

DOMINIQUE AREL

**THE HIDDEN FACE
OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:
Ukraine in Denial
Towards Its Regional Problem**

Translation of
“La face cachée de la Révolution Orange:
l’Ukraine en négation face à son problème régional”
(*Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest*,
Vol. 37, No. 4, Décembre 2006)

Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa (Canada)

The Orange Revolution has prevented the theft of a presidential election. The huge popular mobilization and absence of violence have captivated world opinion and, quite unexpectedly, called the inexorable drift towards autocratic restoration in the post-Soviet region into question. The “Orange” parties have since demonstrated an inability to work together, producing divided governments and an ultimate divorce between President Yushchenko, in coalition since August 2006 with his 2004 rival, Viktor Yanukovych, and the charismatic Yulia Tymoshenko, who reclaimed the barricades of the opposition. Post-Orange Ukraine staggers, although it is a Ukraine that hinges on a permanent contestation of political power: between political parties, between the President and the Prime Minister, between the executive and the legislative branches, and between center and periphery. This political pluralism may be volatile, but it gives meaning to the use of the term “revolution” to characterize the events of Fall 2004. The nature of the political regime has truly been transformed in Ukraine and the contrast with Russia is as strong as ever.

Ukraine’s Achilles heel, however, is the regional factor. Any state, especially a sizeable one, must deal with a certain tension between the center — the locus of political power — and the periphery, often distinct according to identity, economic, or historical criteria (and, more often than not, combining all three). Peculiar to Ukraine is the fact that the periphery can encompass virtually half of the country in crucial elections.

The Orange Revolution revealed a geographically polarized Ukraine where the victorious candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, obtained overwhelming majorities in seventeen contiguous territories of the

Center-West, while the loser, Viktor Yanukovych, received enormous majorities in ten contiguous territories of the South-East. The same electoral dynamic played out during the parliamentary elections of March 2006, when parties close to Yushchenko and the former Prime Minister Tymoshenko swept the Center-West, while Yanukovych's Party of Regions did the same in the South-East. In both cases, in 2004 and 2006, the proportions were similar: a little more than four-fifths of Ukrainian citizens from the Center-West supported candidates or parties associated with the Orange Revolution, while four-fifths of South-East electors voted against.¹

The regional question is taboo in presidential circles. The "Orangists," whether directly associated with government or active in civil society, generally refuse to accept this geographical polarization as legitimate. This denial can be explained by their incapacity to distinguish the grievances of anti-Orange regions, where the Russian language predominates overwhelmingly, from Russia's ambitions. Russian discourse, it is true, is bent on emphasizing "two Ukraines" to sap the credibility of the Orange Revolution. In this black and white approach, the authentic Ukraine—Russian-speaking and Russophile—is opposed

1. In December 2004, Yushchenko obtained 81 percent of the vote in the 17 territories of the South-East, against 16 percent for Yanukovych. In the ten territories of the South-East, Yanukovych crushed Yushchenko — 76 percent to 19 percent. Data calculated from the official results available on the web site of the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua). In March 2006, the parties sympathetic to the Orange Revolution gained 65 percent of the vote in the Center-West, against 12 percent for the Party of Regions and its allies. In the South-East, the anti-Orange parties smashed the Orangists — 60 percent to 14 percent (Khmelko 2006). If we only include the vote given to parties that passed the parliamentary threshold— the Tymoshenko Bloc and "Our Ukraine" in the Orange camp, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party in the anti-Orange camp —, the proportion of the vote in the Center-West was identical in 2004 and 2006 (84 percent pro-Orange, 16 percent anti-Orange) and almost identical in the South-East (81 percent anti-Orange in 2006, 80 percent in 2004). In 2004, a small percentage voted against both final candidates. This is why, in the Center-West, the combined tallies for Yushchenko and Yanukovych reach only 97 percent (81 + 16). In order to compare these results with those of a parliamentary election using proportional representation, where the votes against all parties are not included in the official results, the 3 percent of negative vote in 2004 is eliminated, allowing us to state that Yushchenko, in 2004, received 84 percent of the vote that counts in the Center-West. In 2006, the Socialist Party initially presented itself as pro-Orange, before defecting to the other camp in July. Its parliamentary results (8 percent in the Center-West, 3 percent in the South-East) are not included in the comparison.

by an Orange Ukraine manipulated by external forces (America) intent on uprooting Ukraine from its historic Russian environment.

The Orangists play into the Russian hand by associating any grievance for autonomy to a “separatist” threat and a scheme orchestrated from Moscow. In this typically instrumentalist view, Eastern Ukrainian elites are portrayed as playing an autonomy card far removed from the aspirations of their own electorate. The result is an absence of recognition that the regional problem has domestic roots, a denial that could have serious consequences, not for the territorial integrity of the state, since the majority of the population in anti-Orange regions define themselves as “Ukrainians,” but for the political integrity of Ukraine, that is to say, its capacity to transform the assets of the Orange Revolution into the foundations of a strong reform state, based on pluralism, transparency and respect for the law, three essential ingredients to join Europe. The strength of a state, it must be emphasized, is not contingent upon the degree to which political power is centralized.

The French have invented, since their Revolution, a model of state-building imposed from the center. This model continues to fascinate nationalist elites throughout the world, most certainly including those associated with the Orange Revolution. Yet, in fact, this model constitutes an exception in the way states developed in the modern era. Instead, the long-term trend, particularly in the last decades, has been to cope with a durable regional diversity, bringing out the best (multinational democracies) and the worst (violent conflicts). Fifteen years after independence, twelve years after the first regional polarization caused by the 1994 presidential elections, it should be clear to all that the top-down model is as illusory in Ukraine as it has proven to be for states emerging from the decolonization process in the 1950s-60s. The regional factor, it goes without saying, is prone to be manipulated by external forces, in their quest for influence, but the point we are making here is that regionalism has, first and foremost, an intrinsic value. It must be taken seriously, for its own sake.

This article explores what is peculiar about Ukrainian regionalism through an examination of the abundant academic literature that has developed in the last decade. Most of this literature is based on public opinion surveys generally conducted at the national level, but sometimes using a local sample, by internationally reputable survey institutes. Some notable contributions are also made through anthropological research. Data from surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (*Kyivs'kyi mizhnarodnyi institut sotsiologii* —

KMIS, KIIS in English) are the most frequently cited in this critical literaturereview, due to the great visibility of this institute in surveys on political orientations. With a single exception, that of the final round of the 1994 presidential election, the KIIS pre-electoral surveys or exit polls have always predicted, within a statistical margin of error, the results of parliamentary or presidential elections in Ukraine.²

Our thesis is the following: Ukraine is regionally polarized according to the language that individuals prefer to speak, when given the choice, within regions endowed with distinct ethnic structures. The major ethnic cleavage in Ukraine is not an opposition of nationalities (such as Ukrainian and Russian), but rather an opposition of cohesive, or homogeneous, national identity, on the one hand (Ukrainian), and a dual, or bi-ethnic, identity, on the other (Ukrainian/Russian). The political orientation that polarizes Ukraine is a two-dimensional “Russian factor,” touching both on the official status of the Russian language and the type of relations that Ukraine should maintain with Russia. The territorial division in Ukraine is a durable phenomenon, but this division rests upon demands for *inclusion*, rather than secession.

1. Regionalism and Politics

Regionalism can be found in any polity. The tiniest county is proud of its own ways as conveyed by popular sayings. In Old French, in a pre-modern era where identities were mostly local, “country” (*pays*) referred to what we now call “region.” Even now, the expression *être en pays de connaissance* (to know your way around) does not evoke the state, even though *pays* also stands for *country* (as in “how many countries are in the UN?”). Yet what interests us here is not the existence of a certain regional culture, as natural as the existence of a rural culture, but regionalism as a factor of political division. Since regionalism is by definition territorial, our analytical focus is thus territorially divided political communities.

Territorial division operates at three levels. The first, which triggered our investigation, is an *electoral cleavage*. As mentioned earlier, the decisive round of the Orange Revolution, as well the 2006 parliamentary elections, have geographically divided the state in a fairly polarized manner. Ukraine has experienced four presidential elections

2. During the second round of presidential elections in 2004, these surveys, which predicted a Yushchenko victory, played a decisive role in legitimizing the popular mobilization against the fraudulent result announced by the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine.

since independence and two of them, in 1994 and 2004, have produced a striking geographical division. These were the two instances where a challenger defeated an incumbent — Kuchma in 1994 and Yushchenko in 2004.³ Parliamentary elections, however, had never split the country until 2006, notwithstanding the fact that all political parties were regionally based and proved incapable of receiving significant cross-regional support.

The second level is that of *political orientations*. What is meant here is not support to a political party or a specific candidate, which pertains to the electoral cleavage discussed above, but rather opinions on questions deemed politically salient by a society. A major issue in democratic societies is the role of the state in economic life. Since the Soviet Union had, for all intents and purposes, eliminated the private sector in the legal economy, the development of a market economy constitutes one of the most controversial questions in post-communist politics in Ukraine. The electorate, of course, is not homogeneous in its perception of economic change, but all serious studies, based on representative surveys, agree on a central point: the variation in popular orientations regarding economic policy does not follow a regional axis. Each region is divided regarding the benefits of a market economy, but the opinion is not balanced, as skepticism, if not rejection, predominates everywhere (Kubicek 2000, Malanchuk 2005). Individuals tend to negatively portray their own economic conditions and this predisposition is a constant across Ukraine, whether in rural or industrial areas. What territorially divides citizens of Ukraine is, in fact, a cultural dimension which could be called the “Russian factor.”

The third level deals with *political mobilization*. The Orange Revolution revealed a civil society in the throes of a political uprising (Tucker, 2005). However, the demonstrators on the *Maidan*, Kyiv’s central square, came overwhelmingly from the Central and Western regions, and disproportionately from Western provinces annexed during the Second World War (Arel, forthcoming). In the South-East, meanwhile, no significant demonstration was reported. The anti-Orange expressed their opposition at the ballot box, but otherwise stayed at home. We thus witnessed a remarkable regional division

3. In 1994, President Kravchuk had called early presidential elections and was seeking a second mandate. In 2004, President Kuchma, already twice elected, was proscribed by the Constitution to run again. His handpicked candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, was the incumbent Prime Minister.

in popular mobilization — an asymmetrical division of activism in contrast to passivity.

Political parties, the other key locus of political mobilization, have barely acted as platforms for the organization and aggregation of interests during the first decade following independence. Ukraine had only two real parties — the Communist Party of Ukraine, based in the East, and *Rukh*, a nationalist formation, entrenched in the West.⁴ Nevertheless, the vote in the South-East was in fact divided between Communists and unaffiliated deputies, the latter subsequently joining fleeting parliamentary factions close to presidential power. As for *Rukh*, it split in two in the late 1990s and lost its appeal. It is only with the introduction of an electoral system entirely based on proportional representation, in 2006, that a systematic regional division in parliamentary party politics can be observed. The Party of Regions, initially confined to the Donbas mining stronghold, now speaks on behalf of all the anti-Orange provinces that gave it huge majorities. Its sole competitor, a Communist Party on the verge of extinction, received thirteen times less support.⁵ In the Orange zone, the contest is essentially between Our Ukraine (Yushchenko's party) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, with a small representation of the Socialist Party of Oleksandr Moroz in rural areas. The electoral system of pure proportional representation has thus engendered what had previously been missing: (the following is grammatically incomprehensible) a territorial polarization in the parties that crossed the parliamentary threshold.

It is useful, at this point, to clarify what is meant by *province*, *territory* or *region*. A province is the highest administrative unit of a state. The name varies across states: oblast in Ukraine (a Soviet terminology), department in France, province in Canada, state in the United States. Ukraine has 24 provinces, as well as an autonomous republic (Crimea)

4. Ukrainian intellectuals are allergic to the term *nationalist*, due to its discredit in Soviet propaganda, where it was reduced to extremism and incitement to violence. Internationally, however, scholars agree to define nationalism not as a means of political action, but as a principle of legitimacy (Gellner, 1983; Brubaker, 1996).
5. An extreme-right party, the Natalia Vitrenko Bloc, received more votes (6 percent) than the Communist Party (4 percent) in the South-East, but did not enter parliament since its national score was less than 3 percent. In July 2006, according to a KIIS survey, the Party of Regions held 77 percent of the vote in the South-East on its own, against 4 percent for the Communist Party and less than 1 percent for Vitrenko. See *Elektoral'ni namiry vybortsiv Ukraïny: v razi pozacherbovykh vyboriv do Verkhovnoi Rady* (Electoral Intentions of Voters of Ukraine in case of Early Elections to the Supreme Rada) at <http://kiis.com.ua>.

and two cities with a distinct status (cities of republican subordination) — Kyiv, the capital, and Sevastopol, home to the naval installations of the Black Sea Fleet, leased to Russia. Since three of the 27 largest administrative units of Ukraine are not formally provinces, we are using the more general concept of *territories* to describe these units. As for the term *region*, it is a geographical referent that often does not correspond to an administrative division, as is the case in Ukraine. Ukrainian statistics and official electoral results do not aggregate data above the 27 administrative units, and these territories are invariably listed in alphabetical order.⁶ This practice dates from the Soviet era. Officially, “regions” do not exist.

Yet since political orientations, electoral behavior, political mobilization, economic structures, ethnic composition, spoken language and historical experience all denote a regional distinctiveness that goes beyond the official territorial breakdown, our challenge is to seek the most optimal way to group these territories into regional clusters. We thus have to be very clear on one point: the delineation of Ukrainian regions is an academic construction, devised for analytical purposes. This does not make the exercise arbitrary. The point is to demonstrate the usefulness of resorting to a given territorial construction over another in attempting to better capture the dynamics of political division in Ukraine.

A first method of grouping territories into regions corresponds with the current electoral fracture. On one side, the ten anti-Orange territories; on the other, the seventeen pro-Orange ones. This division is generally presented as following an East-West axis even though, geographically, it could as well resemble a North-South dichotomy. Yushchenko won in 2004 in part because slightly more people live in the West than in the East and the turnout in the West was higher.⁷ But the division was not only electorally-based. Five of the Eastern

6. With two minor exceptions: the Crimean Autonomous Republic is always listed first, followed by the 24 oblasts in alphabetical order, and the two cities with special status.

7. Fifty-two percent of the adult population lives in the West, against 48 percent in the East (data compiled from KIIS survey samples). The turnout in the last round of the 2004 presidential election was 77 percent. The average was slightly higher in the West (79 percent), due to a rate of participation approaching 85 percent in five of the seven Western-most provinces, while the turnout in the East was 75 percent, despite a high score (84 percent) in the two Donbas provinces. The turnout in Donbas had been fraudulent in the second round (94 percent!), but not in the final round. Data obtained from the website of the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua).

provinces, the industrial heart of Ukraine, have urbanization rates far above the national average while, in the West, more than two-fifths of the population live in rural areas. More than 80 percent of Russians live in the East. More than 80 percent of Easterners prefer to speak Russian, while Westerners prefer Ukrainian in more or less the same proportion. Historically, all Western territories have belonged at some point to the Polish-Lithuanian State, while none in the East have been under its rule. Once economic, cultural, historical and electoral criteria are factored in, the East is clearly distinct from the West.

Most scholars, however, agree that this binary regional division obscures, in fact, important regional distinctions within each zone. The disagreement is on the number and boundaries of such regions as analytical tools. Most studies on regionalism in Ukraine are based on a quadripartite division: West, Center, East, South. This author first proposed it in his early writings (Arel, 1991), before intriguing electoral results led him to further divide the Central region into a Center-West and a Center-East, thereby producing a Ukraine of five regions (Arel & Khmelko, 1996). Barrington and Herron (2004), on the other hand, argue that regional variations are more statistically significant when Ukraine is divided in eight regions. What is the evidence?

In many respects, there is no doubt that Galicia, comprised of the provinces of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs'k and Ternopil, makes up a distinct region. A territory under Polish social domination for nearly five hundred years, Galicia provided the stage for Ukrainian national mobilization between 1870 and 1940 (Himka, 1988; Magocsi, 2002) and, once again in the late 1980s (Birch, 1995). Galicia stands out due to its religious heritage (the Uniate Church, Catholic with Orthodox rites, unique to the region) and because its capital, L'viv, is the only important city in Ukraine where the Ukrainian language clearly predominates. Galicia was annexed to the Soviet Union during the Second World War, along with the neighboring territories of Volhynia (Volyn and Rivne provinces), Bukovina (Chernivtsi province) and Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia province). All of these territories have in common their belonging to states other than Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union in the modern era: Poland in the case of Volhynia (before the Partition of Poland and after the First World War) and Galicia, Austria and Romania for Bukovina, Hungary and Czechoslovakia for Transcarpathia. Thanks to this historical lineage, these regions are the

only Ukrainian territories to have experienced contested parliamentary elections in the course of several decades prior to the Soviet era.

It is precisely for this reason that this region is clearly distinct from the rest of the country, argues Sarah Birch (2000), as its electoral tradition has forged a distinct political culture that has survived fifty years of Soviet rule. This tradition impels parties to organize according to an ethnic criterion. Galicia has experienced elections between 1873 and 1938 and nationality (ethnicity) has always been the main cleavage explaining electoral behavior. In other words, Ukrainians voted for “Ukrainian” parties. In the interwar period, when a class cleavage began to crystallize under the pressure of the Soviet model across the border, Galician socialist parties nonetheless ethnically divided themselves: Ukrainian or Polish. No significant party was able to overcome this division. The same phenomenon was taking place in Volhynia and was becoming stronger in Bukovina and Transcarpathia, territories less developed where the ethnic “Other” was not Polish, but Romanian or Hungarian. This inclination to vote massively for a party playing the national card reappeared during the first contested parliamentary elections of the Soviet Union in 1990 and of independent Ukraine in 1994 when the nationalist movement Rukh dominated Galicia and, to a lesser extent, Volhynia, acquiring virtually two-thirds of its deputies in these two formerly Polish regions (Arel, 1991; Arel and Wilson, 1994). Since then, Galicia and Volhynia have always voted as a bloc in Ukrainian elections, reaching a new plateau during the Orange Revolution when the Yushchenko vote was close to 95 percent in Galicia and 90 percent in Volhynia.

Birch uses this historical factor of political culture to group the seven territories annexed during World War II into a single region: Western Ukraine. Barrington and Herron prefer to highlight what distinguishes Galicia, separating the West into three regions. In conducting a survey on ethnic distance, measuring individual perception towards an ethnically defined “Other,” the authors (2004) found that Bukovina and Transcarpathia have statistically more in common with the South and the East than with the other Western provinces. A subsequent survey (Barrington and Faranda, 2006), on the degree of closeness vis-à-vis Russia, produced the same results, while having the added effect of bringing Volhynia closer to the agricultural provinces of the Center, away from Galicia. How Ukraine relates to Russia is the most determinant political orientation in electoral behavior, as we will see later. The research by Barrington and Faranda indicates that this orientation is divided in three large geographical blocs: hostile in

Galicia, ambivalent in Volhynia and in the Center, and favorable in the South and East, as well as in what the authors call the “Southwest” (Bukovina and Transcarpathia).

This tripartite division can probably be explained by a distinct identity structure. Ukrainians from Volhynia tend to be Orthodox, rather than Greek-Catholics as in Galicia, making them closer to Russia. On the other hand, the ethnic “Other” in Volhynia, as in Galicia, was Polish or Jewish and disappeared during the Second World War following massacres and deportations, to be replaced by the Russian Other. Bukovina and Transcarpathia, however, have preserved to this day important non-Russian minorities (Romanian/Moldovan and Hungarian) within their midst, which could have the effect of lessening the ethnic cleavage with the Russian Other. In addition, a “Rusyn” national movement, for which the “Other” is Ukrainian, has developed in Transcarpathia. From this perspective, there is little doubt that the Southwest and Volhynia are distinct from Galicia.

This being said, it is appropriate to clarify our purpose in categorizing regions in Ukraine. We are interested in regionalism as a determining factor of political life. This factor, as we previously explained, can be observed at the level of electoral behavior, political orientations, or political mobilization. Barrington and his co-authors focus on political orientations, but their relationship with voting and the organization of parties is not linear. The hostility felt in Galicia towards Russia led to the creation of a strong nationalist movement. The ambivalence found in Volhynia did not, however, produce a distinct party, more moderate towards Russia. The point of our regional categorization is precisely to explain voting and party politics. This is why, in the last analysis, the Birch thesis on the common political culture of the seven Western provinces seems to us more convincing. Bukovina and Transcarpathia, as Russophile as they may be in their orientations, are clearly on Galicia’s side during elections.⁸ Ukrainian nationalist parties have always been able to penetrate these two provinces in the past sixteen years, but never the Southern ones. Meanwhile, electoral orientation has always brought Volhynia and Galicia closer. In the political arena, Western Ukraine constitutes a separate zone.

The second large region is the Centre, the agricultural breadbasket of Ukraine, stretching from both sides of the Dnipro river and

8. The one exception was the very first parliamentary election, in 1990, when a single deputy from Rukh was elected in Transcarpathia, and none in Bukovina. The validity of the electoral process in these regions had, however, been questioned at the time (Arel, 1991).

including Kyiv, the capital. The 1994 presidential elections caused a surprise when the challenger, Leonid Kuchma, managed to overcome the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, by sweeping the three agricultural provinces of Dnipro's Left Bank. Since the Left Bank was incorporated to the Russian Empire a century and a half before the Right Bank, which stayed under Polish domination (until the partition of the 1790s), this division between Left Bank (Center-East) and Right Bank (Center-West), the latter comprising six provinces and the capital, seemed appropriate. Beginning in 2002, however, the electoral behavior of the two Banks has drawn considerably closer, as well as their political orientations towards the Russian question, according to Barrington.

The heart of the East is the Donbas, the first industrialized zone in the Russian Empire and, until the 1960s, the great mining region of the Soviet Union, made famous by Stakhanovism, an emulation campaign that glorified industrial workers for allegedly surpassing unreal productivity norms. The Donbas, comprising the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, is also the region in Ukraine with the second highest concentration of ethnic Russians, after Crimea. In terms of electoral behavior, there is little doubt that the Donbas exhibits a political culture as distinct as Galicia, since the only durable political parties that have marked the South-East in the post-Soviet era have originated from this region: the Communist Party of Ukraine, which created a sensation in the 1994 parliamentary elections, but find itself nowadays on the verge of extinction, and the Party of Regions, which achieved a phenomenal regional success in the 2006 parliamentary elections. The Donbas, like Galicia, always votes as a bloc, yet lacks the Galician democratic tradition. It produced the greatest electoral frauds of the last few years, such as the fabrication of nearly a million votes in the second round in November 2004 — the triggering factor of the Orange Revolution (Wilson, 2005).

Industrial Ukraine also includes the provinces of Kharkiv, a military industrial centre; Zaporizhzhia, famous for its hydro-electrical dams; and Dnipropetrovsk, specialized in metallurgy. In the polarized elections of 1994 and 2004, these three provinces massively sided with the Donbas. This electoral trend, combined with their unique rate of industrialization in Ukraine, have led many analysts to include them in a region known as Eastern Ukraine. Barrington and Herron (2004), however, argue that in their statistical studies, the Donbas is sufficiently distinct to warrant a division of the East in two — the other provinces becoming, in their terminology, the Center-East. It is indeed difficult to deny the distinct identity of the Donbas. While

Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k, in particular, have experienced the Cossack Hetmanate and produced elites that governed the Soviet Union, the Donbas developed a "frontier" mentality, nurturing a direct, and yet distant relationship with the center of political power, i.e., Moscow under the Soviet Union. The Donbas is more hostile to the establishment of Ukrainian schools and its anti-Orange vote was even more considerable than in Barrington and Herron's Center-East. In terms of political organization, on the other hand, it is important to note that the Party of Regions, while dominated by elites from the Donbas, managed to win decisively in this Center-East, as well as in the South, as we will see shortly, without having to compete against parties originating from Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovs'k. Regional distinctions yielded to a pan-regional Donbas party.⁹

The South, finally, brings together the coastal provinces of Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa, as well as the Crimean peninsula. Each of these provinces is divided between an industrial south and an agricultural north. The continental South was sparsely settled until the defeat of the Crimean Khanate—a Crimean vassal state of the Ottoman Empire—by Imperial Russia in the 1770s. A vast campaign of colonization was thereafter launched in these territories that became known as "New Russia" (*Novorossia*). Odesa, a cosmopolitan city with a very large Jewish population, became the third port of the Empire. Crimea, in many respects, is in a league of its own. It is the only province of Ukraine that belonged to Russia during the Soviet era (until 1954), the only one with an ethnic Russian majority (58 percent in the 2001 census), the only one hosting a politically mobilized ethnic minority (the Crimean Tatars, deported in 1944, that have returned since 1989 and form approximately 14 percent of the population) and the only one to have known a secessionist movement (between 1992 and 1995). Crimean electoral behavior is far more homogeneous than in the continental South and much closer to the Donbas, the other region of Ukraine with a strong concentration of Russians.

All in all, in each case, the four large regions of Ukraine could be divided in two, bringing the total to eight. This is what Barrington and Herron claim, based on statistical analyses of political orientations. We believe, however, that a quadripartite division is more useful, first of all,

9. See footnote 5.

for practical reasons. It is difficult to represent in our minds a political community divided in eight. As argued above, regional construction is a methodological exercise, but if the tool that we select makes our understanding more difficult, the exercise misses the point. Moreover, representative samples are far more difficult to obtain when the sub-units are too small. For instance, a typical representative national survey is unable to obtain a sufficiently representative sample for Crimea alone. Finally, and more importantly, it all depends on what we are trying to explain. In the last analysis, electoral behavior and the organization of political parties are very well explained through a four-region prism, which does not prevent us from taking into account intra-regional variations in our analysis. All things considered, these four regions follow a certain logic of historical incorporation to the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union and, in the case of the East and South, of territorial settlement.

Some authors call into question the relevance of a regional division, due to the fact that the arbitrary nature of the borders could very well obscure a continuity in political orientations or electoral behavior on each side of the demarcating line (O'Loughlin, 2001). Aren't boundaries more fluid than a regional division would assume? The point is well taken, without, however, being decisive. We must first be reminded that the raw materials from which these regions are constructed are not themselves methodological constructs, but administrative units (the provinces, or *oblast*) that have been in existence for several decades. Ukraine, contrary to other former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan, has not undertaken a new demarcation of its provinces. Within the provinces, the district (*raion*) constitutes the smallest administrative unit. Border districts are thus attached to a different administrative hierarchy. The question is whether, in spite of their administrative division, districts on each side of a provincial border have more in common among themselves than with other districts within their province. This is an empirical question that has yet to be systematically tested. The 2004 and 2006 elections have revealed an important polarization of the vote along the border separating the Center-West from the South-East, each border province producing an overwhelming majority for a candidate or bloc, diametrically opposed to the result of the province across the border. This leads one to believe that if the border demarcation glosses over a certain degree of

continuity, it appears, nonetheless, to have a decidedly minor effect on the geographical distribution of the vote.

2. The Economic Factor

Is the regional division in Ukrainian electoral politics explained, first and foremost, by economic factors? This would appear to be the case since, as indicated above, anti-Orange Ukraine is highly industrialized, while most Orange provinces have kept an agricultural vocation. Yet this simple observation of Ukraine's economic structure does not explain in itself the polarization of electoral behavior. After all, the rate of urbanization in the South (close to 65 percent) is not that much higher than in the Center (around 60 percent) and a KIIS survey in 2004 demonstrated that there is no correlation between the occupation of respondents and their political and electoral orientations, with the exception of pensioners, opposed in principle to the Orange Revolution (Arel and Khmelko, 2005).¹⁰ Thus, workers in the West part with these brethren in the East in defining votes. Why?

In the last fifteen years, Ukraine has undergone an economic transformation that has had a tangible, and in principle objectively measurable, effect on the economic conditions of its inhabitants, and how they evaluate their own situation and future prospects. A first objective indicator is the level of unemployment. Unfortunately, official statistics on the matter are not very reliable (Birch, 2000). In 1993, at the height of hyperinflation that was ravaging the Ukrainian economy, and a few months before an election that would polarize the country, the unemployment rate was officially lower than 1 percent. The expected wave of lay-offs instead took the form of a policy where employees were officially kept on the payroll in order to maintain access to social benefits — which, as in the Soviet era, continued to be distributed in the workplace — while in practice receiving a miserly wage that had to be compensated through work not monitored by the state. This practice touched all of Ukraine. The one statistical study that offers an economic explanation of the 1994 polarized vote (Kravchuk and Chudowsky, 2005) makes the mistake of

10. This nationally representative survey was conducted by KIIS between December 8, the day the Supreme Court ordered a third round of presidential elections, and December 26, the day of the vote. 2,076 respondents were randomly selected in all Ukrainian territories and 1,666 agreed to take part in the survey. Thirteen occupational categories were created and only one (*pensioners*) showed statistical significance in explaining the vote.

confusing the rate of unemployment with the turnover rate, that is to say, the degree to which people changed jobs. Data from 1993 suggest a certain correlation between this turnover rate and regions, the rate being slightly higher in the East than in the West. Yet changing jobs has a totally different effect, and not necessarily a nefarious one, on an individual's economic condition than the effect of losing one job altogether.

Another objective indicator is the level of revenues. Could it be that post-Soviet economic transformation hit some regions harder, leading to a protest vote? The data suggest the opposite. In a survey conducted a few weeks before the decisive December 2004 vote, no statistically significant correlation could be established between household revenues and voting preference (Arel and Khmelko, 2005).¹¹ Inequalities in revenues, with the development of a middle class and of the so-called "nouveaux riches," have nevertheless become far more pronounced in the last decade. Yet, they are common to each region and do not explain why, for instance, the relatively poor East and the relatively wealthy East vote *en bloc* for the same candidate. A recent study by Malanchuk and Hrycak (2005), comparing the cities of Donetsk (East) and Lviv (West), points out that a critical mass of residents of these two cities give more weight to their social identity as businessmen, rather than to their ethnic, religious, or political identity. On the crucial question of the kind of relations that Ukraine should foster with Russia, a question that, as we will see later, is determining in explaining electoral preference, these two groups with similar and relatively high revenues are nonetheless split along a regional cleavage.

Ukraine elected its first President, Leonid Kravchuk, at the same time as it achieved independence through referendum, in December 1991. Kravchuk presided over an economic decline that, relatively speaking, was worse than the Great Depression that struck America in the 1930s, a galloping inflation that reached a monthly rate of 50 percent, and a political paralysis in addressing the crisis. With such a catastrophic economic outcome, one could think that the South-East regions, which voted massively against Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential elections, causing his defeat, were expressing their opposition to the economic downturn in Ukraine. Indeed, all surveys revealed the disapproval of voters from these regions and their profound dissatisfaction with their economic conditions. Yet the level of disapproval was as high among

11. See footnote 10.

voters of the Center-West, who nevertheless supported Kravchuk. Kubicek (2000), in analyzing Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1992 and 1996, notes that residents from all regions had an extremely negative opinion of their economic situation. Khmelko (1994, cited by Hesli, Reisinger and Miller, 1998) adds that, in the months preceding the defeat of Kravchuk, 71 percent of voters throughout Ukraine considered the “economic crisis” their greatest worry. Had the elections produced a landslide, as happened at the same time in Belarus, where the outsider Lukachenko crushed the incumbent Prime Minister with 80 percent of the vote, the argument of an economically rational vote would have been convincing. What happened instead was a situation in which voters sharing an extremely negative evaluation of their economic environment came to diametrically opposed conclusions regarding their political preference.

The 2004 presidential elections took place at a time when Ukraine was enjoying its highest rates of economic growth since independence, reaching a record 12 percent in 2004. The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was at its peak in the anti-Orange regions of the South-East, higher than in the fiercely pro-Orange Center-West by approximately 12 percent. And yet Kyïv, the capital, by far the wealthiest territory of all, was an Orange fortress (Aslund, 2005). A better indicator of the standard of living is revenue per capita. With the exception of Kyïv, regional differences were minimal (Aslund, 2005). Salaries are higher in the East, and particularly in the Donbas, a Soviet feature that remained true even in the years of economic crisis that followed independence (Birch, 2000; Hrytsak, 2001). The cost of living, however, is higher in the industrial East. Still, the perception that citizens of Ukraine have of their economic condition remains extremely negative throughout the country.

A more convincing argument underscores socio-economic institutional structures as a factor of dependence in electoral orientations. In the Soviet Union, an individual depended upon his workplace, his “collective” (*kollektiv*) to have access to welfare benefits, such as health care, group vacations and even the supply of consumer goods. According to Allina-Pisano (2005), this structure has largely been preserved in the industrial provinces of the East and the local organization of voting precincts is in the hands of the same people upon whom people depend for their employment and social benefits. This dependency generates a climate of conformism, if not fear, towards candidates supported by the local authorities. In the agricultural Center-West, on the other hand, the system of collective farms has

collapsed, increasing economic insecurity and yet, at the same time, freeing individuals from their dependency upon local potentates. The geographical polarization of the vote during the Orange Revolution could thus be explained, not by objective or subjective indicators of economic development, but by the socio-economic context, or structure, in which individuals express their electoral preference.

This thesis is intriguing, but it is difficult to prove. The electoral process in Eastern Ukraine has been marred by numerous violations in the first two rounds of the 2004 presidential elections, duly documented by election monitoring organizations. Fraud is the first level of “administrative resources” (*adminresursy*), a terminology that has become ubiquitous in post-Soviet political discourse. However, Allina-Pisano is not focusing on fraud *per se*, but on the control exercised over electoral behavior, a type of administrative resources that is far more efficient. But how do we know when electors are prevented from expressing their true interests? This line of reasoning reminds us of the Marxist notion of “false consciousness,” when the working class is incapable of understanding where its interest lies. The argument, nevertheless, has an empirical basis, that of the *kollektiv*. To test it, we should compare the behavior of electors working for private enterprises in the East – and they are quite numerous – with those still dependent on a *kollektiv*. Such a study would be enlightening, but the huge support for Yanukovich or the Party of Regions seem to suggest that a context of non-dependency in the workplace does not significantly affect electoral behavior. As for the Orange regions, it must be noted their “agricultural” orientation is relative. Not taking into account Kyïv, the rate of urbanization in these regions is inching closer to 60 percent and one must wonder whether the Soviet structure of *kollektiv* has not also been preserved in the urban areas of the Orange zone, as they have been in the East. If that is the case, then how can we explain the Orange vote?

Moreover, the rural vote remains a mystery. Since the establishment of competitive elections in Russia and Ukraine in 1990, the peasant vote was initially the most conservative, massively supporting communist parties or their successors (Arel and Wilson, 1994; Clem and Craumer, 1995). In Ukraine, beginning with the 2002 parliamentary elections, the rural provinces of the Centre have defected to the other camp, represented by Yushchenko (Popov, 2003). This rural vote, which had eluded Kravchuk in 1994, ultimately made the difference in 2004, bringing the Orangists to victory. Yet, is Allina-Pisano right to assume that this rural electoral rebellion constituted a repudiation of local

elites? Could we not assume instead that it is these elites — collective farm bosses reappearing as village mayors — that defected from central authorities? Two scenarios are possible. Either local officials, with the collapse of the collective system, have lost control and the peasantry has rebelled against the *status quo* by voting Orange. Or they have themselves broken up with the regime while their peasant constituency, as deferential as before vis-à-vis authority, has followed new directives emanating from above (but an “above” that is in fact very local). An ethnographic study of electoral dynamics in a Ukrainian village would shed light on this question.

3. The Linguistic Factor

The geographical polarization of Ukraine is based on identity, but not in the traditional meaning of the word. The division is not ethnic, at the very least not according to established categories. Since the creation of the Soviet Union, the state has listed its populations according to an exclusive criterion of nationality. Ukrainians thereby obtained what Imperial Russia was refusing to grant them the recognition that they form a nationality separate from Russians. Yet in the practice of nationality policy, still in vogue in post-Soviet Ukraine, the relation between nationality and language was complex. On the one hand, what made a claim to nationality legitimate was a distinct language. Ukrainians were recognized as a nationality because they spoke a language that was considered distinct. On the other hand, the nationality of an individual was not determined by language, but by the nationality of his parents (Zaslavsky and Luryi, 1979). An individual could thus be primarily Russian-speaking, while defining himself as Ukrainian. This example is not the exception, but the rule in South-East Ukraine, where the great majority of Ukrainians use Russian in their daily lives. People in these regions speak Russian, but most are not ethnic Russians, as two-thirds actually define themselves as Ukrainian. Even in the Donbas, the territory with the most Russians in continental Ukraine, Ukrainians are in the majority, with a little more than 50 percent. The only province with a Russian majority is Crimea, which, as we indicated, belonged to the Russian Republic until 1954. The polarization in 2004-2006, and in 1994, was not a conflict of “Russians” and “Ukrainians”: Yushchenko and Yanukovich, or Kuchma and Kravchuk, all had in common a Ukrainian nationality.

The territorial division is linked to language, but once again we must set aside traditional categories to better understand this attribute.

From the Imperial census in 1897 to the first Ukrainian census in 2001, the state has always used the criteria of native language (*ridna mova* in Ukrainian, *rodnoi yazyk* in Russian) to categorize the language of individuals (Arel, 2002). Several studies have shown that most people associate *ridna mova* with the language of their nationality, rather than the first language they actually learned and prefer to use (Silver, 1986). *Ridna mova* usually translates as “mother tongue.” The concept of “mother tongue,” however, is ambiguous and can have the connotation of a first language learned at home, a definition accepted by the UN, or of a language that an adult is most comfortable with, which is how German-speaking states have customarily defined it. *Ridna mova*, moreover, connotes descent, often understood as the nationality of origin. The language of origin, or *native language*, seems to us a more appropriate translation.

The fact that a great many Ukrainians for whom Russian is their preferred daily language identify with Ukrainian as a native language is an important trend, suggesting a certain degree of attachment with their nationality, but it does not explain the polarization of the vote. Most studies claiming that language does not significantly explain electoral behavior relied on official statistics using *ridna mova* (Cramer and Clem 1999, Birch 2000, Kravchuk and Chudowsky 2005). As Arel and Khmelko (1996) have shown in their analysis of the 1994 election, neither *ridna mova* nor nationality correlate with the regional division of the vote. In the 2001 census, 14.8 percent of ethnic Ukrainians indicated Russian as their *ridna mova*, the great majority of them living in the South-East. And yet two-thirds of Ukrainians from these regions nonetheless claim Ukrainian as their native language. Even when taking into account ethnic Russians, who almost all give Russian as their native language, and people of other nationalities, those claiming Ukrainian as their language of origin constitute a majority, albeit barely. On one side, a huge majority of residents of the Center-West claim Ukrainian as their language of origin. On the other, those of the South-East are almost evenly split between Russian and Ukrainian *ridna mova*. The regional distinction is thus important, but it does not explain the electoral bipolarity.

It is when the category of language is conceived as a language of *use* that language and electoral behavior begin to correlate. As with all language categories, the concept of a language of use is equivocal. In this article, we define it as the language that an individual prefers to use *in a context when a linguistic choice is possible*. The concept does not thus pertain to the ability by an individual to speak a given language, or to

the language that he must use in the workplace, since in both cases the language used does not necessarily result from a choice. The language of use, or language of preference, presumes a choice. In Ukraine, there are no official statistics using these categories, as the only data gathered pertains to language of origin (*ridna mova*). However, in the past decade, sociologists from KIIS have developed a technique that captures the dynamic of language preference based on the language selected by a respondent in the course of a one-on-one survey. The picture emerging from this survey category differs significantly from census data. Thus, while the difference is minimal in the Center-West, where the great majority prefers to use Ukrainian, in the South-East, the great majority prefers Russian, even though many continue to identify Ukrainian as their language of origin.

When the language category captures a behavior (the choice of a language in a formal interaction) rather than an identity statement (language of origin understood as the language of one's nationality), Ukraine becomes sociologically polarized between a mostly Ukrainian-speaking Center-West and a mostly Russian-speaking South-East. Statistical studies by Arel and Khmelko (1996, 2005) have shown that this category of language of preference correlated very strongly with electoral behavior in the 1994 and 2004 presidential elections, the two elections that polarized the country. Of all the demographic variables such as age, gender, level of education, professional occupation, revenue, nationality and language, the language of preference has been the most statistically significant. The argument is not that Ukrainian citizens always vote according to the language that they prefer to speak. This has been the case in neither the presidential elections of 1991 and 1999 nor any of the parliamentary elections until the most recent election in 2006. What Arel and Khmelko argue, instead, is that whenever a regional polarization is observed, it can be statistically explained only by language of preference. The question, thus, is why language is decisive in some elections, but not in others.

Barrington (1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2006/co-authored with Faranda) has been the most robust critic of this thesis. His main contribution to the debate is methodological. The concept of region, he claims, is often thought of in purely demographic terms, when a linguistic, ethno-national or religious cleavage corresponds to a territorial division. This composite approach, in which regional difference is equated with identity difference, leaves no room for the notion that place of residence at the level of "region," can have an autonomous effect on political behavior. After all, there is an abundant literature,

mostly on the American South, devoted to the concept of a “regional political culture” that is not reduced to demographic characteristics. Barrington claims that Arel and Khmelko (1996) did not inquire whether their language category would still be statistically significant if a separate regional category was added to the analysis. In other words, what best explains geographical division: language or the region as such? Barrington, in his early work, claimed that the regional variable had more explanatory power than the linguistic one.

Barrington agrees with the argument that the language of preference is the key language category. With the exception of an early publication (1997), his published articles are based on data gathered by KIIS, a polling agency co-directed by Khmelko, making the debate quite stimulating. He first tested the linguistic and regional categories in connection with questions eliciting the degree of trust that Ukrainian citizens express towards their political institutions, and the degree to which, in their view, the post-communist state has undergone a transformation in its interactions with citizens (Barrington 2002a). His statistical analysis indicates that while results follow a regional distribution, the explanatory power of the language of preference is weak. This exercise, however, is not conclusive since the questions asked do not touch upon the dimension that produces a geographical polarization.

In their research, Arel and Khmelko (1996) argued that a “Russian” dimension is at the source of this polarization. This dimension covers two areas. Externally, it touches on the general question of Ukraine’s orientation vis-à-vis Russia. Internally, it revolves around the status of the Russian language. Citizens of Ukraine have different perspectives on these issues, depending on their language of preference. As we mentioned above, their orientations along this “Russian” axis are not polarized in the sense of a geographical opposition between two camps, since the Center occupies a middle position between the West, on one side, and the South-East, on the other. But when a Russian dimension becomes salient at the time of an election, electoral preferences do create a polarization. The degree of trust in institutions and the perception of the changing nature of the political regime have, however, little to do with the Russian question. As Barrington’s data indicate, popular mistrust is pervasive, although slightly less so in the West.¹² The belief that “nothing has really changed” can also be found everywhere, with a

12. On the weak level of trust expressed by the Ukrainian population towards its institutions, see also Berenson, 2006.

slight variation in what Barrington calls the “West” and “Center-East.” His study confirms the weak legitimacy of post-Soviet institutions, without however giving us an insight into the electoral division or even the turnout, which remains relatively high.

A second study (2002b) directly tackled the “Russian” dimension in analyzing survey results on the degree of distance that Ukraine should seek towards Russia. The results clearly demarcated Western Ukraine from the other regions. Once more, the language of preference turned out to be a much weaker factor than region in explaining the variation in the data. Language is in fact less important than nationality, argues Barrington, since on this question of distance vis-à-vis Russia, “Russian-speaking Ukrainians think a lot more like Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians than like Russian-speaking members of other nationalities” (2002b: 140). In a recent paper (Barrington and Faranda, 2006), Barrington once more explored the Russian dimension in the political orientations of Ukrainian citizens and, this time, the language factor stood out far more strongly, to the point that Russian-speakers (those using Russian as their language of preference), whether they are of Russian or Ukrainian nationality, are deemed by the authors to “differ greatly” from Ukrainian-speakers. In his work, Barrington seeks to demonstrate that the regional category in itself — the “regional culture” mentioned earlier — is the key variable in explaining political dynamics in Ukraine. The 2006 paper still supports this idea, although region no longer predominates at the expense of language, as both categories are henceforth significant. The language of preference is as important as the regional factor.

Yet we have to wonder why language was not a factor in the first study (Barrington, 2002b). The questions asked in the surveys upon which the two studies were based, were not identical. The first survey seems to have used a dichotomous approach where respondents had to take a stand for or against Ukrainian independence and for or against the proposition that Ukraine should maintain minimal relations with Russia. The problem is that the Russian dimension does not manifest itself, in Ukrainian politics, in such radical terms. Even though a hard core of citizens in the East remains hostile to independence and would prefer that “Ukraine and Russia form a single state” — one of the options offered in the KIIS surveys — the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens (close to four out of five) and the great majority of those residing in the South-East (more than two-thirds) do not call

into question Ukrainian independence.¹³ The pro-Russian orientation of the South-East regions should not be confused with a secessionist movement, since the majority of the population defines itself Ukrainian by nationality. The exception to the rule is Crimea, precisely because it is the only province with a Russian majority. Moreover, Western Ukraine is the only region with a clearly anti-Russian orientation due to its unique political culture developed under Austro-Hungary. The dichotomous approach emphasizes the extremes (Galicia, Crimea), but fails to account for the geographical polarization that took place in 1994 and 2004. This is probably one of the reasons why the significance of the language of preference was so weak in Barrington's first study. When results demarcate Galicia from the rest of Ukraine, the linguistic factor necessarily recedes, since Central Ukrainians, almost all of whom are Ukrainian-speakers, end up on the other side.

The concept of a language of preference seems to assume a clear linguistic choice between two languages. In fact, many Ukrainians constantly switch from one language to another and often within the same sentence. This mixing of languages is known as *surzhyk*, a word that conjures up a mixture of grain, and is severely frowned upon by the Ukrainian cultural elite who sees in it an insidious form of "Russification" (Bilaniuk, 2005). *Surzhyk* is not spoken by true bilinguals, but by people whose knowledge of a second language is weak. It applies mostly to Ukrainian peasants recently settled in the city and who strive to speak Russian, but with a strong Ukrainian accent or, in a new and far less widespread phenomenon, to Russian-speakers forced to speak Ukrainian, but with by a high degree of Russian interference. To address the criticism that the category of language of preference does not take into account the mixture of idioms on the ground, KIIS has refined its criteria by creating an intermediate category, between "Russian" and "Ukrainian," for respondents that are using a mixture of the two languages in conversing with survey officials.

Cumulative data from KIIS, compiled from a dozen surveys conducted throughout 2004 — thus, with a very large sample — reveal

13. Since 1994, KIIS has included the following question in its numerous representative surveys conducted every year: "How do you assess relations between Ukraine and Russia? (a) They must be the same as with all other states, with closed borders, visas and custom duties; (b) Ukraine and Russia must be independent, but friendly, states, with open borders, without visas and custom duties; (c) Ukraine and Russia must unite in one state." In September 2004, a month before the presidential elections, only 20 percent of the population favored the third option, that is, 12 percent of voters in the Center-West and 29 percent —in the South-East. Data shared by Valeri Khmelko of KIIS.

that 14 percent of residents of Ukraine speak *surzhyk*, compared to 38 percent who speak Ukrainian and 48 percent who speak Russian (Arel and Khmelko, 2005). In the two studies by Barrington on language and the “Russian factor,” only the second, based on 2005 data, incorporated a *surzhyk* category. According to him, it may be why language was significant in explaining regional division (Barrington and Faranda, 2006), contrary to the first study, which did not include *surzhyk*. It is doubtful. In their analysis of the 2004 presidential elections, Arel and Khmelko (2005) used both a restricted version of the language of preference (Ukrainian or Russian) and an expanded one (Ukrainian, Russian, Mixed). In both cases, the language variable was highly significant, a little more so, it is true, in the latter (inclusive) version.

The incorporation of the *surzhyk* category allows us, however, to better grasp some key electoral dynamics. As revealed by KIIS data, *surzhyk* is concentrated in five non-contiguous zones in Ukraine, all located at the contact point between a Ukrainian-speaking and a Russian-speaking zone. These are the Russian-speaking provinces of Mykolaïv and Kherson, agricultural in their northern parts and adjoining the Ukrainian-speaking provinces of the Center-West; of the rural and Ukrainian-speaking province of Kirovohrad, bordering the South; and the Ukrainian-speaking rural provinces of Sumy and Chernihiv, on the Russian border. Four of these five provinces are precisely those that either changed camps between 1994 and 2004 (Sumy, Chernihiv and Kirovohrad voted for Kuchma in 1994 and for Yushchenko in 2004), or came very close to (Kherson was the only province in 2004 where the race between the two candidates was extremely close), while Mykolaïv still provided a relatively high score to Kravchuk in 1994 and Yushchenko in 2004. In the context of regional polarization, a certain correlation between linguistic uncertainty (the mixture of languages) and the possibility of a political shift from one camp to another seems to exist.

4. The Ethnic Structure

The population of Ukraine is essentially divided between two nationalities, Ukrainian and Russian, with a few small-numbered minorities concentrated in border provinces (Crimean Tatars, Romanians/Moldovans, Hungarians). Ukrainians clearly predominate, with 78 percent of the population. The proportion of Russians has declined considerably between the 1989 and 2001 censuses, from 22 to 17 percent. Only 5 percent of residents claim another nationality,

none reaching the 1 percent threshold. The Russians of Ukraine live mostly in the South-East, although they only constitute 30 percent of the population in these regions, against 65 percent for Ukrainians, and they are a minority in all provinces, save Crimea. In the Center-West, only 7 percent are Russian, against 88 percent Ukrainian. Ethnic belonging does not thereby explain regional polarization.

As with language of origin (*ridna mova*), the nationality category, used in Soviet and Ukrainian censuses and, until the mid-1990s, in personal identification documents (internal passports), has limited explanatory power. In classifying their populations according to an exclusive criterion of ethnic nationality, Soviet officials have accepted the premise of any nationalist discourse, namely, that an individual can only have one nationality. In daily life, however, national identities are not always as neatly delineated, particularly when individuals come from mixed homes, with parents of different nationalities. In Ukraine, mixed marriages between Ukrainians and Russians are very common, mostly in the East where the rate of urbanization is higher. An Eastern Ukrainian has a greater chance of having a Russian parent than a Western Ukrainian. To what extent does this bi-ethnic lineage affect national identities? A popular belief is that most children of mixed marriages were registered as Russians in the Soviet era during the policy of Russification. Yet if that were true, then the South-East would have a Russian majority. A study comparing the nationality of parents in internal passports with those of their children has shown that only a thin majority (55 percent) of children from Ukrainian-Russian households were registered as Russian (Volkov, 1989).

KIIS has sought to find out to what extent individuals would identify to two nationalities if they were given the choice. The method selected is that of a question with five options (1 to 5), where the extremities (1 or 5) represent those who identify with a single nationality (Ukrainian or Russian), the median option pertains to those who identify equally as Ukrainians and Russian, and the other two options indicate a dual sense of belonging, but with a preference for one or the other (Ukrainian and Russian, but more Ukrainian; Ukrainian and Russian, but more Russian). Linz and Stepan have used this technique of representing national identities in non-mutually exclusive ways for several decades in their studies of multinational societies such as Belgium and Catalonia (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, forthcoming). Inhabitants of these areas have ethnic (Flemish, Catalan) and civic (Belgium, Spain) identities. Linz and Stepan focus on how these identities relate to one another. A nationalist discourse assumes that individuals identify, or would

identify if they had an adequate national consciousness, first with their ethnic nationality. Linz and Stepan, however, show that a plurality in Flanders or Catalonia prefer to identify both as Flemish (or Catalan) *and* Belgian (or Spanish). For the authors, the Flemish and Catalan autonomous movements have not become secessionist because of this dual attachment among their population.

The case of Ukraine is somewhat different since, contrary to the just mentioned Western multinational states just mentioned, the term defining civic and ethnic identity is the same (*ukrainsk'yi*). To the question “Who are you?”, the answer “I am Ukrainian” could mean either “I am of Ukrainian citizenship,” or “I am of Ukrainian ethnic nationality.” KIIS investigators have concentrated on bi-ethnic identities. In the post-Soviet context, their question was not ambiguous, since it referred to the concept of nationality (*natsional'nist'* in Ukrainian, *natsional'nost'* in Russian), whose meaning was clear to all. Their findings are stunning (Arel and Khmelko, 2005). While the Center-West remains massively Ukrainian — 83 percent of the population defining themselves exclusively as Ukrainians, and only 14 percent identifying in part or exclusively as Russian — South-East Ukraine swings over drastically to the side of identities at least partly Russian. While in the 2001 census only 30 percent of people from the South-East identified as Russian, when faced with the opportunity of choosing more than one nationality, 60 percent opt for an identity fully or partly Russian. A certain regional polarization thus reappears — 83/14 against 40/60, but in a less pronounced way than the correlation of the Orange/anti-Orange vote and the language of preference.¹⁴

Data on bi-ethnic identities can be interpreted in two ways. We have contrasted the exclusively Ukrainian identities with the ones that are at least partly Russian, because this division was closer to electoral behavior, the theme of this article. We could also compare bi-ethnic identities with nationally homogeneous identities, either Ukrainian or Russian. In the South-East, 41 percent of the population claim, to some degree, both a Ukrainian nationality and a Russian nationality, a proportion four times higher than in the Center-West (10.9 percent). The bi-ethnics are more numerous than those who define themselves exclusively as Ukrainian (35 percent) or Russian (19 percent). Their

14. Unsurprisingly, there are regional distinctions within each zone: the proportion of “exclusively Ukrainians” is higher in the West than in the Center, and higher in the South (except Crimea) than in the East. Russian national identity is more consolidated in Crimea than in Donbas, since the “exclusively Russians” remain at 52 percent in Crimea, while they drop to around 20 percent in the Donbas.

highest proportion is found precisely in the Donbas, the heart of anti-Orange agitation, where it reaches 50 percent. Thus, the Ukraine of Yanukovich, formally Ukrainian by nationality and language of origin (*ridna mova*), transforms itself into a Ukraine that is Russian-speaking (language of preference) and of Ukrainian/Russian bi-ethnicity, once more appropriate analytical tools are used. From this vantage point, Ukrainian regions are not polarized along an identity axis, since a Ukraine with a homogenous identity (Centre-West) is facing a Ukraine whose identity is mixed (South-East).

Can an individual identifying with two ethnic groups develop a strong bi-national consciousness? The experience of Eastern Ukraine suggests otherwise. Several authors have noted the weak level of attachment to ethnic nationality in the bi-ethnic regions of Ukraine. For Pirie (1996), the identity of Ukrainians from the South-East is “marginal,” the product of a “vacillation” between two “unstable” identities. The fact that people are attached to a language that differs from their formal nationality is a cause, for him, of this identity confusion. In a study of parents and pupils in a Kharkiv school, Filippova (1999) found that only a slight majority of them gave “significant meaning” to their ethnic nationality. The others, whom she called “ethnically indifferent,” prioritized a local identity. Ukrainians, in her study, had more affinity with Russians from Eastern Ukraine than with Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. As for Kharkiv Russians, they feel closer to Russians from Eastern Ukraine than with Western Ukrainians. Surveys conducted in Donetsk (Hrytsak, 2001) have documented the poor level of national consciousness among Russians from Ukraine. In the typical Ukrainian nationalist discourse, the nation-building project is presented as incomplete, on the grounds that Eastern Ukrainians have not yet acquired the appropriate standard of national consciousness. What we are learning from these studies, however, is that the degree of national identification is as weak among Russians as with Ukrainians in the South-East, with the exception, once again, of Crimea. Bi-ethnicity does not affect only Ukrainians. Russian-speakers from the East, whether they present themselves as Russians or Ukrainians, have traditionally favored a supra-ethnic identity, imperial in the old days, and then Soviet. In 1994, more than half of Donetsk respondents chose a Soviet identity over an ethnic one when the option was offered to them in a survey (Hrytsak, 2001). Inevitably, this Soviet category practically disappeared later in people’s self-representation (Hrytsak and Malanchuk, 2005) and no supra-ethnic or supra-state category has replaced it, even though the

attachment to such a wider world has remained crucial. For Shulman (2004), this wider world is that of the Eastern Slavs, whom he even conceives as a national identity, in opposition to the national identity of Ukrainians in the ethnic sense of the term. Eastern Slavs share a common vision of their history and do not recognize themselves in a nationalist narrative promoting an ethnic Ukrainian identity that puts Ukraine in opposition to Russia. The core problem, as accurately described by Zhurzhenko (2002), is that Eastern Ukrainians do not consider themselves “just [as] victims of an imposed external power but also [as] active agents of their own history.” In the nationalist vision, Ukrainians have been victims of Tsarist and Soviet Russia. “Eastern Ukrainians,” writes Zhurzhenko, “refuse to accept [this] anti-Russian message.” In this respect, the contrast between L’viv and Donetsk is striking. To the statement “Russia has always exploited us,” 66 percent of L’viv residents, in 1994, were in favor, while 72 percent of Donetsk residents were against (Malanchuk, 2005).

Eastern Slavs, in Shulman’s analysis, encompass all pre-Second World War Soviet Ukrainian territories, thus including Central Ukraine and excluding Western Ukraine. In an article on the pro-Russian and pro-Western cultural division in Ukraine, Darden (2004) agreed. For these authors, the demarcating line is thus not linguistic, but religious, pitting Catholic Ukraine, confined to Galicia, with Orthodox Ukraine. It is true, as we saw earlier, that on the question of the type of relations that Ukraine should have with Russia, Central Ukraine is far more favorable to Russia than Western Ukraine. The recent study by Barrington and Faranda (2006) places the Center at mid-point between the West, on the one hand, and the East and South, on the other. On the “Russian question,” Central Ukrainians might, after all, seem relatively pro-Russian. Yet this ambivalence does not prevent them from massively supporting parties, such as Our Ukraine or the Tymoshenko Bloc, whose discourse is perceived in the East as hostile to Russia. The ethnic structure in Central Ukraine might provide the key to this puzzle. The overwhelming majority of the population in the Center, as in the West, identify exclusively as Ukrainian. Birch (2000) demonstrated how Western Ukrainians have historically voted on an “ethnic” basis. It is eminently possible that, in the current decade, Central Ukrainians have developed a similar inclination to “vote ethnic.” Despite a more favourable orientation towards Russia, Central Ukrainians limit their political repertoire to parties able to communicate with an ethnically homogeneous constituency, even though these parties are more radical on the Russian question. Parties

arising from a bi-ethnic environment, like the Party of Regions, even though their platform might not be necessarily far from the concerns of these Ukrainians, nevertheless appear as foreign to the local political culture. The political discourse of the Eastern Slavs penetrates very little the ethnically homogeneous territory of Ukraine.

5. The Implications of Regional Division in Ukraine

Three points are raised by our analysis. The first is that regional division, far from being a transitional phenomenon linked to the nation-building process, is durable and serves as an anchor upon which post-Orange politics is built. The second is that regionalism in Ukraine does not constitute a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, except possibly (although unlikely, for now) in Crimea, a territory that has never truly accepted its Ukrainian subordination. Russian-speaking elites and the general population in the East seek inclusion, not separation. The third is that languages in Ukraine symbolize identities rooted in a regional milieu shaped by history. Language embodies a fundamental motivation in politics: recognition by the Other. In post-Orange pluralist Ukraine, Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers have yet to establish the rules of their mutual recognition. The three points are explored in sequence.

(a) The Durability of Regional Division

Ukrainian nationalists deplore that Eastern Ukrainians prefer to speak Russian and are convinced that the formation of the Ukrainian nation is not yet completed. Yet this teleological vision of the development of the Ukrainian nationality is an illusion. The considerable number of mixed marriages in the past century has produced a durable bi-ethnic structure in the South-East. This structure has not engendered a new nationality, but rather an identity that brings together a shifting attachment to Ukrainian nationality, a preference for the Russian language, and the sense of a certain common destiny with the Russian world, but not in terms of aspiring to be part of the Russian state. The survey by Filippova (1999), cited above, is revealing: Ukrainians and Russians from the East do not feel close to Western Ukrainians, but they do not feel close to Russians from Russia either. This “Russian factor” (Russian language, orientation towards Russia) is thus not about assimilating to a cohesive Russian identity, since only 40 percent of Russians in Ukraine declare themselves “exclusively Russian” in the

KIIS surveys.¹⁵ It explains, however, much of the electoral regional polarization that Ukraine experienced in 1994, 2004, and 2006.

When two candidates or political formations are perceived by public opinion as promoting opposing policies on the status of languages and the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine, the electorates of the South-East and Center-West are polarized. In 1991, during the first presidential election, which coincided with the referendum on independence, the question of rethinking Ukrainian-Russian relations was not yet on the agenda and Leonid Kravchuk, already Ukraine's foremost politician in his capacity as Speaker of Parliament, won decisively.¹⁶ In 1994, Russian-speakers perceived Kravchuk as opposed to Russia. In 1999, the presence of a non-reformist Communist candidate on the second round ballot split the Eastern electorate in two, pushing the Russian factor aside. In 2004, the fact that the three opposition parties supporting Yushchenko represented only the Center-West alienated the South-East electorate, who saw the Orange Revolution as an illegitimate conspiracy hatched by the West. In 2006, for the first time, a parliamentary election has produced regional polarization, as a result of a new electoral system based on pure proportional representation. The Party of Regions speaks in the name of the entire South-East and regional division is now entrenched in the parliamentary arena. The division is durable, since it is built upon an identity structure (bi-ethnic, linguistic, historical memory) that is probably little changed in the fifteen years of Ukrainian independence.¹⁷

(b) The Illusion of Separatism

Regional division in Ukraine is not a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. There is no ambiguity on the matter, except perhaps in

15. Once more, Crimea clearly stands out on this score. Close to 90 percent of Crimeans declaring themselves Russian on the census identify exclusively with the Russian nationality, while the proportion of others Russians in Ukraine is only 30 percent.

16. Kravchuk won in the first round with 57 percent of the vote. His only serious opponent, Viacheslav Chornovil (26 percent), was backed mainly in Western Ukraine. It may seem strange to state that the prospect of independence did not bring about calls for a change in Ukraine-Russia relations. The fact is, outside of Western Ukraine, people thought that nothing would change, except the formal status of territories and the end of the bureaucratic *diktat* from Moscow.

17. The proportion of Russians in Ukraine has gone from 22 percent in the 1989 census to 17 percent in the 2001 census, a decrease caused by migration flows and, perhaps, by a certain degree of re-identification, in particular, by a greater proportion of children from mixed marriages declaring a Ukrainian nationality

Crimea.¹⁸ Since the first years of independence, regional political mobilization emanates from Donets'k. Strikes from Donets'k miners forced the government to organize an early presidential election in 1994 and the Communist Party of Ukraine, head-quartered in Donets'k, became, the same year, the political party with the largest representation in parliament. The Party of Regions has since replaced the Communist Party as the main Donets'k party. Almost all of its leaders hail from Donets'k, but they are benefiting from enormous support in all of the South-East.¹⁹ According to KIIS data, cited earlier, Donets'k is the cradle of bi-ethnicity, with 48 percent of the population identifying, to different degrees, both with the Ukrainian and Russian nationalities, 29 percent identifying exclusively as Ukrainian, and 20 percent — exclusively as Russian. This means that more than three-fourth of Donets'k voters — an electorate that voted 95 percent for Yanukovich in the final, non-fraudulent, round in 2004 — feel that they belong to some degree to the Ukrainian nationality.

This identity belonging begets a territorial belonging. In 1994, only 5 percent of Donets'k residents were in favor of dividing Ukraine in separate states (Hrytsak, 2001). In the same year, when the Crimean government called for a referendum on independence, deputies from all regions, including those from Donets'k, massively voted against. It is true that a hard core would prefer Ukraine and Russia to unite in a single state, rejecting independence, but not through territorial separatism. According to KIIS data, this hard core formed 47 percent of the electorate in provinces that provided a majority for Kuchma in 1994. Ten years later, it had melted to 29 percent of the electorate of pro-Yanukovich provinces, i.e. the South-East.²⁰ The majority of the population in Donets'k, and more generally in the South-East, is for

(Rapawy, 1997). We do not have data allowing us to compare Ukraine's bi-ethnic structure from the early 1990s to the present. Yet since mixed marriages are part of long-term demographic trends, it is unlikely that this structure has experienced significant changes in the last decade.

18. Crimea had a secessionist period between 1992 and 1995, that ended with the abolition of the Crimean presidency in 1995 and the recognition, confirmed by the 1996 Constitution, of territorial autonomy. In the last decade, no major political movement has called the status quo into question, although it is not impossible that secessionism be given a new life in the future.
19. See footnote 5.
20. The pro-Kuchma provinces in 1994 included four Central provinces (three from the Left Bank and Kirovohrad). At the national level, the proportion of people favoring a union between Ukraine and Russia has declined from 34 percent in 1994 to 20 percent in 2004.

an independent Ukraine with a pro-Russian orientation. What it seeks is to be included in the decision-making process in Kyiv.

When the Orange popular mobilization prevented the fraudulent victory of Viktor Yanukovich from being confirmed after the second round in November 2004, Party of Regions elites, sensing their power slipping away, called a meeting in a Donbas town to discuss plans for “autonomy” in Russian-speaking regions.²¹ Orange leaders and Western analysts called this initiative an incitement to “separatism” and a conspiracy by elites against popular interests. There was no doubt that the initiative originated “from above,” since political culture in the East remains authoritarian and hierarchical. However, it is symptomatic of the Orange denial of the existence of a regional problem that any claim for “autonomy” or “federalism” in Ukraine — and this is what the “Regionals” were calling for in November 2004 — is inevitably linked with a “separatist threat,” liable to criminal charges, as President Yushchenko stated on numerous occasions. Yet the Europe that Ukraine wishes to join does support the autonomy of local communities and federal practices. It is more than possible that the Ukrainian state is not yet ready to absorb a federal model of politics (Kappeler, 2004), or that the intolerance expressed by Russia toward Ukrainian national sovereignty does not make it viable. Be that as it may, the current political climate does not allow for a calm discussion of these issues. The Orangists suspects the Regionals to play the secessionist card, while, in fact, they were seeking to protect themselves against unilateral decisions made a government from which they were excluded.

When elections polarize a state on a territorial basis, the exclusion of the losing party, a normal outcome of the democratic process, can mean the permanent exclusion of an entire territory, a troubling development for the political integrity of a state. In the first Cabinet of Ministers, under Tymoshenko, only four ministers out of thirty were from the South-East. The three parties that formed the short-lived initial parliamentary coalition after the 2006 election (Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialist Party) had less than 10 percent of their deputies hailing from the South-East. The first draft document allocating the chairmanships of parliamentary commission —before the Orange camp lost its parliamentary majority in July 2006—would have totally excluded the Party of Regions, and thus the South-East.

21. The word used in Russian and Ukrainian is *avtonomiia*. If the concept of autonomy is ambiguous in politics, it is generally not interpreted as “secessionism.”

The *Regionals* repeatedly claimed that a national government ought not to exclude half of the state, in the territorial sense of the term. This argument has never appeared credible to the Orangists, who are loathe to recognize the legitimacy of their opponents in the Party of Regions, suspected of having perpetrated reprehensible acts in the Kuchma era. Yet the “Regional” elites, notwithstanding their questionable past, do carry with them an undisputed electoral legitimacy since the 2006 parliamentary elections. To deny them this legitimacy is tantamount to denying their electorate the right to choose its representatives. The Russian-speaking electorate is indeed extremely sensitive to the lack of respect expressed by the Orangists towards them. Far from longing for separation, South-East Ukraine is rebelling against the political exclusion that it felt until the return to power of the Party of Regions in Summer 2006.

(c) Language as a Means of Political Representation.

The relationship between language and politics in Ukraine is linked to the two meanings of the concept of representation. Language acts as a means to represent a system of values, codes and meanings of the outside world. Language, in this sense, is a lens that filters, selects and interprets information (Barrington 2004). Arel and Khmelko (1996, 2005) have demonstrated that the language of preference is the sociological variable that best explains the electoral polarization experienced by Ukraine in 1994 and 2004. This does not mean that language issues have predominated during the campaigns, but rather that the way voters framed their understanding of politics is linked with the language they prefer to speak. The language factor is entrenched in a regional environment. It is here that Barrington’s argument about the preeminence of the regional factor resonates. Speaking Russian does not make one “think like a Russian-speaker.” Case in point: the city of Kyïv, very Russian-speaking, and the polar opposite of Donetsk on election night. The linguistic filter has developed in a regional context with its unique historical references and identity structure. The Russian-speakers from the East have a bi-ethnic identity lineage distinct from the Russian-speakers in Kyïv who originate, for the most part, from homogeneous Ukrainian roots. In his writings, Barrington insists that the region should be seen as an explanatory variable in its own right. He is correct to claim that the regional factor cannot be simply reduced to the language factor. As Barrington alludes in his recent articles, we should focus instead on the relation between regional specificity and language of preference. The two variables have

to be taken into account. A Russian-speaker from the East does not vote simply as a Russian-speaker—we are speaking here, of course, of a probability, not of some automatic behavior that can be observed at the individual level—but as a Russian-speaker and an Easterner. The fact of residing in the East provides content to the filter created by language.

The second level of representation is that of political action on behalf of a group. This level is akin to the concept of recognition. Russian-speakers from the South-East want to be recognized for what they are. They decode very well the allusions, sometimes explicit, often implicit, regarding their insufficient national consciousness and, thus, their alleged incapacity to grasp their own interests. Russian-speakers reject what they consider to be a condescending attitude emanating from the Orange camp. They aspire to be recognized as equals “not as objects of re-nationalization, but as people whose right to a distinct version of Ukrainian identity is recognized” (Zhurzhenko 2002). It is through this prism that we must examine the repeated demands to give Russian the status of a second official language. Russian-speakers claim this status, not because they are prevented from speaking their language in public — the use of Russian, to the contrary, is nearly hegemonic in South-East Ukraine — but because this status would give them the symbolic confirmation that they *count* as much as Ukrainian-speakers from the Center-West in Ukrainian politics.

Russian-speakers, on the other hand, poorly understand the perspective of Ukrainian-speakers, who tend to interpret the lack of prestige of the Ukrainian language in social life as a consequence of the prohibition of Ukrainian in public life —*de jure* in Tsarist Russia and *de facto* in post-War Soviet Union. The relationship between language groups is always asymmetrical, in the sense that the group whose language is socially favored does not have to be bilingual, since the group whose language has a lower social status has to learn the prestigious tongue. The international experience of language management tell us that, in this case, the political compromise is to have the language of lesser status recognized as the only official language, in order to incite speakers of the socially dominant language to become bilingual. The fact that Ukraine has only one state language — Ukrainian — is thus perfectly in line with international norms and this compromise has been accepted by Russian-speaking elites during the adoption of the adoption of the Constitution in 1996. The status of Russian at the regional level has, however, never been clarified and has become a bone of contention since the Orange Revolution. A compromise could

take the form of a unilingual Ukraine at the central level, yet officially bilingual in the regions with, however, a clear predominance of Russian in the South-East and Ukrainian in the Center-West. It is a solution supported by a plurality of Ukrainians, in all regions, in opinion surveys. Yet this compromise would run counter to a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalist thinking, which sees Russian as a language “foreign” to Ukrainian soil. This vision is precisely what the bi-ethnics in the South-East are rejecting. They aim to be recognized for who they are.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

- ALLINA-PISANO, Jessica (2005), "Informal Institutional Challenges to Democracy: Administrative Resource in Kuchma's Ukraine," Paper presented at the First Annual Danyliw Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa.
- AREL, Dominique (1991), "The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, 1, pp. 108-54.
- AREL, Dominique (2002), "Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 18, pp. 213-49.
- AREL, Dominique (Forthcoming), "Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, But Without the East," in Ingmar Bredies, Valentin Yakushik, and Andreas Umland, eds., *Aspects of the Orange Revolution. Studies, Reports and Documents on the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections*, Stuttgart and Hannover: ibidem-Verlag.
- AREL, Dominique & WILSON, Andrew (1994) "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, pp. 6-17.
- AREL, Dominique & KHMELKO, Valeri (1996), "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine," *The Harriman Review*, 9, pp. 81-91.
- AREL, Dominique & KHMELKO, Valeri (2005), "Regional Divisions in the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: The Role of Language and Ethnicity," Paper presented at First Annual Danyliw Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa.
- ASLUND, Anders (2005), "The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 46, pp. 327-53.
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. (1997), "The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 38, pp. 601-14.
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. (2002a), "Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of

- Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, pp. 455-91.
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. (2002b), “Region, Language, and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia,” in Taras Kuzio and Paul d’Anieri, eds., *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 131-46.
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. (2004), “Language, Ethnicity, and Region as Sources of Identity and Determinants of Political Behavior in Ukraine: What We Know and What We Still Need to Do,” Paper presented at the Seminar “Understanding the Transformation of Ukraine: Assessing What Has Been Learned, Devising a Research Agenda”, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa. Available at http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/P_Barrington.pdf
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. & ERIK S. HERRON (2004), “One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences,” *Nationalities Papers*, 32, pp. 53-86.
- BARRINGTON, Lowell W. & FARANDA, Regina (2006), “Are ‘Interaction Effects’ More Important than the ‘Regional Effect’? Reexamining Region, Ethnicity, and Language in Ukraine,” Paper presented at the Tenth ASN Annual World Convention, Columbia University.
- BERENSON, Marc P. (2006), “Less Fear, Little Trust: Deciphering the Ways of Ukrainian Tax Compliance,” Paper presented at the Second Annual Danyliw Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa.
- BILANIUK, Laada (2005), *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- BIRCH, Sarah (1995), “Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine in National Elections and Referendums, 1989-91,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, pp. 1145-76.
- BIRCH, Sarah (2000), “Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics,” *Europe Asia Studies*, 52, pp. 1017-41.
- BRUBAKER, Rogers (1996), *Nationalism Reframed*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- CLEM, Ralph S. and CRAUMER, Peter R. (1995), “The Politics of Russia’s Regions: A Geographical Analysis of the Russian Election

- and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993,” *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36, pp. 67-86.
- CRAUMER, Peter r. & CLEM, James (1999), “Ukraine’s Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections,” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 40, pp. 1-26.
- DARDEN, Keith (2004), “The Ukrainian Divide,” *YaleGlobal*, 29 novembre, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4936>.
- FILIPPOVA, Olga (1999), “Ukrainians and Russians in Eastern Ukraine: Ethnic Identity and Citizenship in the Light of Ukrainian Nation-Building,” Paper presented at the conference “Nationalism, Identity, and Minority Rights”, University of Bristol.
- GELLNER, Ernest (1983), *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- HESLI, Vicki L., REISINGER, William M. & MILLER, Arthur H. 1998 “Political Party Developments in Divided Societies: The Case of Ukraine,” *Electoral Studies*, 17, pp. 235-56.
- HIMKA, John-Paul (1988), *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century*, New York: St.Martin’s Press.
- HRYTSAK, Yaroslav (2001), “National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk,” in Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, eds., *Cultures and Nations in Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, pp. 263-81.
- KAPPELER, Andreas (2004), “Bürgerkrieg höchst unwahrscheinlich,” Mit dem Wiener Ordinarius für osteuropäische Geschichte sprach Burkhard Bischof, *Die Presse* (Vienna), 2 December. Translation by *The Ukraine List* (No. 298, 3 December 2004, “A Civil War

- Is Highly Unlikely”) available at http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Revolution_2004/UKL/photos.php?UKL298.
- KHMELKO, Valeri (1994), “Peredvyborchi nastroi mis’koho naseleння Ukraïny,” *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny*, 6, pp. 5-6.
- KHMELKO, Valeri (2006), “Cherez shcho politikam vdaiet’sia rozkoliuvaty Ukraïnu,” *Dzerlako tyzhdnia*, No. 24 (603), 24-30 juin.
- KRAVCHUK, Robert S. & CHUDOWSKY, Victor (2005) “Ukraine’s 1994 Elections as an Economic Event,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38, pp. 131-65.
- KUBICEK, Paul (2000), “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52, pp. 273-94.
- MAGOCSI, Paul Robert (2002), *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia As Ukraine’s Piedmont*, University of Toronto Press.
- MALANCHUK, Oksana (2005), “Social Identification versus Regionalism in Contemporary Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers*, 33, pp. 345-68.
- MALANCHUK, Oksana & HRYTSAK, Yaroslav (2005), “A Tale of Two Cities: Lviv and Donetsk—Ten Years Later,” Paper presented at the Ninth ASN Annual World Convention, Columbia University.
- O’LOUGHLIN, John (2001), “The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 42, pp. 1-33
- PIRIE, Paul S. (1996), “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, pp. 1079-104.
- POPOV, Aleksei (2003), “Sud’ba vyborov reshilas’ v Kryzhopoliakh,” *Kievskii telegraf*, 20 February.
- RAPAWY, Stephen (1997), “Ethnic Reidentification in Ukraine,” IPC Staff Paper, No. 90, Washington, DC: International Programs Center, Population Division, US Bureau of the Census.
- SHULMAN, Stephen (2004), “The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56, pp. 35-56.
- SILVER Brian D. (1986), “The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses,” in Ralph S. Clem, ed., *Research*

- Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 70-97.
- STEPAN, Alfred, LINZ, Juan & YADAV, Yogenda (Forthcoming), “*Nation State*” or “*State Nation*”: *Theoretical Reflections and Data from Spain, Belgium, and India*.
- TUCKER, Joshua (Forthcoming), “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the “2nd Wave” of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions, *Perspectives on Politics*.
- VOLKOV, Andrei G. (1989), “Etnicheski smeshannye sem’i v SSSR: dinamika i sostav,” *Vestnik statistiki*, 7, pp. 12-22; 8, pp. 8-24.
- WILSON, Andrew (2005), *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- ZASLAVSKY, Victor & LURIY, Yuri (1979), “The Passport System in the USSR,” *Soviet Union*, 6, pp. 137-53.
- ZHURZHENKO, Tatyana (2002), “The Myths of Two Ukraines,” *Eurozine*, 19 September, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-09-17-zhurzhenko-en.html>.