid to Second World War and Nazi victims. There are a whole series of books about Ukrainian victims of Nazi terror. Sofia Grachova argued that one should look deeper into this issue before claiming it was genocide against a certain class. She also added that the opposition between Eastern and Western Ukraine is an intellectual construct which has been imposed on Ukrainian society by some academic circles since 2004.



■ **Roman Serbyn** (UQAM)
*Discussion sur Raphael Lemkin: Lemkin's
Recognition of the Ukrainian Genocide*

■ **Myroslava Antonovych** (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy)
*Legal Accountability for the Crime of the
1932-1933 Great Famine in Ukraine*

Roman Serbyn's discussion served as an analysis of Lemkin's position with regards to the Ukrainian famine during the 1930s. The presentation brings forward three main points. First, Lemkin officially recognized the famine as genocide, and even as a quintessential example of soviet genocidal practices. Second, for

Lemkin, the famine directly targeted the Ukrainian nation with the goal of suppressing nationalist – or separatist – aspirations which constituted a threat to the territorial unity of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Lemkin affirms that the Ukrainian genocide can not be compared to the Holocaust since the means employed to stifle the Ukrainian population were completely alien to the means employed by the Germans during the Holocaust. In practice, the Ukrainian population was much too large to be exterminated and the strategic use of the famine as a means of genocide served to destabilize the peasants, who formed the largest stratum of society.

The Ukrainian genocide was conducted in a highly organized manner, following a four-step sequence. The first step of the soviet crime consisted of the destruction of the intelligentsia. This was mainly accomplished through the dispersion of nationalist movements within large agglomerations. Furthermore, the influence of religion, a major driving force of revolts in many states within the Soviet bloc, was abated through the destruction of the Church. Moreover, the Soviets directly target the Ukrainian peasant class by launching an aggressive policy of land collectivization and harvest requisition. The result: more than 5 million peasant casualties. Finally, a strategy of disjoining the population is implemented. With this goal in mind, soviet authorities proceeded to embed Russian-speaking populations within Ukrainian territory, with the goal of dispersing any nationalist movements within Ukraine and reducing them to silence.

In the spirit of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it should be noted that this crime has occurred throughout history and has caused much damage to humanity. Therefore, it is not only crimes committed after 1948, the year the convention was adopted, that should be punished; all similar crimes perpetrated in the past should also be subject to juridical consequences. Article two of the Convention enumerates the conditions defining genocide: the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, “as such.” This article further elaborates on the means which can be employed to achieve this goal: killing, hurting, destroying physically, preventing births, and the forced transfer of children from one group to another. It is evident that such elements apply to the case of the Ukrainian genocide, most notably with regards to Soviet intentions to destroy a national group and the means used to achieve it.

With regards to the question of sources, there exists an extensive array of sources attesting to the Ukrainian genocide, which refutes the argument stating that not enough physical proof exists to demonstrate the occurrence of genocide. On the contrary, many sources which date back to the early 1930s indicate that the strategic goal of the famine, in the minds of the soviet authorities, was to ensure that Ukrainian nationalism would be stunted and that separatist movements desiring the secession of Ukraine from the USSR would not arise.

Following Serbyn’s presentation, Myroslava Antonovych discussed the legal accountability for the famine of 1932-1933. Identifying those who bear the legal responsibility for the Holodomor is a very contentious issue at the moment. It is important to attempt to define the latter since there are still no recognized perpetrators. The Holodomor is a crime of genocide: if it is recognized as such, the national legislator must bring the issue before the

International Court of Justice, so that the latter can judge the guilty parties in virtue of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Several laws and decrees adopted in Ukraine and the USSR during the 1930s attest to the soviet intention to commit the crime of genocide on Ukrainian territory. Among these, we can cite the following: « The grain collection law in Ukraine » (USSR, 1932) which announced the requisition of the harvest, « The suspending supply of goods to Ukrainian villages decree », « The Black Board decree » (1932) which demanded the transfer of the food items to soviet military groups and declared the suspension of the passport system for Ukrainians in November 1932, thereby preventing Ukrainians from fleeing the territory affected by the famine.

Since the USSR was accused, in 1983, at the Hague, of being responsible for the great famine (legal document of exiled Ukrainians), several states and international organizations have recognized the genocide of Ukrainians. Notable among these are Canada and the United States Congress. Finally, in 2006, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law recognizing the Holodomor as genocide. These various forms of recognition have accelerated the necessity of the attribution of legal responsibility for the genocide and, eventually, the punishment of the guilty parties.

Therefore, the legal responsibility must be determined. Documents which can serve as the basis for a formal accusation are abundant. At the national level, Ukraine has passed a law designating the Holodomor as genocide. In addition, there exists, since 1974, a European convention against the statute of limitations on crimes against humanity and crimes of war. At the international level, the final report of the United Nation's Commission of Inquiry into the famine in Ukraine from 1932-1933 concluded that the famine destroyed a part of Ukraine by attacking the largest part of its population: the peasants.

In conclusion, the Holodomor is recognized as genocide. The next step is to have this recognition transform into law before national and international courts, thereby allowing for the identification, location, and punishment of the guilty parties. There are two ways by which the question of Holodomor can be legally resolved: either a criminal trial must be launched by the Prosecutor or legal action must be launched by the victims themselves. Moreover, the Communist Party of Ukraine should be held responsible for the responsibility of its predecessor in the famine. Finally, it is important to plead this case in front of an international tribunal.

Professor Dominique Arel, the discussant, explained that the two presentations touched on two main venues of debate of the Ukrainian genocide: the political and legal spheres. An important nuance to be made with regards to the recognition of the genocide is that there is a difference between denying the existence of the Holodomor and denying its status as genocide. This latter vision must not be criminalized since it can lead to a great variety of interpretations. In order to determine if a given event is an act of genocide, or not, it is important to ask the following question: why is a specific group targeted? Professor Arel then explores how this has unfolded in the Ukrainian case.

Firstly, he says, there should be an attempt to define the motives of the aggressors and determine if the exterminated population was targeted because of its identity? It is generally accepted knowledge that the famine was the result of a voluntary act. However, whether it consisted of involuntary homicide, due for example to the policy of grain procurement without considering possible repercussions, or murder, which assumes intent to destroy the Ukrainian people, is still a debated issue.

Following Lemkin's definition of genocide, it is also important, indicates professor Arel, to define the method, extent and type of destruction that occurred. With regards to method, for example, the systematic destruction of the sources of livelihood tilts the balance in favour of defining the event as genocide. In a similar manner, the strategy of first targeting elites and certain groups within society is also found in Lemkin's definition. Moreover, it must be determined whether the ultimate goal was the annihilation of the population or way of teaching the population a lesson.

With regards to the definition of the population targeted, it is important to differentiate between targeting the Ukrainian nation and targeting the peasants. A historical debate exists with regards to this matter. This leads one to question whether the famine of 1932-1933 was different from other famines engendered by Soviet policies of harvest procurement? Is it possible to prove that the borders were closed off in order to prevent the population from fleeing persecution and death?

Following Lemkin's reasoning, the Ukrainian famine, the Ukrainian holocaust, the occupation of Ukraine, and the deportation of Poles all represent genocides. If one is to use Lemkin's definition, one can not be selective and must accept all the above as genocides, and therefore, the famine should be conceived as one genocide among many during that period of time.

The ensuing discussion focused, among other things, on the problem of responsibility and the question of the different motives and intents inherent in the definition of genocide as opposed to mass murder, which has no ethnically defined goal. Asked about the question of responsibility by Jessica Allina-Pisano, Antonovych stated that it is imperative to search for those responsible, and to ban the current Communist party from political participation due to the role of its predecessor in the famine. Furthermore, Serbyn insisted that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide outlines the need to prove intent, not motive. Motive is a reason that pushes one to act, whereas intent supposes that there is a deliberate will to accomplish a certain aim. Proving the latter has proved to be extremely difficult. Serbyn reiterates that there was not a lack of food supply at the time of the famine. In fact, there was sufficient food to feed the entire Soviet Union and the majority of grain taken from Ukrainians served for export purposes. This can serve to illustrate a certain form of intent. Moreover, notes Serbyn, it must be remembered that, for Lemkin, the presence of mass murder is not necessary for the attribution of the status of genocide, destruction without murder can be sufficient. A last note was brought forward by Marco Carynnyk, who noted there is a particular anti-Semitic coloration to the popular debate on the "Holodomor as genocide" debate.


Friday 24 October

CONTESTED MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II VIOLENCE IN UKRAINE



Session III

Understanding Ethnic Violence During World War II



■ **Marco Carynnyk** (Writer, Toronto)
The 1941 Pogroms in Lviv

■ **Omer Bartov** (Brown U)
*Memory, Erasure, and Commemoration
in Contemporary Western Ukraine*

Historical novelist and scholar Marco Carynnyk delivered a powerful presentation, which will form the core chapter of an upcoming book, on the subject of anti-Semitism in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The presentation was made through the unusual medium of a detailed narrative of the life of Ivan Klymiv, a man who was to reach the higher echelons of the organization and become the right-hand man of OUN leader Stepan Bandera.

Carynnyk describes the Klymiv's early life in the village of Silets', near the town of Skodal, at the Northern edge of the L'viv region. A promising student, Klymiv excelled at school and acquired reputation for being pious and hardworking. During the last year of gymnasium, he enlisted in secret society, the UVO. After losing much of his family to Tuberculosis, Ivan enrolled in law at L'viv University and joined the OUN.

Through a narrative of the early meetings of the Organization, Carynnyk describes the beliefs at the core of the OUN programme. Ukraine was to be freed of all foreign occupiers, most notably Poles, but also Hungarians, Romanians, Russians, as well as "internal enemies" namely Jews. Beyond the dream of independence also lay the goal of national grandeur: Ukraine was to become master of the East and push back Russian to the Urals. Ivan Klymiv subscribed to these ideas and did not hesitate to use violence to attain them.

Carynnyk goes on to describe the early conspirational activities of Klymiv in the OUN. Perhaps the most important aspect of it is Klymiv's various terms in Polish prisons, as well as his early beating up and torture at the hand of Pilsudski's repression of the Ukrainian countryside. This is where Klymiv, to quote Carynnyk, acquired firsthand the notion of "collective responsibility", which was most directly inflicted on him by the Poles. His hatred of Jews grew even more rapidly, as he saw them as a fight column working for whoever occupied Ukraine.

In September 1939, with Germany's invasion of Poland, Klymiv and his fellow nationalist prisoners were freed from Polish jails. Ivan made his way to Cracow, now the center of the German-created Generalgouvernement. Klymiv enrolled in an officer-training course sponsored by the Germans. But as Carynnyk makes clear, Klymiv is a "kraiovyk", a homeland fighter who longs to go back to the front. As the OUN embroils itself in intestine fights, Klymiv meets fellow "kraiovyk" Stepan Bandera, and shares with him his disgust for the opportunists who have taken over the organization. As Bandera takes control of the OUN, he appoints Klymiv as leader of the North-West lands.

Klymiv crosses back into Soviet-occupied Ukraine, with his bodyguard, to organize a "collective effort" to clear Ukraine of its internal enemies and fight the Bolsheviks. But war in the East only starts in June 1941, as Klymiv receives the news that the war will start in "fifteen days".

As a small group of Ukrainian nationalist headed by Karbovysh enters L'viv, just after the German takeover of the city, Carynnyk makes its most provocative claim. Ivan Klymiv is not in the town of Zolochiv, seventy kilometres to the east and still behind Soviet lines. He is in fact in the town of Ruda Rozaniecka, 140 kilometres to the west, with the staff of the German 17th Army. Using the testimony of four witnesses (Volodymyr Lobai and three Ukrainian interpreters with the staff of the 17th Army) Carynnyk establishes that Klymiv discussed his plans to punish Jews in L'viv with the local German command. Klymiv and his group then made their way to L'viv and arrived there on the 1st of July.

Here, says Carynnyk, chronology is essential. Many accounts from L'viv, be it from the local population or the German army, establish that the great L'viv Pogrom only started on the 1st of July, and that the 30th of June was relatively calm. The point Carynnyk is making is that German troops did not encourage the population to carry out the pogrom, nor that the local population immediately took the opportunity to do so as soon as the German came in. It took the arrival of Klymiv to stir the population. Placards collected from the period also make a similar point. Klymiv explained: "I am introducing mass (ethnic and national) responsibility for crimes against the Ukrainian State and the Ukrainian Army". Similar events took place in Zolochiv, on July 3rd, that is, at least two days after the Waffen-SS took possession of the town. Same situation in Ternopil, on July 4. In each case a pogrom broke out not when the German army first occupied the town and townspeople found mutilated remains in NKVD prisons, but only two days later. This is the time Klymiv's men needed to come to town, reach an understanding with the German forces, round up their local supporters, and set the pogrom in motion.

The second presentation, by Professor Omer Bartov, discussed Memory, Erasure and Commemoration in Contemporary Western Ukraine, highlights the fact that the debate in Ukraine about the nature of the Second World War, in stark contrast with Western Europe and Great Britain, is not about acknowledging the "great" or "patriotic" character of the former, but rather about determining what made the war great, and for which patria it was fought. If we look at the debate from the perspective of against whom the war was fought,

argues professor Bartov, it is not certain at all that the trajectory of the historical debate in Ukraine is on the path to greater knowledge and understanding.

Broadly speaking, argues Bartov, narratives about violence in Ukraine during the war can be categorized into two opposites. On the one hand, the old Soviet narrative frames the issue as a great fight between Soviet citizens and fascist invaders, while marginalizing Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with the Germans and subsuming the genocide of Ukrainian Jewry under the mass losses of Ukrainian (Soviet) citizens. The Ukrainian nationalist account, on the other hand, defines the Great Patriotic war as a struggle for Ukrainian nationhood. This goal defines both domestic and external enemies. Ukraine, according to the OUN and UPA needed to be liberated from its Jewish and Polish inhabitants. Moreover, anyone who helped in this enterprise (i.e. Germans) was by definition an ally. In the end, according to this interpretation, Ukrainian patriots had to fight on all fronts, against the Soviets and the Germans, as outside enemies, and against the Poles and Jews, as internal enemies. While these two accounts may look like total opposites, they actually share the same silencing and suppression of the genocide against Ukrainian Jews.

Professor Bartov then discusses the issue of collaboration, liberation and occupation. In essence, says he, resistance or collaboration rests on the definition given to it by participants. Just as the Soviet occupation of previously Polish-held territories in 1939 was seen not too unfavorably by large segments of Ukrainians and Jews, so was the 1941 German occupation seen favorably by Ukrainian nationalists, which contrasted with Jewish perceptions of it as a catastrophe. By 1944, with the return of the Soviets, the roles are once more reversed. According to professor Bartov, the best way to research this contentious and complex period is to make use of the extraordinarily rich but underused testimonies kept in various archives mainly in Poland, the United States and Israel. These are mainly testimonies of the victims, which, joined with official documents from the occupiers, would give us a much clearer and deeper knowledge of what actually went on at the local level. Prof. Bartov's own research, for example, highlights the fact that distinctions between collaboration and resistance, complicity and rescue, denunciation and betrayal, become increasingly blurred the closer one focuses on daily life during the occupation. Moreover, the idea of "bystander" in the small, intimate interethnic communities of Western Ukraine is completely vacuous.

Professor Bartov's presentation draws with a plea for greater courage in challenging the taboos that have plagued historiographical discourse in Ukraine. In good comparative fashion, professor Bartov reminds that it took until the 1970s for West Germany to confront its history freely and stop relegating the perspective of the victims to the status of "mythical memory". This process was also quite difficult in the Fourth and early Fifth French Republics, in which the dominant myth of "Résistance" obscured for more than twenty years a past of massive collaboration and accommodation, as well as the distinction between those who were deported because they resisted the occupation, and those who were murdered because of their alleged "race". Discussing those events had a liberating effect on German and French societies, and this is perhaps the way forward for new generations of Ukrainians.

Professor Leonid Heretz commented on Carynnyk's presentation. He praised the powerful narrative presented by Carynnyk through which we can better understand the Bandera fac-

tion of the OUN. However, while Heretz conceded that ominous crimes were committed by members of the OUN in 1941, the remaining question is why? While one can find anti-Semitism as a component of some OUN publications, and while acknowledging the presence of what Russians coined as “daily life” anti-Semitism, the fact remains that the OUN was not an ideologically anti-Semitic organization. The kind of anti-Semitism we find in OUN is in fact quite common in other nationalist organizations of the period in Poland, Romania and other parts of Eastern Europe. For Heretz, it seems that the crucial question for OUN was statelessness, and that OUN was indeed obsessively anti-Russian, while not programmatically anti-Semitic. Heretz goes on saying that he does not find in OUN the strain of anti-Semitism that would explain 1941 violence. One possible avenue of explanation, says Heretz, might have been that the young, inexperienced leadership of OUN tried to prove the Germans that they too, were good anti-Semites, so as to gain access to a better bargain with Europe’s new hegemonic power.

Professor Dominique Arel, Chairholder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, commented both Bartov’s and Carynyk’s papers, noting at first that the evidence brought forward by the latter concerning the existence of the Lviv pogrom and its link to the OUN represented a tremendous contribution by itself. Prof. Arel further noted that the question now seems to locate those actions inside the philosophy behind Ukrainian nationalists, and ask why it happened. Then drawing from Bartov’s presentation, Professor Arel noted that Ukrainian society, much like French and German society in the 20 years after WWII, has to come up with its own free debate on WWII violence and specifically about anti-Semitism. Prof Arel shares Bartov’s opinion that this will have a liberating effect on Ukrainian Society. This will only possible when the Ukrainian State opens up a space of discussion on that matter.

Vitaly Vozyak (University of Chicago), asked if as in the French and West German case, the process of opening up a space for debate will take 20 years or more, and if there are any major attempts to discuss the pogrom issue through mass-oriented television programs. Prof. Bartov responded that the problem with such a large time period is that if Ukraine takes another 15 or 20 years to address the issue of the massacres against Jews, there will not be a lot of survivors still alive to share their stories.

Adrian Karatnycky noted that although the dual role played by organizations such as the OUN and UPA rendered notions of resistance and collaboration harder to define, one needed to take into account that the UPA itself experienced some radical programmatic changes in the latter phase of the war, embracing “civic” nationalism and rejecting fascism and anti-Semitism. He asked how this phenomenon fit into the discourse described by Bartov.

Oxana Shevel, finally, asked prof. Bartov if the current tendency in Ukrainian official state discourse to eliminate certain aspects of the violence that occurred during WWII is a function of the relative youth of the Ukrainian state itself, and in some way a means through which consolidate post-communist Ukrainian statehood.

John-Paul Himka questioned Carynyk’s chronology by stating that there exists film and documentary evidence that the Lviv pogrom started on June the 30th, when local Jews were

rounded up by the Germans to exhume the bodies in NKVD prisons. Himka also asked for a better definition of what should be understood as the Lviv Pogrom. Carynnyk maintained that survivors' memoirs, mainly, indicate that the pogrom did start on the 1st of July.

Orest Subtelny (York University) commented that although Carynnyk did present a thorough description of Ivan Klymiv's life as an OUN militant, he was not able to prove a direct connexion between the latter and the events surrounding the Lviv pogrom, thereby weakening its overall argument. Subtelny then quotes the German scholar Dieter Paul as having found no connexion whatsoever between Klymiv and the issue of pogroms. This is corroborated by the post WWII Soviet trials which did not mention the issue of the pogroms. On the issue of the Soviet trials, Carynnyk answered that this did not fit the Soviet narrative of Ukrainians as good Soviet citizens. As for the direct link between Klymiv and the pogrom, Carynnyk raises the importance of the meeting between Klymiv and the staff of the 17th German Army one day before the pogrom started as evidence. The idea, he says, of the OUN as not "programmatically" anti-Semitic, is ludicrous. Carynnyk also highlighted some of the lacunas in Dieter Paul's writings.

Session IV

The Contested Memory of Ukrainian Insurgent and Military Formations



■ **Sofia Grachova** (Harvard U)

Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian Politics of Memory after 2004

Throughout her work on the "politics of history" in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, Ms. Sofia Grachova, a scholar at Harvard University, discusses the policy pursued by President Yushchenko to, officially, "strive for reconciliation between the adherents of different versions of the war narrative."(p.3) The failure of this reconciliation attempt and its role in what the author dubs as "the war of memorials" are explored in her paper presented at the 4th annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, entitled "Unknown Victims: Ethnic-Based Violence of the World War II Era in Ukrainian Politics after 2004." In addition, Ms Grachova discusses the growing trend of local or municipal mobilization in opposition to the dominant nationalist depiction of history propagated by the powers in Kiev.

This 'war of memorials' has ushered in a growing attempt "by the state to nationalize the official narrative of national history, and, at the same time, to exploit with varying degree of success historical representations inherited from the Soviet times and still shared by wide population strata." (p.3) With the great exception of the law declaring the Famine of 1932-1933 as a genocide, the recent initiative of nationalization of history has proven unsuccessful. In fact, the attempt to reconcile conflicting narratives has simply resulted in two methods

of commemoration developing in parallel to each other, one which maintains the old Soviet account of the Great Patriotic War, and another which places the Ukrainian nationalist movements at the centre of the creation of the Ukrainian state. In pursuit of the latter, Yushchenko has utilized a strategy of glorifying the UPA and OUN, a strategy which has led to both international condemnation and domestic division.

The lack of cross-regional support for the pro-Presidential party “Our Ukraine” has hindered Yushchenko’s attempt to solve one of the most intractable issues of Ukrainian history – the role of Ukrainian nationalist military units in the war and in Ukrainian history in general. Officially, the President’s position with regards to this issue has been one of denial. This has proven to be an alienating policy for many regions in Ukraine, most notably the Eastern ones. Local authorities in these areas have recently shifted the ways in which they respond to the definition of history by the central powers. They have “assumed the right to criticize Yushchenko’s history-related decisions officially, and to determine for themselves correct interpretations of historical events.” (p.11) In order to establish their own narratives, many have erected monuments or organized exhibits contradicting the official discourse. One of the most provocative among these, an exhibit bearing the controversial title of “Victims of the Orange Revolution”, not only presented a commemoration of the victims who suffered at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists in the Second World War but also depicted contemporary Ukrainians opposing the rehabilitation of the UPA as new types of victims of Ukrainian nationalism.

While these accounts can convey the image of a fundamentally divided Ukraine, wherein diametrically opposed narratives coexist in the strictest sense of the term, Grachova posits that these visions remain reconcilable. In her analysis, she affirms that this ‘war’ remains an ongoing process, through which a common Ukrainian identity can be negotiated and constructed.

Discussing the elements of this paper, Dr. John-Paul Himka, a professor at the University of Alberta, noted that the way the Holodomor is brought forward in the current campaign complements the glorification of the OUN and the UPA. With this in mind, he discusses the striking disparity of perceptions of the famine between Western Ukraine, on the one hand, and Eastern and Southern Ukraine, on the other. Western Ukraine has shown, more so than other regions, an acceptance of the famine of 1932-33 as a deliberately organized Soviet attack directed at the Ukrainians as a people. While Western Ukraine was not directly affected by the famine, conceiving the Holodomor as genocide shores up a narrative in which the Soviet period is understood as one of foreign occupation, against which the OUN and the UPA fought valiantly. Conversely, in other regions, a feeling of stake-holding or complicity in the Soviet experience persists, and there was an absence of large-scale armed nationalist resistance after 1921. This serves to explain the divide which Dr. Grachova spoke of. Moreover, Dr. Himka shed light on a particularly troublesome element of the current process of identity construction in Ukraine, whereby xenophobic acts perpetrated by the OUN and UPA are justified through the use of the Holodomor. Furthermore, he inquired about the feasibility of a common Ukrainian identity, and whether this identity could be built on the basis of plurality. In addition, he questioned the role of Russian interest and Russian

initiatives in what is described as “the ongoing process of negotiating a common Ukrainian identity?” Does Russia have an interest in working towards a common Ukrainian identity? Is its role exaggerated by national democrats? How seriously, if at all, does the Russian factor complicate the internal debate?

On this note, Ms. Grachova warns against over-emphasizing the Russian role which, while it exists, is mainly directed through local Ukrainian actors. Therefore, it must be understood that the Russian narrative remains popular amongst many Ukrainians and it is that which allows it to exert influence on the Ukrainian domestic sphere. With regards to the feasibility of a common Ukrainian identity, she notes that the goal must be a “value-based view of history”, one which would accept the existence of a common over-arching narrative and does not equate the recognition of different group experiences with the negation of others. Fundamentally, however, she argues, groups responsible for the murder of civilians can not be venerated.

With regards to the creation of a common identity, Dr. Margaret Paxson, a scholar from the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C., implored for the ‘heroism of history’, and a greater understanding of the difference between group memory and history. The former is only formed following a filtering process which eliminates the complexities of history, thereby shrouding the real empirical truth. This truth, which composes history, must be kept in mind if one is to overcome the dilemma of conflicting narratives, suggests Dr. Paxson. Grachova, on the other hand, insisted that the ultimate goal must be something that is neither memory nor history, which forms an integrative role within society, based on common values. A member of the audience, Magdalena Dembinska, however, questioned whether it is even desirable for a state to propagate a nationalist narrative. She also highlighted that a re-framing of the way in which one conceives of this memory is necessary; instead of speaking of negotiation, which implies concessions on the part of the parties involved; she would rather speak of integration. Inversely, Ms. Grachova cautions that integration can imply the subordination of several memories to one dominant one, which they will be integrated into.

Moreover, the venue in which questions of memory are brought forward in Ukraine, as Sofia Dyak discussed, is also an important factor in the success of memory construction. With regard to this question, Dr. Grachova explains that, while the public sphere in Ukraine remains under-developed, civil society structures permitting this type of discussion exist within Ukraine. For example, the issue of the 65th anniversary of the UPA received much attention within the local media, and incited much discussion among the citizens. Ultimately, as Ms. Grachova’s work demonstrates, the process of memory construction is an inherently selective process, and division, at the very least in the short term, will accompany it. Fundamentally, however, this process should strive to incorporate as many narratives as possible, on the basis of common values and respect for difference.



■ **Olesya Khromeychuk** (U College London)

Memory, Identity and the Waffen SS “Galicia” in the Light of the Post-WWII Displacement

Despite its attempts to democratise itself and its current President’s challenge to reconcile the pro-Soviet and nationalistic military factions of the WWII period, Ukraine has no integrated response to the ethical and political significance of the Waffen SS “Galicia” division. When the military account of the Division does seem to receive some attention, there is no discussion of the “Galicia’s” members’ identity or their narrative. Having become a shameful taboo in conversations among Ukrainians, both within the country and in the Diaspora, the story of the “Galicia” division has acquired an enigmatic shade. Olesya Khromeychuk addressed the question of how the perceptions of the Waffen SS “Galicia” members and the interpretations of their identity have changed over time. By focusing on the concepts of memory and identity, Ms. Khromeychuk presented what is seen to constitute the ‘truthfulness’ of the Division’s narrative. Khromeychuk explained that the available memoirs written by the members of the Division are the only ‘truth’ for them. This ‘truth’, however, can be easily challenged when contrasted with other ‘truths’, for instance archival reports or memoirs of ‘the other side’, often written by Polish or Soviet authors. Although memory can serve as a link between the past and the present, it cannot be seen as the ‘truth’ on which such a narrative can be based. The task of analysing the identity of a group and the memory which has an impact on such an identity is a process of studying the traces of memory in its language, its oral tradition, its relation to history at the time of it being retrieved. The memories of the “Galicia” men and those who came in contact with them shapes the forms that their narratives take, the ways of recalling a dormant past and the creation of a certain perception of the identity of themselves (for the Division members) and of the “Galicians” as a group for those who came in contact with them.

Olesya Khromeychuk than addressed the role played by national identity in the Division’s own perception of itself and attitude towards them from the outside world. Ms. Khromeychuk explained that identity is actually something formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something “imaginary” or fantasized about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always “in process”, always “being formed”. She added that national identities are not something that individuals are born with. They get constructed and reconstructed according to the representation or perception of the group. In the case of the Division, it underwent a number of identifications, both within itself (during its active years as a military unit) and for the purpose of categorisation (once in POW camps); and none of these identities were based purely on the ethnicity of some fixed feature, uniting the group. This has changed, evolved over time together with the circumstances surrounding the group. This can be exemplified by the ‘nationality crises in the aftermath of WWII. The “Galicians” had only a nation to define themselves by, as their state no longer existed. Since national identity was not enough for categorisation purposes, they attempted defining themselves according to the region – Galicia in the west of Ukraine. This also posed a problem, for this region moved from belonging to one state (Poland) prior to WWII and then another (Soviet Union) after 1939. This confused not only the screening

commissions, who eventually chose to recognise the Division members as ‘stateless’, but the “Galicians” themselves. Olesya Khromeychuk explained that the contemporary perception of the Division and the importance of the memory surrounding the “Galicians” is not relevant in Ukrainian society for various reasons. Finally, Ms. Khromeychuk concluded by asking why if the first division became an imagined community, because of that statelessness and various things that united them against something else, then why the Second division is not part of that community?

Professor Orest Subtelny, York University, commented on Khromeychuk’s paper. He discussed the importance of looking at the memoirs of the people who founded the division, and why. The impact of memory was also important at that time for them. Especially the Ukrainian committees that worked with the Germans to set up this division. The context is also important to understand the decision to join the SS Galicia because they decided to join the “lesser evil” in 1943. They could join the German slave force in Germany, they could enter UPA, they could be used by the German army or they could enter a regular division. For many it was the lesser evil in 1943. In 2008, the same person using a different context under the influence of 50 years of various media exposure is confronted with the fact that they were on the side of an absolute evil. He added that he thinks that the discussion about imagined communities is interesting but he does not think it is really necessary in that case. They don’t have to imagine anything, they were Ukrainians. The only reason why the term Galician appeared is because the Germans would not let them call Ukrainians. Finally, professor Subtelny argued that the memories are not as relevant as the political issue of these topics. Viktor Yushchenko brought up the topic of the Holodomor and the UPA. Leonid Kravchuk didn’t talk about it before and Leonid Kuchma for nine years said very little about it, but President Yushchenko has his own political agenda and sees fit to bring these topics forward.

In the discussion, Omer Bartov said that we should be careful with memoirs and the way we use them. He added that he thinks that the Galician’s choice was pragmatic and not moral. Finally, professor Bartov asked if the Galicia division was linked with concentration camp. Olesya Khromeychuk answered that she doesn’t think it was an ethical choice. From what she read and heard from her interviews it was a pragmatic choice. Concerning the concentration camp, she did not see any evidence so far of the Galicia division becoming part of it as a unit. Professor Wsevolod Isajiw suggested making the distinction between two types of memory: collective memory and personal memory. Professor Katchanovski said that the division was not only fighting against Bolshevism and Stalin but they were fighting against fellow Ukrainians. Olesya Khromeychuk answered that Galicia was fighting on the Eastern front and only on the Eastern front, and did not fight fellow Ukrainians. They rather tried to protect, in their mind, the region from the Soviets. Roman Serbyn asked where one should place Ukrainians who fought for Stalin against Hitler? Ukrainians who fought for Hitler against Stalin? In both cases they were saying that they were fighting for Ukraine. Olesya Khromeychuk suggested that one way of dealing with this problem of fighting for Stalin and Hitler or fighting against Hitler and Stalin is precisely the micro-historical approach and a context analysis like she did in this paper.



Session V

The December 2008 Elections and NATO Summit



■ **Adrian Karatnycky**

(Atlantic Council of the United States)
*Ukraine and NATO on the Eve of the
December 2008 Summit*

■ **Dominique Arel** ((Chair of Ukrainian Studies)

*The Impact of the War on the 2008 December
Elections in Ukraine*

Throughout this session, Mr. Adrian Karatnychy, Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council of the US discussed the situation between Ukraine and NATO in the aftermath of the NATO Summit that was held in December of 2008. Mr. Dominique Arel, director of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies of the University of Ottawa, discussed the impacts that the 2008 August war between Russia and Georgia might have on the upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The panellists expressed three distinct positions concerning the current political conditions in Ukraine which consist of the following: The Russian-Georgian conflict has not had any foreseeable impacts on Ukrainian public opinion with regards to the proposed support of joining NATO, and it is very probable that Ukraine will receive a Plan of Action (MAP) from NATO in the near future, and that the political instability in Ukraine is caused by a deep structural problem resulting from ongoing competition between two executives in power at head of the state

The conflict that took place in August of 2008 between Georgia and Russia has been a test for analysing the development of Ukrainian public opinion. According to Professor Arel, following the Russian invasion of parts of Georgia, observers should have expected a crystallization of Ukrainian public opinion and a movement in favour of Ukraine joining NATO. However, this expected outcome did not occur. In contrary, the parliament, the elites, and the Ukrainian population revealed to be divided in regards to their opinions concerning relations with Russia. Three major political figures, including Mr. Yushchenko, Mrs. Timoshenko and Mr. Yanukovych illustrate this point well as they have all taken opposite positions concerning this matter. In addition, it seems that a good portion of the Ukrainian population would prefer to maintain a rather neutral position in regards to the conflict and increasingly its relations with Russian and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, Mr. Arel notes that due to this, reaching a popular consensus for progress towards Ukrainian membership in NATO will be a difficult task to accomplish in the near future.

With this in context, Mr. Karatnycky notes that it is unlikely that Ukraine will receive a MAP during the next meeting among NATO foreign affairs ministers that will be held in December as well as in the following one next year. In regards to the Alliance, the lack of popular con-

sensus and current instabilities within the Ukrainian political system has prevented it from taking a clear decision with regards to this matter. Moreover, Mr. Karatnycky has observed that the willingness of the population as well as the effects of the global economic crisis seems to put the process of integration on hold among the leading elites in Ukraine.

The multitude of different reactions taken throughout the Ukrainian political class faced with the Russian-Georgian conflict, as a recent issue, demonstrates the internal divisions and instability of the current Ukrainian political system. In essence, Mr. Arel recalls that the Ukrainian regime entered, this fall, a third constitutional crisis since the election of president Yushchenko. This demonstrates that the Ukrainian political system is struggling through a structural crisis, wherein the principal cause lies in the presence of two executive powers at the head of the state. In addition, Mr. Arel notes that these political crises are produced in an ambiance that is characterized by little respect for the rule of law as well as instability among political actors. Thus, this could lead to dangerous situations.

However, it has also been observed that political actors on the Ukrainian front do not have a history of resorting to violence throughout such conflicts and have a tendency to continue to respect the democratic process. Moreover, in spite of the dividing rhetoric produced by some of the major political figures, none have proposed any form of radical ideological political orientations. In addition, Mr. Karatnycky notes that the government has stayed quite moderate during the recent years; in spite of major changes within the government. This stability can be partially attributed to the large presence of business people in all political groups within Ukraine as well as a certain satisfaction towards economic developments throughout Ukraine. Finally, the anticipated parliamentary elections, following the dissolution of government by president Yushchenko, is subject to strong resistance, particularly from Mrs. Tymoshenko – a resistance that observers have difficulty explaining. The assumption made in response to this evokes some of the negative effects the global financial crisis has had in Ukraine, which conversely, enforces larger restraints and divisions among political actors which have appeared in political camps following the Russian-Georgian crisis

During the question period, Professor Lucan Way noted that since the Orange Revolution, pluralism and democratic competition have been intensified in Ukraine. He also questioned what the panellists think might be the reasons or motivations behind the polarisation of President Yushchenko's political positions throughout the last couple of months. Mr. Karatnycky responded by noting that many of these are short term electoral tactics rather than long term political strategies. In addition, Mr. Arel also notes that he does not believe that President Yushchenko and his political circle viewed his positions to be polarising but that the problem causing the lack of support for his policies can rather be attributed to a problem of comprehension on behalf of the Ukrainian population, mainly due to Ukraine's Soviet history. Moreover, professor Tucker noted that in spite of the negative effects of such a scenario, imposing a pause on the admission into NATO by Ukrainian authorities will allow the population to put aside some of the main conflicting disagreement with regards to NATO as well as its relations towards Russia. In this, Mr. Karatnycky agreed by adding that the possibility of this outcome would work in favour for the creation of a technocratic government which would ensure a period of relative stability in its socio-economic develop-

ments. However, Mr. King notes that this is contrary to the direction that has been taken by the Alliance during the Bucharest Summit in the fall of 2008; while this was engaged, at least verbally, in favour of a Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO.

Session VI

The Looming Crimea Question



■ **Charles King** (Georgetown U)

The “Unfreezing” Conflicts in Transnistria and Crimea

■ **John (Ivan) Jaworsky** (U of Waterloo)

Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet: Some Scenarios

This paper, presented by Georgetown University professor Charles King, discusses the “unfreezing” conflicts in Transnistria and Crimea, whereas Mr. John (Ivan) Jaworsky of Waterloo University presented a discussion on Crimea, Sevastopol and the fleet of the Black Sea.

During the weeks that followed the Russian-Georgian conflict, much attention has been given to the situation in Crimea as it is suspected to be a future “target” of the Russian government in an attempt to upset the regional situation around the Black Sea. Several important factors to this debate have been brought forth by these two panelists.

Although Russia has recently demonstrated an inclination towards diplomatic and military activity in the Black Sea region, Mr. King highlights that this can be attributed to the current status quo. As similarly demonstrated through the case of South Ossetia, Russian intervention is intended at limiting the West’s power and influence in order to bring change to the current “frozen” conflicts that have followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian interventions have also occurred in an attempt to limit Western influence in the region. In this, Mr. King notes that Russian reactions have been relatively reserved considering the amount of power they could have imposed in the region. Mr. King also discusses the diverse characteristics that many of these “frozen wars” hold in common. The difference between peaceful resolutions and the outburst of violence from one separatist region towards post-soviet locations can be partially caused by the recent violent reactions of newly independent governments towards separatist regions. In addition, throughout many of these cases, separatist forces have been victorious in wars that took place throughout the 1990s. These victories as well the willingness of international organizations to intervene have therefore rendered international negotiations a difficult task throughout the years that followed. Thus, Mr. King notes that external interests, at times, have perpetuated a number of “frozen” conflicts; just as this has been the case for the cancellation of the “Kozak plan” which began as an attempt to find a solution to the conflict between Moldavia and Transnistria.

Moreover, Mr. Jaworsky notes that in spite of the chances for potential conflict revolving around the Crimea area in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union; this region is, arguably, well represented in comparison to other regions located within post-soviet territory. According to Mr. Jaworsky, the ongoing stability of this situation has been supported by several factors. They include the fact that the Kiev authorities have a capacity to negotiate and come to a consensus with the Simferopol authorities as well as the amount of tolerance given to political elites in Crimea, the ongoing support given by the Tatars of Crimea towards Ukrainian authorities, the presence of large security measures put up by Kiev in the region, as well as the absence of any significant support given by higher Russian authorities towards the Crimean separatist movements, and lastly, international mediations that have favored finding a solution through a compromise between the Kiev and Simferopol authorities. Unfortunately, this situation cannot be considered to be a permanent one for the years to come, as the deterioration of the current socio-economic situations in Crimea and the inaction of Kiev in the region seem to have promoted wider regional instabilities. In addition, Russian willingness to maintain an influence in Crimea, mainly through to its military presence in Sebastopol, brings uncertainties to the future of Crimea.

During the question period, Mr. Karatnycky, suggested a scenario concerning the future of Crimea, which was not addressed by the panellists – that of “controlled instability”. In such a situation, Russia could assist separatist forces through political and diplomatic interventions, while labelling this as recognition of the wishes of the Sebastopol population. Throughout such a scenario, Ukraine would be faced with little possibility for reactionary measures. Prof. Jaworsky responded by noting that it has been an easy task of blaming Russia for the development of such events, however, Kiev would have had a large part of the responsibility if such a destabilization would occur. Moreover, in spite of the presence of important security measure, Ukrainian authorities do not evidently have a strategy for coping with the current socio-economic problems that have developed in the region.

Lucan Way, University of Toronto, also raised questions in regards to the role of local interests and revenues that have resulted from trade through the uncontrolled borders of the “cold-conflict” in Georgia and the rest of the region. Mr. King responded by stating that these issues exist indeed, but that they have had a rather stabilizing role for these regions. In addition, he notes that, having the Moldovan case in mind, if one would like to find a durable solution to these conflicts, one would have to certainly accept the fact that part of the gains received from trafficking must be considered legitimate and that corruption will persist, even once a political solution has been found. Finally, the audience asked the panelists to describe the ways in which Ukrainian authorities have responded to the vote taken in the Simferopol parliament which resulted in favour of supporting the Russian invasion of Georgia. Mr. Jaworsky responded by noting that Kiev had done nothing while reminding us that the Crimean parliament had no authority to make such a decision.

Saturday 25 October

THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON UKRAINIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Session VII

The Clash of Economics and Politics



■ **Mihai Varga** (U of Amsterdam)
*Turning Crises into Opportunities: Strategies of Labor
Representation at Plant Level in Ukraine*

Mihai Varga's presentation "Turning Crises into Opportunities: Labor Representation in Ukraine" is based on fieldwork conducted in five cities in Ukraine and five in Romania. Among his key findings were that trade unions (TU) are structurally weak and that workers generally distrust them because of the ideological legacy from communist times as well as because of a lack of understanding of the role and the methods of the TU for the protection of workers. They are also confronted with structural problems caused by the privatization process, and it was revealed that in many cases, employees did not know who their employers were. Flaws in the implementation of the current laws on labor organizations and workers' rights were also pointed out as the main barriers for workers to efficiently organize. His leading research question focuses on how the way trade unions can overcome structural labor weakness at the plant level. His hypothesis underlines three conditions for the potential successful mobilization of trade unions. The first involves massive wage rears, the second, the absence of social safety nets and finally, a context in which the employers are known by the workers.

Serge Denis, discussant on the panel, addressed three main questions: 1- From the necessary conditions under which TU would engage in collective action, the first two ones are external to the activity of workers. The only factor that proceeds from TU intentions would be a kind of an initiative, the capacity to articulate this understanding and an activist leadership. This dynamic could better explain the different forms of action people take in any type of situation when his or her immediate survival is at stake. Denis explains a certain type of situation that is unfolding but it cannot be seen as a method of action or frame of action because these conditions are too narrow. 2- Independence of the TU is crucial for the effective representation of the interests of the workers as the text shows well. In Germany, mergers of the old Eastern and Western Unions settled this type of issue. How could this influence the events in Ukraine? Are there any links between countries of FSU and communist blocs and meetings for experiences to be shared? 3- The paper underlines the absence of a formalized and stable legal mechanism for regulating industrial workers-management relations. The necessity for employers and employees to use political actions to ensure the settlement of an agreement, the use of external methods, in a certain manner extraordinary, seems to be a manifest symptom of the absence of legal/ institutional methods. Do work relations in Ukraine constitute

today but one particular aspect of an unfinished or stalled national institutional development or is this problem specific to that kind of relations?

Reacting on the comments made by the discussant, Varga explained that formalized legal procedures do exist on paper but that employers don't have incentives to implement them. The TU of Vinitza was the only union to challenge the authorities to exclude employers from TU ranks, they win the case and had the law changed. Concerning the plan of action, Varga argues that sociologically speaking, TU will always be considered as secondary organizations. The TU can be absent but workers won't die whereas if you take away companies, the workers will die. Therefore, TU always have a reactive role.

In response to questions that were addressed to him by more than one participants, Varga further elaborated on the relevance of studying the action of trade unions at the plant level, mentioning, in the context of post-communist countries, that the defense of workers' rights was still at the base level and that plant level labor unions are the most relevant actors in this environment. As pointed out by Jessica Allina-Pisano, the relevance of the actions of trade unions should not be presented as a teleological issue based on their sole existence but rather on the fact that there are variations between their action leverage and influence on their situations.



■ **Adam Swain** (U of Nottingham)
Performing Corruption in Ukraine

Adam Swain, University of Nottingham, introduced his presentation with a quote from scholar and practitioner Anders Aslund to introduce the topic of his presentation, "Performing Corruption in Ukraine". His critiques of the corrupt economic and political environment in Ukraine testifies, according to Swain, of the construction of the idea of corruption by what he calls the "corruption industry" that invokes corruption to explain economic development and the legitimacy of political and economic actors. The argument proposed by Swain aims at lifting the lid on the corruption black-box to highlight the ways in which political-economic actors struggle over the definition of political-economic practices as either legitimate or illegitimate and in so doing construct the category of "the corrupt".

The contention is that the idea of corruption is one of the ways by which Western centers of authority seek to capture and align actors with their interests, which they do through the activities of experts defining and measuring corruption, producing discourses and indexes that serve their purposes of shaping economic identities. That is to say, the way corruption is a discursive category produced by expert communities, subjected to technologies of calculation and benchmarking, and to experimentation through the practices of anti-corruption activities. This industry compares the post-soviet economic practices to those of the West and promotes one direction for future economic development. One evidence of this phenomenon becomes evident when one does review the enormous amount of scientific literature

that focuses on issues of corruption in the Former Soviet Union which has increased tremendously in the last years.

Vitaliy Voznyak, the first discussant, suggested he clarifies the term Corruption industry that is fairly new in the literature and has no commonly accepted definition. Voznyak underlines that the same term is used by other scholars to describe the corrupts, whereas Swain uses it to describe those who want to fight corruption. Also, he mentions the necessity to strengthen the proposition stating that Ukraine is an emblematic case in regards to the corruption industry. Finally, he proposes to the authors to further elaborate on how the process of deployment of western ideals to align the post-soviet countries economies works? Who performs this and through which mechanisms?

The second discussant, Joshua Tucker, directed his main criticism towards the premises of the approach as well as the scientific demonstration itself. First, he raised concerns about the perception that the proposed analysis is setting paradigms instead of actually demonstrating that there is a deliberate construction and instrumentalisation of the idea of corruption. Second, the issue of the existence of an objective phenomenon was raised. Since the approach challenges the essence of the concept of corruption, voices expressed concerns over the definition of the phenomenon. Can there be real objective behaviors which can be labeled as corrupt? How is it possible to define corrupt attitudes? There is enough congruence in some actions to say that some activities will always fall in the category of the corrupt.

The argument put forward by Swain and the issues raised by discussants led to a vivid discussion that went beyond the dispute over the choice of variables and which challenged the apprehension of political phenomena as well as the issue of normativity in the social sciences.

Among the alternative explanations provided by the panelists was the idea that the reforms that have led to major economic transformations produced more corruption opportunities and made corruption more profitable. Another perspective proposed to understand the use of the discourse on corruption not as an intentional construction of a definition but rather as the instrumentalization of a phenomenon that exists and that is used as a tool by political and economic actors to reach their objectives. Supporters of this critical approach nevertheless stressed the importance of pointing out the perception of corruption by the people who are concerned with it and play a role in this process. Finally, the issue as to whether or not this paper proposes a normative approach to the issue of corruption, its meanings and uses was discussed, again confronting the positivist and the constructivist understanding of social reality.

Session VIII

Economic Transformation and Social Dislocations



■ **Maureen Murney** (U of Toronto)
*The Politics of Gender, Alcohol Consumption,
and Addiction in Western Ukraine*

This paper presented by Maureen Murney discusses the perceptions and stereotypes held by people in Ukraine about alcohol addiction problems, particularly in regards to women. The author's ethnographic study, completed over a one year period, emphasizes the repercussions that may be caused due to the social stigmatization of Ukrainian women with alcohol addictions. More specifically, the author attempts to demonstrate how this stigmatization renders treatment for women with alcohol addiction more difficult. Murney affirms that alcoholism among Ukrainian women is often perceived negatively due to the traditional role and image that women tend to hold in society. Consequently, alcohol problems are driven to be more difficult for women to overcome than for men.

The main purpose of this research is to demonstrate the relation between societal discourses of women's behaviour as well as the treatment of public medical centres in relation to women's experiences with alcohol addiction problems in West Ukraine.

Murney draws a parallel between alcoholic treatment offered to women in other Western countries as well as in Eastern Europe. She concludes that the medical services in Ukraine are poorly developed in comparison to others found within Western countries. Moreover, she explores cultural factors, where she notes that, in Ukraine, the marginalization of alcoholic women is due to the perceptions maintained by a patriarchal society that emphasizes a clear distinction between gender roles.

The author presents her research through a « top-down » analysis. She believes that the cultural attitudes as well as social practices must be studied in order to determine which treatment methods can offer higher success rates. In addition, this will also enable one to analyse the cultural attitudes and practices that must be studied as they can often pose barriers to recovery. This research observes the current social control in Ukraine while attempting to understand the practices that rise from social stigmatization.

Murney affirms that the current health system, which offers counselling and treatment for alcoholism in Ukraine, shows low success rates. Practices common during the Soviet period are still predominant and influence new treatment measures. In spite of recent developments in psychological aid, individuals often complain of the poor treatment they receive. Current conditions are extremely criticised as personnel of health institutes are substantially more occupied with financial incentives. In Ukraine, treatments associated with detoxification do not show any significant success rates due to the continual influence of soviet medical treatment for alcoholism.

The main point made by the author reflects the impact of women's role in Ukraine. Alcoholism and the recognition of such problems represent the largest problem faced by Ukrainian women – a problem that is not as common among men. Women have larger difficulties expressing their struggles with alcohol due to the risk they face of societal stigmatization. Women in Ukraine are often still expected to reflect upon religious values where they are represented through the incarnation of purity modeled to the image of their mothers. Finally, Ukrainian women must also correspond to the ideal beauty figure as they are subsequently pressured by men and sexist ideas. Alcoholism among women is also viewed to have wider impact on the entire family, which conversely, aggravates the problem. According to Murney, these stigmatizations have direct effects on treatment procedures, which therefore, render alcoholism an increasing difficulty for women to overcome.

In essence, the progress for treatment of alcohol addiction problems among women in Ukraine depends on the evolution of medical treatments, financial development and reducing social stigmatizations towards alcoholic women.

During the discussion that followed, Margaret Paxson recognized the devastating effects that alcohol problems can cause in Ukraine. With this, she also recognized the long and difficult history this issue has received during the Soviet era where alcoholics, at times, were extremely marginalized. She notes that alcoholic treatment in Ukraine is often not as accessible or beneficial than in other North American countries. Paxson believes that an anthropological approach to the study might bring a more holistic vision to the issue without disregarding the research that Murney has undertaken. However, Paxson wonders how stigmatization manifests itself among social groups. If this stigmatization is the cause of individual rejection, than how can this dynamic occur in different groups within society? Paxson proposes an in-depth study of various groups and their social dynamics in order to understand the origins of stigmatisation.

In addition, she also poses the question as to how the diffusion of the ideal figured women in Ukraine excludes alcoholic women in society. Can the effects of stigmatization towards women have any positive effects on treatment for alcoholic women? If women receive such a high amount of social pressure, then could this not be used to have positive effects on women; pressuring them towards treatment? Although the interviews conducted by Murney reveal the contrary, it would be interesting to analyse the opinions of women who passed through other means to overcome their alcohol addiction problems.

Finally, Paxson critiqued the negative aspect drawn concerning all alcohol consumption within Ukrainian society. Alcohol addiction problems can arise from excessive consumption as well as social stigmatization; alcohol consumption can have positive impacts on social relations between people. Must stigmatization automatically be linked to alcohol consumption? Paxson proposes to look at how alcohol consumption is maintained among groups before an addiction problem arises in order to better evaluate the impacts of stigmatization.

During the question period, Jessica Allina-Pisano pointed out that this research emphasizes the rather extreme side of alcohol addiction problems among women, and she questioned the validity of the information presented by Murney as well as the analysis conducted through

interviews. In order to understand women's experiences, this study is based on the notion that Ukrainian society is patriarchal. Allina-Pisano, therefore, questions how this can be demonstrated throughout the research and whether or not such judgements made by the author are sufficiently plausible. Murney responded by noting that such behaviour is not only observable throughout the public realm but is also evident in the private sphere.

Sofia Dyak and Olesya Khromeychuk noted that the study focuses on the image of women in society. Dyak notes that stigmatisation does not only concern women, but can also have an impact on other individuals that do not consume alcohol. She also notes that men subsequently experience social pressures concerning their professional developments. If society divides both, the roles of women and men, then men must be professionally successful as the family relies on their support. The study focuses on pressures put forth on women, without addressing the effects of such pressures on men.

Finally, Oxana Shevel questioned whether or not it would be important to discuss the problems that can arise due to tolerance with regards to alcohol consumption in Ukraine which is not taken into consideration once an alcohol addiction problem arises. She suggested that attention should be given to the measures taken by the government facing the mentalities of people in order to assess any possible improvement. Murney responded by stating that one of the main problems remains that monetary funding for these measures often come from abroad, as the state does not have the means to take charge of these issues.



■ **Natalia Khanenko-Friesen** (U of Saskatchewan)

*Oral History of De-collectivization in Ukraine in the 1990s:
Rural Experiences and Perspectives*

This anthropological study presents an analysis of the discourse of residents in Ukrainian villages in an attempt to demonstrate the effects of de-collectivization on their lifestyles in order to understand their interpretations of history. This research is one among others that have been completed; however, the author brings new perspectives to this study as it takes place within a Ukrainian context.

This project discusses some of the dramatic social transformations caused by the de-collectivisation of Ukrainian villages and their residents. Through a number of interviews, Khanenko-Friesen attempts to understand the post-socialist transformations and their impact on residents of Ukrainian villages. This study is completed mainly through an analysis of the discourse in which villagers explain their historical interpretations and the consequences lived by historical events on their community and current lives.

The history of the de-collectivisation process is based on 112 interviews which took place in twenty different rural Ukrainian communities. Respondents included individuals born between 1936 and 1951 as they are those whom have experienced war – therefore their testimonies are, arguably more relevant for the study. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate

the ways in which collective representations are reflected throughout individual discourse since the post-communist transition in relation to the development of a newer form of collective memory that has developed in rural populations.

Khanenko-Friesen attempts to identify the collective memory throughout the historical narratives of individuals questioned during the research project. Throughout the narration of their lives, their attitudes, their nostalgia and sensitivity, the author began to see the emergence of this collective memory.

Throughout the interviews, the author placed particular attention to the importance of individual experiences. While villagers narrate their their past, the author is able to derive a diversity of historical interpretations they hold, which conversely, reveal the transformations in their living styles in a post-soviet era. The author also attempts to contextualize their memories in relation to the current time period. Thus, this has demonstrated that in order for individuals to understand the societal change within their communities, they have attempted to change their past to reflect upon these changes. Ukraine's recent history remains contested throughout public debates as different interpretations are still present. Thus, the study reveals that discourse is an important factor that needs to be analysed in order to understand the effects of de-collectivisation.

The study is focused in rural areas due to the dramatic changes that de-collectivisation has provoked on the lives of individuals residing in such areas – notably on their identities in a context of war. The identities projected by the respondents, reflect their collective farm work as well a family discourse which is drawn in relation to their genealogical identities. When asked to discuss their collective histories, respondents had a tendency to often include a discussion of their personal lives as villagers in Ukraine.

The discourses represent a reconstruction of historical information which reflects a contradiction that indicates the presence of conflicting views in relations to various representations of the past. These contradictions also reveal the influence of a ruptured period in time in which these villagers had experienced.

Through a deep analysis of these interviews, the author is challenged by several obstacles. Respondents often had a personal interpretation of their past, wherein their professional identities came up as integrated parts of their personal lives. Khanenko-Friesen notes, however, that Ukraine's identity formation is not completed and that this is partially due to the consequences of de-collectivisation and changes that individuals have experienced due to it. Finally, the variety of interviews conducted have demonstrated strong similarities between the various discourses concerning history in an after-war period. These individuals made reference to themselves as subjects; their experiences were similar while they also shared some of the same contradictions between interpretations of reality.

Throughout the discussion, presented, by Jessica Allina-Pisano, many of the comments that were brought forth pertained to the epistemological and empirical methodology of this research. Thus, de-collectivisation and official interpretations do not depict the importance

and effects that de-collectivisation can have on individuals and social relations. In this case, the challenge remains in evaluating the significance of such impacts while keeping in consideration the diversity of Ukrainian villages. Allina-Pisano wonders whether the research evaluates the results taken from further villages in the same manner as villages situated closer to the center.

Moreover, she notes that the passivity observed throughout some of the respondents in their interpretation of the past does not indicate real passivity, but is rather an indication of people not carrying out the impacts they have from social changes. Therefore, Allina-Pisano suggests a deeper study on de-collectivisation and its impacts prior to moving towards an analysis of discourse offered by villagers.

In addition, the main point of this critique revolves around the subjectivity of respondents throughout their narratives. Some residents had a tendency to change their stories when they were asked to discuss their experience. Their speech demonstrates several differences between their personal interpretation of history and the account given throughout the interview. Individuals will adapt their stories in front of a public and a researcher. Thus, it would be important to carefully choose the remarks; however, this type of analysis would require a wider effort. Allina-Pisano adds that without decreasing the importance given to personal experience, she believes that keeping this in context can influence present reactions which can, at times, render the historical narratives more tragic.

During the question period, Adam Swain questioned how this research, notably during the analysis of interviews, adapts to the inter-subjectivity of the remarks that were collected. Khanenko-Friesen responded to these comments by affirming that the narratives given by residents of the villages were always studied in comparison to official narratives; although she affirms that none of these were systematic.

She recognizes that it is difficult to trace the line between reality and the information given by respondents. This is where the analysis itself becomes a methodology wherein she attempts to control or calculate the level of inter-subjectivity. The author notes that she takes several precautions in interviews in order to avoid any faults in the analysis of the narratives given and that this method also makes it possible to evaluate the effects of official discourses on people's perceptions of history.

Session IX
Elite and Mass Politics



■ **Lucan Way** (U of Toronto)
*Deer in Headlights: Authoritarian Skill
and Regime Trajectories after the Cold War*

In his presentation, University of Toronto's Lucan Way examines the diverse trajectories of transition countries following the collapse of the USSR. He presents a voluntarist argument for regime change over time by examining leadership choices and structural explanations to understand regime outcomes, citing geography, linkages to the west, resources, state and party capacity, and national identity as potential factors. He argues that these factors, combined with high linkages to the west, have facilitated western pressure and democratization. Way then asks the question of how Eastern European regimes, especially Belarus, got from early 1990's liberalization to a return, or not, of authoritarian leaders. In that endeavour, Way focuses less on the outcome of this transition than on the process it represents. In his view, structural variables do not explain outcomes, although they provide key insights. More voluntarist variables, on the other hand, such as competition over time, seem to provide more satisfying answers. Way thus suggests that the explanation is a matter of autocratic skill.

Way examines and theorizes leadership skill and examines a number of factors, using structural factors in Belarus as an example. He outlines the factors and events in Belarus as follows: Experience and competence relate to authoritarian skill. An autocrat then makes decisions in a new environment that is influenced by the international environment, more specifically, the spread of multi party elections. At the beginning of the 1990s, he says, most autocrats lacked any good knowledge of possible international sanctions and their effects. They also lacked interpersonal and media skills, and misjudged the nature of the opposition threat.

Using Belarus as the case study, Way finds that structural advantages promoting autocracy were indeed available to the supreme power holder, President Kebich. But the former didn't how to use the advantages provided to him by the structural situation. Kebich successfully monopolized parliament and control over the state. The weak opposition gave him impetus. He controlled the levers of power but crucially misjudged the balance of power, his own authority and popularity, and depended on the unreliable support he received from Russia. This was compounded by little experience with public opinion polls. Kebich never believed the polls could represent public opinion. Thus, he seriously misjudged the seriousness of the opposition threat. Kebich focused his efforts on control of the media to attack nationalist elements, but he crucially ignored Lukashenka.

The first practical mistake that Kebich made was to call a presidential election when he did not have to. He gave Lukashenka, a relatively unknown politician, the opportunity to become better known in the early 1990s through an anti-corruption commission. Lukashenka was put as the head of an anti-corruption enquiry which he used to his political advantage, expos-

ing grave corruption scandals related to major power holders in the ruling party. Because of his modest origins and low rank in the Party structure, Lukashenka did not attract attention from Kebich and was allowed to go on with his inquiry.

Lukashenka never uncovered all the details of Party corruption, but he mounted a campaign which hammered down the idea of “clean politics”. Kebich clearly underestimated Lukashenka’s persuasive powers. He also believed that information given to him, the one stressing his upcoming victory in the presidential race, were reliable, while in fact they were not. The extensive vote manipulation he relied on did not happen because of local incompetence of his men. However, when Lukashenka took power, he fully asserted his power and benefited that structural conditions for authoritarianism were already present. He formalized state control, increased monitoring capacity and fired many people.

Way reaches a number of conclusions. Theorizing leadership skill is difficult because identifying it independently of outcome is nearly impossible. The assumption here is that there is a high correlation between leadership skill and success. By exploring the impact of authoritarian skills within structural factors that promote authoritarian rule, Way attempts to explain outcomes in terms of actor choice. This includes dependence on the west for assistance, inexperience with multi-party systems, elections overconfidence, misconceptions and misreading of public opinion.

Oxana Shevel commented on Way’s paper. She pointed out that Way’s work is groundbreaking in its analysis of authoritarian leaders’ skills. On the conceptual side, Shevel notes that we need to question the conceptualization of the role of leadership. This is of great importance for all works done in a voluntaristic approach, as opposed to structural ones. The approach taken by Way, she says, concentrating on a set of skills that authoritarian leaders are assumed to possess or not, leaves aside a discussion of leaders’s beliefs and values.

Some leaders, she says, might be characterized as having more democratic inclinations than other, while others will try to cling to power more forcefully. Some leaders actually under-used power. Way’s presentation, for example, concentrated on the switch from Kebich to Lukashenka, while he could have looked at Schushkevitch. She also questioned what Way meant by “leader learning”, that is, the fact that authoritarian leaders learn from their predecessor’s mistakes, as well as from their own. She asked whether “learning” is an event or a process, since it seems Lukashenka learned rather rapidly from Kebich’s experience. A last point concerned the sharp difference between structural and voluntarist factors. To what extent is this distinction clear cut? Are structural factors completely independent of what leaders do?

Other elements include the question of why a presidential system was not adopted in Belarus, which might be argued is conducive to greater autocratic power. When one looks at other East European and Central Asian cases, it is not clear why this was not done in Ukraine. Another precise point concerns the extent of the power turnover when Lukashenka came in. Way did not develop on the team and close circle accompanying him to power.

Charles King praised Way's focus on process rather than outcome. However, he questioned how much Way's framework differed from a much older tradition, that of "consolidation". He also asked at what point the study of "transition", "consolidation" and regime change ends? That is, when exactly are academics studying simple "politics" versus transition? Jessica Allina-Pisano asked what evidence would prove that the authoritarian leaders Way mentions actually wanted to achieve the supreme power. How can we know they acquired "authoritarian skills" to actually take power? There is a tendency, here, she says, of assuming that authoritarianism is somehow embedded in certain individuals and not in others. And what does Way mean by "successful authoritarian regime"? There seems to be an emphasis, she says, on regime reproduction, and a certain quality of power.

Adam Swain raised some questions on Way's methodology, having mostly to do with the accurateness of the information gathered from interviews with authoritarian leaders and their close guard. Mihai Varga, finally, mentioned that Way could use a more thorough discussion of the literature pertaining to the much contested concept of learning, particularly in the case of leadership.



■ **Joshua Tucker** (NYU, US)

People Power or a One-Shot Deal? The Legacy of the Colored Revolutions Considered from a Collective Action Framework

Joshua Tucker presents here a paper which should not be interpreted as an empirical inquiry. It is rather a blueprint for how to think about mass protests and collective action after the occurrence of so-called colored revolutions. This framework should be a means to think about the future of protests and the sense of people power. Tucker notes that a closer examination of the logic leading to the coloured revolutions produces a "coloured revolutions paradox". The occurrence of a new form of political injustice, for instance, calls into question the need of taking it into the streets in the first place. The question is then whether people will participate in a second wave of mass protests. Put in other words, are the coloured revolutions one shot events?

The paper examines abusive states as a collective action problem for citizens. The base principle is that citizens are better off without an abusive state. In normal life punishment costs are high and massive electoral fraud is the event that changes the calculus. In the case of massive electoral fraud, then every individual experiences collective action simultaneously. The individual costs of protests are much lower than in normal life and the key is the crowds, which are harder to repress and diffuse the cost of individual action. The potential benefits in confronting an abusive state in the aftermath of electoral fraud are also very high, that is, it means "throwing the bums out". This is the framework which explains the colored revolutions in the first place, but is this likely to be repeated?

Tucker proposes a simple model expressed as follows: A $t + 1$ model gives us costs and benefits that change over time. The intuitive answer is people power. Nobody got shot. Everyone

had a good time. The costs in people's minds in protesting against the government should thus go down. That is, they should be more likely to go out in the streets a second or third time. A downward revision of costs and an upward revision of benefits occur. Confronting the state is an empowering feeling. In Serbia and Georgia the "bad guys" were indeed thrown out. In a game theory framework, governments should know that if they try to steal an election people will take to the streets, so they should take their risks with a competitive election. But why haven't there been more protests in colored revolutions countries if the cost went down, and the benefits went up? This is the question Joshua Tucker is putting forward to the audience.

Tucker also examines whether the costs of protesting in country A can be affected by country B? That is, is the successful use of mass protest in country B informed the citizens of country A about the costs and benefits of protests? Do potential protesters learn from what has happened in other countries and how the international community responds? Are there international norms of whether it is acceptable to crackdown on protestors? Tucker then examines the question of what could change. He proposes four scenarios. If the good guys come to power, then the question is will they use fraud to stay in power? If the bad guys get back in power, do people then protest again because they protested to get the bad guys out of power in the first place? What if the good guys are defeated in the next election and the bad guys are back, do people protest again? Is there a credible scenario? What if the original election didn't throw out all the bad guys entirely? Regarding empirical observation, Tucker maintains that he is uncertain whether there is any way to test his framework. The universe of cases might be too restricted and the conditions for further mass protest might not all be present at the same time.

Lucan Way commented on Tucker's paper. Way noted the incredible potential of Tucker's paper and stressed that it addresses an under-studied phenomenon, that of "one-shot protests" and massive popular mobilisations, but in a restricted time frame. This is particularly interesting in societies where civil society is normally seen as weak. Way commented on the four scenarios of popular protest presented by Tucker, which are rooted in collective action theory. While interesting, says, Way, they should be located in the broader literature on contentious politics, such as Tarrow's political opportunity structure. Tarrow also suggested, says Way, that once people live a free and open society, with competitive elections, such as the post-Orange Ukraine, there is not anymore the need to go on the street and protest. Way insisted that the rational-choice approach, although very useful for the case of the colored revolutions, needs to be complemented by other perspectives to understand the absence of mass protest in Ukraine and elsewhere after the colored revolutions. The fact that pro-Russian forces are no longer in power in Ukraine, thus toning down the nationalist component of protests, as well as the fact that no elections have been "stolen" by the party in power, might explain part of the outcome. Way also suggested Tucker look at cases which are indeed "one-shot deals", such as Serbia in 2000, and compare them with cases where large protest have been regularly taking place after the overthrow of the authoritarian government, such as Armenia. The sample of cases selected by Tucker should also include failed cases of mass protest aimed at regime overthrow.

Mihai Varga noted that mass protests cannot be understood as single events that just happened without any “pre-history”. He noted that Tucker’s framework should include a study of smaller but no less important events which in the end led to such mass mobilizations. The T time, representing the occurrence of the mass protest, has a T-1, says Varga, such as 1981 for the Polish Solidarnosc Union, which paved the way for the events of 1989. And what exactly are the characteristics of colored revolutions? What is the universe of cases? Oxana Shevel, in the next comment, questioned whether the “stealing” of an election by a corrupt leader is such a good predictor of mass protest, since the label “corrupt” can be thrown in all directions, including at the opposition. Charles noted that to consider “colored revolutions” as cases is in itself problematic. It might be said that this categorization is the result of the American “democratization industry”. King noted that if we want to study regime response to mass protests, then we should select cases of failed and successful overthrow of authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, if one is studying mass protest itself, then the selection of cases should be made without regard to state response. Jessica Allina-Pisano noted that Tucker disposes of two few cases to proceed with an empirical verification of his framework, and hence needed to bring in the literature on contentious politics. The colored revolutions cases should be kept as illustrations, rather than reified objects.