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#1

Five Thoughts on the Tymoshenko Verdict

By Dominique Arel
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12 October 2011

1. The Orange Revolution has long been a distant dream and received its official burial yesterday with the court decision to send Tymoshenko to jail. Critics who caution of not "personalizing" Ukrainian politics miss the fundamental point. The Orange Revolution was not about Yushchenko (or Tymoshenko), anymore than yesterday's verdict was about Tymoshenko. The civic uprising of late Fall 2004 overturned a fraudulent election and established (or re-established, since Ukraine had experienced it in 1994) a fair and free election, the "thin" – and yet so indispensable – definition of a democracy. With the Tymoshenko verdict, we already know that the forthcoming elections will be unfair and unfree. This has nothing to do with whether Tymoshenko is popular, trusted, or even a "true" democrat, and everything to do with the principle that the Ukrainian government can now prevent political opponents from contesting power. Now that the principle

has been used, it will be used again, and the prospect of a long detention will be enough to dissuade candidates who, in an open system, would seek power.

2. That the trial was a political operation hardly merits a serious discussion. Neither the European Union nor the United States minced their words yesterday, both denouncing the “politically motivated” proceedings. For analysts of the Ukrainian scene, the mere presence of an unreformed Office of the Prosecutor General, whose illiberal powers of “control” over judicial organs were left untouched by the Orange governments, makes any prosecution initiated by the government politically charged. The Procuracy was generally in the business of issuing threats, by initiating – but rarely concluding—investigations. Yushchenko used these powers to try to remove judges on charges of “corruption.” The qualitative difference now is that the Procuracy has become the instrument for neutralizing political opponents. In open societies, politicians commit “crimes” when they are found guilty of having personally benefited from their office (or when they commit the same kind of acts –such as sexual misconduct—that condemn ordinary people). As a private energy entrepreneur in the 1990s, Tymoshenko benefited immensely from the gray laws and practices of the time. As Prime Minister in 2009, however, she did not personally benefit from the gas deal signed with Moscow (while the shady interests of RosUkrEnergo lost a great deal of money). Whether the deal was in the interest of Ukraine was for the electorate to determine, although it doesn’t seem that Yanukovich campaigned on the issue.

3. The problem, as always, is presented as a Ukraine torn between Russia and the West. Ukraine is on the verge of signing a free trade agreement with the European Union, called the Association Agreement. In a summer debate posted in the last UKL, prominent Ukraine watchers were divided over the EU factor. On one side, we have those arguing that democracy must precede integration, that the Agreement must serve as a reward for reform (or rather, in the diminished expectations of the Yanukovich era, for preserving what had been gained before, namely, free elections). On the other side, we have the argument that EU policies, such as free trade, will generate internal demands for reform in the middle to long run, that the need for transparency in economic dealings will bring transparency in political matters. A companion argument is that closing the door to the EU will push Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, a worst-case scenario. While the quasi-“modernization” argument (economic development will bring political change) has merits, the reality is that Ukraine was a democracy, twice (1991 to roughly 1997, 2004 to yesterday) and there is frankly no reason why it couldn’t be one tomorrow, as opposed to in the next decade. As for the Russia factor, the evidence should be fairly clear by now that the Donetsk clan – however close to Russian culture, and definitely close to Russian political culture – does not want to be subordinated to Russia. Yesterday’s statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry about the “obvious anti-Russian subtext” of the verdict does not exactly square with the standard Ukrainian nationalist view of Yanukovich as “pro-Russian”. What Yanukovich wants, other than Russia’s gas, is Russia’s political system, but with economic protectionism from Russia, and at no cost to Ukraine’s dealing with the West. The saying about having one’s cake and eating it too comes to mind.

4. An important word about Ukrainian nationalism. The very term was demonized in Soviet propaganda, on a par with “fascism”, and Western commentators have often been suspicious of its intent and possible consequences. Nationalism is the desire to have one’s state, or to make an existing one more “national” (and what “national” means is generally quite contested). It can have its ugly side, and the rise of Svoboda in Galicia is not pretty. But let the record show that Ukrainian nationalism, in the empirically verifiable field of Ukrainian politics of the last twenty years, has been the driving force behind democracy, while Ukrainian anti-nationalism, for lack of a better word, a.k.a. the political forces grounded in Eastern Ukraine, have aimed at the dismantlement of democracy. Rukh in the 1990s, Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc in the 2000s (although Tymoshenko flip-flopped frequently on core issues) had serious flaws (rule of law, historical memory), but they were, in their *actions*, not just words, for free elections and a free media. Political culture in Central-Western Ukraine is rowdy, exasperating in its incomprehension of the law, but open. Political culture in Eastern Ukraine is based on

intimidation. Kuchma in the late 1990s tried, and ultimately failed, to institute the “blackmail” state. Yanukovich learned nothing from the Orange Revolution and everything from Putin: to stay in power, you have to bully your opponents. Taras Kuzio, already in the Kuchma era, was arguing for a strong linkage between nationalism (or a strong national identity) and democracy (or pluralism). Twenty years of evidence in the Ukraine case backs him up.

5. Why did Yanukovich do it? He has been under immense pressure from the EU and the US not to have Tymoshenko condemned. (Is it necessary to add that no one believes the platitudes, reiterated yesterday by the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, that the President cannot “interfere” in legal proceedings, when the trial was initiated by the Procuracy at the urging of the government, since this is how the Procuracy has always worked?) Promises were made, such as the repeal of obscure “Stalinist” laws, and nothing happened. More promises were issued yesterday (with Yanukovich insisting that “the verdict is not final”), but hardly anyone is holding his breath. One could think that Yanukovich, steeped in a culture of intimidation, does not realize that he is driving himself to the wall. Yet this would imply that he is not a rational politician, whereas he has amply demonstrated, ever since he was down and out after the third round in December 2004, that he has in fact great talents as a politician. Closer to the mark might be the realization that Yanukovich is persuaded that he can get away with it. That in the last analysis, the EU will yield, Ukraine will get its Association Agreement, and that verbal reprimands, when they remain verbal, are perfectly tolerable. After all, if Putin got away with it – he dismantled democracy, at no diplomatic cost – why couldn’t Yanukovich get away with it? He may very well be right. On the other hand, international relations is a study in double standards and Ukraine could fall on the wrong side of selective decisions made by the EU and the US. Lucan Way has an interesting theory about how EU standards matter depending on geographical zones. (They certainly matter in Poland). Ukraine, as always, is in the uncertain borderland in that regard. Russia is definitely outside of the zone, because it is a petro and nuclear state. But what can a “Russified” (politically, but not economically) Ukraine have to offer the West? So let us see whether the EU means what it meant to say with the “profound implications” that yesterday’s decision allegedly entails. And if Yanukovich were to backtrack and release Tymoshenko, all the better, except that the line was crossed and expectations of fair elections next year will still be nil.

#2

Ukraine’s Tymoshenko Jailed for Seven Years

by Ellen Barry

New York Times, 11 October 2011

KIEV, Ukraine — From the moment President Viktor F. Yanukovich took office last year, a central question was whether he would lead Ukraine west, toward Europe, or into a tight symbiosis with the country’s Soviet-era masters in Moscow.

Nineteen months of cautious navigation hit a watershed on Tuesday, when a court in Kiev sentenced the country’s most prominent opposition politician, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, to seven years in prison. European leaders have condemned the case as politically motivated, and hinted that they are unlikely to ratify a free trade and association agreement with Ukraine, a project four years in the making.

Ms. Tymoshenko, an acerbic populist who represents the European-leaning west of the country, rose to drown out the judge’s voice as he read out the verdict, speaking directly to a bank of television cameras.

“This is an authoritarian regime,” she said. “Against the background of European rhetoric, Yanukovich is taking Ukraine farther from Europe by launching such political trials.” As bailiffs led her from the courtroom, Ms. Tymoshenko turned in the doorway to wave goodbye, a small figure in a white coat and a helmet of blond braids.

Prosecutors say Ms. Tymoshenko harmed Ukraine's interests when, as prime minister, she carried out negotiations with Russia in 2009 over the price of natural gas. Tuesday's ruling excludes her from politics for 10 years, and levies a fine of about \$190 million.

But international legal experts say that she seems to have been performing a routine administrative function for which she might conceivably be disciplined, if the government was displeased with her performance, but not charged with a crime.

With Ms. Tymoshenko's trial at an end, European governments will have to decide whether to make good on their warnings that imprisoning her will freeze efforts to integrate with Ukraine politically and economically. On one hand, Mr. Yanukovich has defied intense diplomatic pressure from Western partners, crossing what one analyst called "the reddest of red lines."

On the other hand, Ukraine has been under pressure from Russia to join its own economic bloc, along with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Even compared with the other former Soviet nations, Ukraine — with a population of 46 million — seems to waver between Europe and Russia, so that isolating it from the West could have profound consequences.

Mr. Yanukovich has made integrating with Europe a central goal, and he is likely to head off catastrophic damage by softening Ms. Tymoshenko's conviction swiftly. One route to this would be decriminalizing the article under which she was convicted. In that event, her name would be cleared and she would be able to run in parliamentary elections in 2012, said Serhiy Vlasenko, one of her lawyers. This could occur as soon as next week, so that Mr. Yanukovich would be welcome at European Union talks in Brussels scheduled for Oct. 20.

He suggested as much on Tuesday, when he told journalists, "This is not a final decision."

"Ahead lies the appeals court, and it will without a doubt make a decision within the bounds of the law, but the decision will have great significance," he said, in comments carried by the Interfax news agency.

In Brussels, Ukraine's foreign minister emphasized the progress that the country has made toward meeting European benchmarks, saying the parties "have never been so close to the association agreement as they are now." A Foreign Ministry statement argued strenuously against linking the Tymoshenko verdict with the European Union procedure, making the case that political leaders like Mr. Yanukovich could not interfere in judicial processes. As news of the verdict spread on Tuesday, though, some in Kiev said Ms. Tymoshenko's conviction was already marked in Ukraine's history.

Critics of the verdict warned that Ukraine could follow the pattern set by Belarus, whose nascent engagement with the West came to an abrupt end last year amid a crackdown on opposition figures.

"For the past 10 years, we were in the process of getting to a democratic state," said Yulia Shcherban, a travel agent. "I agree that people who are dishonest must be charged. But in Ukraine, we are going back in the opposite direction and getting back to the days of the Soviet state: Either you are with those in power or you are against them and you are in trouble. She was against those in power."

Criticism came from a range of foreign capitals on Tuesday. Poland's Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, "Ukraine's image as a country that is undertaking a fundamental pro-European transformation has been tarnished." The White House released a statement urging Ukraine to release Ms. Tymoshenko and other jailed political leaders, and to allow them to run in next year's parliamentary elections. Catherine Ashton, the European Union's foreign policy chief, said the trial "unfortunately confirms that justice is being applied selectively in politically motivated prosecutions of the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government."

Russia, too, condemned the verdict in Ms. Tymoshenko's case — in part because her conviction centered on a deal she struck with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin in 2009, agreeing to pay what prosecutors called an excessively high price for Russian natural gas. Russian analysts said Ukraine might be trying to annul Ms. Tymoshenko's gas deal and renegotiate for a better price.

Russia's Foreign Ministry said the prosecution was "initiated exclusively for political motives," and noted "an obvious anti-Russian subtext to this whole story." Mr. Putin, who is on a visit to Beijing, told reporters, "I don't really understand what they gave her seven years for."

Several hundred supporters of Ms. Tymoshenko set up tent camps outside the courtroom on Tuesday, and the police were nervous enough to deploy 1,500 riot police officers in balaclavas and camouflage. But the case is unlikely to mobilize the throngs that coalesced around Ms. Tymoshenko in 2004, when, dressed in the style of an unusually glamorous peasant woman, she became the face of the pro-Western Orange Revolution.

The euphoria faded over the next few years, as the members of the Orange coalition bickered endlessly among themselves and Ukraine's economy foundered. During the last presidential election, Ms. Tymoshenko struggled to engage her voting base — Ukrainian speakers from the west of the country — and lost narrowly to Mr. Yanukovich, who represents the more Russified east.

Mr. Yanukovich surprised many by embracing an emphatically pro-European path, but that choice did not extend to domestic politics. His inauguration marked the opening of numerous criminal cases against his political rivals, a tactic some trace back to his experience in the bare-knuckled politics of eastern coal country.

Leslie Wayne contributed reporting from Kiev, and Michael Schwirtz from Moscow.

#3

Yulia Tymoshenko trial is an own goal for Ukraine

By Luke Harding

The Guardian (UK), 12 October 2011

With Ukraine co-hosting Euro 2012, former prime minister Tymoshenko's jail sentence for abuse of power leaves Kiev prone to EU pressure

The venue was Kiev's glittering Hyatt Regency hotel, overlooking the Old City. The moment was just before Ukraine's 2010 presidential election. Voters had grown weary of the constant bickering between the country's two pro-western leaders – firebrand prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and semi-romantic nationalist president Viktor Yushchenko.

Instead, the man of the moment was Viktor Yanukovych, a Soviet-era apparatchik. Back in 2004, Yanukovych had been caught, embarrassingly, trying to fix the last presidential poll.

Over an agreeable dinner, aides to Yanukovych – without recognising any previous wrongdoing – told me that their candidate was now a reformed character. Yanukovych was a democrat. More than that he was also a passionate European, who believed that Ukraine's geopolitical destiny lay with the European Union, rather than with Russia, the country's authoritarian neighbour (although good ties with Moscow were important, too). The new Yanukovych was even learning English. This message was repeated in Brussels, London and Washington.

Eighteen months later things look rather different. The decision by a Kiev court today to jail Tymoshenko for seven years for abuse of office over a controversial 2009 gas deal with Russia is an unambiguous signal. It says that Yanukovych does not really care what the EU thinks about him. It also confirms what Yanukovych's critics have been saying for some time – that under his

leadership the country is sliding towards Russian-style "managed democracy" and autocratic rule.

Since taking power, Yanukovich has rapidly reversed the fragile democratic gains of the Orange Revolution. He has put a squeeze on the country's independent media, with TV now in the hands of a bunch of pro-regime oligarchs. Nosy opposition journalists – such as the investigative reporter Vasyl Klymentyev – have disappeared. In parliament, Yanukovich's Party of the Regions has, using dubious means, achieved a majority. And politically motivated prosecutions have been brought against Tymoshenko and other senior members of her bloc.

Initially, some welcomed Yanukovich's old-school centralising tendencies. They favourably contrast Ukraine's current political "stability" with the chaotic, and even dysfunctional, Orange revolution years of 2004-2010. Speaking after her prison sentence, Tymoshenko delved into history and said the judge's verdict had plunged Ukraine back to 1937 and the dark era of Stalin's showtrials.

"As for me, be sure that I will not stop my fight even for a minute. I will always be with you as long as it is necessary," she declared defiantly, as she was carted back to jail. The comparison is ridiculous: in 1937 defendants were taken out after their trials and immediately shot. This won't happen to Tymoshenko.

There are rumours that following her conviction Yanukovich, having proved his point, will look for some kind of deal. One version is that the charges against her will be "decriminalised"; another that she will be released on payment of a large fine. The European Union has reacted to the sentence with anger and dismay. Amnesty International dubbed it "politically motivated". The Russian press baron Alexander Lebedev mischievously tweeted: "Free Nelson Tymoshenko!"

But what is clear is that the case was designed to nobble Tymoshenko and to cripple the pro-western, anti-Yanukovich forces she represents.

She is now unable to participate in Ukraine's next two elections: parliamentary ones in 2012, and the next presidential election in 2015. That, presumably, was the idea.

Thousands of her supporters took to the streets of Kiev today, protesting noisily against Yanukovich's heavy-handed tactics, reminiscent of Ukraine's backroom politics a decade ago.

The trial bears comparison with that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian oligarch who fell out with Vladimir Putin.

Khodorkovsky was jailed for a second time in 2010 after a similarly ludicrous judicial process. Khodorkovsky's trial was seen as a bellwether for Russia's political direction: forwards towards partial liberalisation and the rule of law, or backwards along the same lugubrious KGB track as before. Tymoshenko's conviction, alas, shows that Yanukovich isn't the newly minted democrat of 2010, but the same man whose election team in 2004 hacked into Ukraine's central election commission's computer.

Things may look grim for Tymoshenko, but there are several factors in her favour. As Andrew Wilson, senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues Ukraine isn't Russia. There are signal differences: Ukraine's economy isn't booming, its political system is fractured, and it still has a credible (admittedly now jailed) opposition leader – Tymoshenko. Relations with the Kremlin are cool.

Plus, Ukraine is more susceptible than Russia to international pressure.

But the clinching factor is something completely different: football.

Next year, Ukraine, together with Poland, will host the European football championships, Uefa

Euro 2012, with the final taking place in Kiev. It is a moment when the eyes of the world, or much of it, will be looking at Ukraine.

And it won't look too good if Nelson Tymoshenko is still in jail.

#4

Ukraine President says Tymoshenko Verdict "Not Final"

EUBusiness, 11 October 2011

(KIEV) - Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovich on Tuesday said that the verdict to jail opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko for seven years was not final and he understood the EU's anxiety over the case.

"It has made the European Union anxious and we understand why this is so," he told reporters. "Today the court took its decision in the framework of the current criminal code. This is not the final decision," he added.

He admitted that "beyond doubt this is a regrettable case which is impeding the European integration of Ukraine today."

The European Union has warned the trial could thwart the signing of an Association Agreement with Ukraine, the first step towards membership. Yanukovich said that the court of appeal still lay ahead in the case and also appeared to allude to moves to decriminalise the statute in the criminal code under which Tymoshenko was condemned.

"There is the court of appeal ahead and what decision it will take and under which legislation has great importance."

In the first hint of a compromise solution his Regions Party said last month it was ready to examine the possibility of decriminalising the charges that have been laid against Tymoshenko.

No concrete moves have been taken to implement the idea but Ukrainian officials have told AFP that Yanukovich had personally informed EU leaders about the possibility at a summit in Warsaw last month.

Regions Party deputy chairman Dmytro Shentsev, whose faction holds a clear majority in parliament, said it would examine the move if Tymoshenko was prepared to pay back the losses of around \$200 million she is judged to have caused to the state.

Tymoshenko was jailed on charges of abusing her power while in office for agreeing a gas deal with Russia that was deemed overly advantageous to Moscow.

#5

Putin Warns on Tymoshenko Verdict by Anatoly Medetsky

Moscow Times, 12 October 2011

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned that a Ukrainian court's decision to convict former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on Tuesday over a gas trade deal she brokered with Russia could endanger energy ties between the two countries.

A Kiev court sentenced Tymoshenko to seven years in jail for exceeding her authority in shepherding through a contract to end a bitter dispute that left parts of Europe freezing in the dead of the winter almost three years ago.

The January 2009 deal that forced Ukraine's energy company Naftogaz to pay Gazprom a steep price is in "full compliance" with Russian, Ukrainian and international law, Putin said during a visit to Beijing. He warned that it was "dangerous and counterproductive" to question the agreement.

The Foreign Ministry echoed his comments, stating in response to the verdict that the Kiev court ignored "compelling evidence" in favor of the contract's legal impeccability. "We can't fail to note the obvious anti-Russian subtext in this whole story," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "As a matter of fact, Tymoshenko went on trial for legally binding agreements ... that are in force and that nobody voided."

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, under whose administration the case was opened, appeared to alienate European Union political leaders as well. EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton described the verdict as a deeply disappointing testimony of selective application of justice, and said it jeopardized the country's further cooperation with the bloc.

Gazprom said its chief, Alexei Miller, held a meeting with Ukraine's energy minister, Yury Boiko, and they agreed to adhere to the current contract until reaching any new agreements. The issue will likely be on the table when President Dmitry Medvedev meets Yanukovich at an interregional economic forum in Donetsk next Tuesday.

The office of Darya Chepak, Yanukovich's spokeswoman, did not comment on what effect the ruling will have on the gas deal, when contacted Tuesday afternoon.

The ruling opens another way for Ukraine to press for a revision of the gas deal with Russia, a subject to which Moscow grew more conciliatory as the judge in Kiev approached his decision. Otherwise, Ukraine could now seek to annul the entire deal, said Andrew Neff, an energy analyst at IHS Global Insight.

Gazprom and Naftogaz stipulated in their contract that they would settle any disputes in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, but Ukraine could argue that if the contract were not valid, then the dispute resolution clause was not applicable either, Neff said.

"That would really open up some legal complexities, however," he added, because Gazprom would likely insist on taking the matter to Stockholm arbitration.

Valentin Zemlyansky, an independent energy analyst in Kiev, said the verdict could trigger arbitration of the gas contract.

Yevgeny Minchenko, director of the International Institute of Political Research, a Moscow think tank, doubted that the court decision would serve as strong evidence in favor of Ukraine in a Stockholm arbitration. The EU outrage with Yanukovich will weaken his hand in talks with Moscow, he added.

Tymoshenko's conviction comes after Yanukovich held a meeting with both Putin and Medvedev outside Moscow on Sept. 24, the same day the pair of Russian leaders announced they would attempt to swap jobs next year. The meeting followed months of saber-rattling, in which Ukraine threatened to take Russia to an international court in an effort to rip up the gas contract.

Two days after the meeting, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced that the two sides had agreed to revise the troublesome contract. Energy Minister Boiko's visit to Moscow for gas talks Tuesday was the third since then. Gazprom consistently reported that the dialogue was constructive.

The Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that it hoped that the verdict would not disrupt these talks. The current contract ended a pricing spat between Moscow and Kiev that arose in January 2009 and

resulted in reduced deliveries to Europe via Ukraine.

Putin, meanwhile, expressed confusion about sentence, saying, "I don't really understand why they handed her seven years."

But he showed no sympathy. "Tymoshenko for us, and for me personally, is neither a friend nor a relation," he said, Reuters reported. "Moreover, she is a political opponent, because she was always a political person of Western orientation."

#6

Statement by the US Press Secretary on Ukraine

11 October 2011

The United States is deeply disappointed with the conviction and sentencing of former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko through a politically motivated prosecution. The charges against Mrs. Tymoshenko and the conduct of her trial, as well as the prosecution of other opposition leaders and members of the preceding government, have raised serious concerns about the Government of Ukraine's commitment to democracy and rule of law.

The United States strongly supports the Ukrainian peoples' goal of becoming a democratic and prosperous European state, and remains dedicated to strengthening bilateral cooperation based on shared values and shared interests. Ukraine, however, cannot reach this goal without redoubled efforts to protect and advance democracy and the rule of law for all its citizens. For these reasons, the United States urges the release of Mrs. Tymoshenko and the other political leaders and former government officials, and believes that they should have an unrestricted ability to participate fully in political life, including next year's parliamentary elections.

#7

European Union, 11 October 2011

Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the verdict in the case of Ms Yulia Tymoshenko

The EU is deeply disappointed with the verdict of the Pechersk District Court in Ukraine in the case of Ms Yulia Tymoshenko. The verdict comes after a trial which did not respect the international standards as regards fair, transparent and independent legal process which I repeatedly called for in my previous statements. This unfortunately confirms that justice is being applied selectively in politically motivated prosecutions of the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government. It is especially disappointing for a country that currently holds the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

The EU urges the competent Ukrainian authorities to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial process in any appeal in the case of Ms Tymoshenko and in the other trials related to members of the former Government. The right of appeal should not be compromised by imposing limitations on the defendants' ability to stand in future elections in Ukraine, including the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

The EU will reflect on its policies towards Ukraine. The way the Ukrainian authorities will generally respect universal values and rule of law, and specifically how they will handle these cases, risks having profound implications for the EU-Ukraine bilateral relationship, including for the conclusion of the Association Agreement, our political dialogue and our co-operation more broadly.

#8

Farce Kiev

Free countries do not make it a crime to lose an election.

Editorial

Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2011

In August, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich published an op-ed in these pages extolling Ukraine as a "modern and dynamic country" that was looking to sweep away "the remnants of Soviet corruption" and set a course toward becoming "a proud member of the European Union." The seven-year prison sentence imposed yesterday by a Kiev court on former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko renders those claims absurd.

Mr. Yanukovich, recall, ran for President in 2004 and initially emerged as the supposed winner in a contest that international observers denounced as a fraud. He conceded defeat only after Ukrainians staged the Orange Revolution and a re-run vote reversed the earlier result. But the elected government did not pursue legal actions against Mr. Yanukovich or his coterie, and he was honestly elected last year after defeating Ms. Tymoshenko in a tight race.

In modern democracies, political differences are settled politically and policy differences aren't criminalized. Not so in Mr. Yanukovich's Ukraine, which has subjected the opposition to a campaign of intimidation and prosecution. Ms. Tymoshenko's case ostensibly revolves around a decision she made as Prime Minister to order the state gas company to sign a deal with Russia. Prosecutors accused her of "exceeding her powers."

As in other autocracies that prefer to maintain a veneer of legal respectability, Mr. Yanukovich's government has tried to distance itself from the trial with platitudes about the separation of powers and the rule of law. But if Mr. Yanukovich is serious about bringing Ukraine into the fold of "modern and dynamic" countries, he can show it by ending the legal persecution of the opposition and allowing Ms. Tymoshenko and others to freely contest next year's parliamentary elections. Free countries do not make it a crime to lose an election—a point Mr. Yanukovich might consider more carefully before posturing as a reformer.

#9

The 'Ukrainophobe' in Charge of Educating His Country's Youth by Ivan Lozowy

Transitions Online, 7 October 2011

Ivan Lozowy is a TOL correspondent in Kyiv.

Dmytro Tabachnyk makes no secret of his pro-Russian sympathies. That is precisely why he sits in the cabinet, critics say.

KYIV | President Viktor Yanukovich's government has plenty on its plate, including continuing economic woes, the government's falling popularity, and international criticism of the trial of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Yanukovich might be forgiven for not paying much attention to the gathering swell of protest aimed at one member of the government.

Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk is probably Ukraine's most controversial government official. Tabachnyk himself is quoted on the ministry's website as saying, "If a ranking was compiled of officials who are most often mentioned in the press then Dmytro Tabachnyk would definitely be near the top," but the reasons for his (often negative) press are largely unknown outside the country.

So when European education ministers met for a summit in Kyiv on 22 September, they hardly expected to see their host get hit in the face with a bouquet of flowers. But that is what happened when university student Daria Stepanenko approached Tabachnyk during the summit and, following a brief discussion, smacked the minister with an armful of flowers. After being detained by police, Stepanenko said her gesture was a form of protest, delivered on behalf of all of Ukraine's students, against the minister's policies.

Tabachnyk, 47, served as press secretary and chief of staff to former President Leonid Kuchma and was twice a deputy prime minister during governments headed by Yanukovich. Tabachnyk carried controversial baggage with him when he took over the minister's job 19 months ago.

Several newspaper articles had set the tone for his tenure as education minister. A September 2009 article for the major Russian newspaper *Izvestia* titled "From Ribbentrop to the Maidan" – the latter a reference to the Orange Revolution of 2004 – said the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was "standard European practice." He likened the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to the Munich Agreement, the 1938 pact by which Britain and France acceded to Germany's demand to annex part of Czechoslovakia.

Tabachnyk also claimed that western Ukrainians "have practically nothing in common with the people of 'Great Ukraine' [its central and eastern regions], not in the psychological, religious, linguistic, or political areas. We have different enemies and different allies. More than that, our allies and even brothers are their enemies." The last is a reference to Russians, who had been depicted in school textbooks as occupiers of Ukraine under the Russian empire and the Soviet Union.

Vadym Karasyov, a political analyst in Kyiv, said Tabachnyk is "convenient for the government as a lightning rod because all potential criticism of the government is drawn away and directed at Tabachnyk instead." Opposition lawmaker Lev Biriuk sees Prime Minister Mikola Azarov as the key individual who lobbied through Tabachnyk's appointment and serves as his protector in the government. "There is a clear link between the two. Azarov supports all of Tabachnyk's initiatives," Biriuk said. Karasyov agrees that Azarov and Tabachnyk are "people with the same post-Soviet mentality."

Tabachnyk was appointed in March 2010, a month after Yanukovich took office. At a meeting with the president shortly after being appointed, Tabachnyk gave assurances that his personal views would not color his policies as a member of the government. In the eyes of his critics, however, Tabachnyk has taken his own writings to heart and embarked on a wide-ranging campaign to reverse changes to Ukraine's education system introduced over the past 20 years following the country's gaining independence in 1991.

The status of the country's two main languages lies at the heart of several of his most disputed decisions. Students can now take the standardized university entrance exam in any of four languages, including Russian, not solely in Ukrainian as before. A number of Ukrainian-language schools have been closed down in the largely Russian-speaking east of the country, and classes in Russian have been added in some Ukrainian schools.

Soviet-era terms such as "Great Patriotic War" in place of "World War II" have returned to history textbooks on Tabachnyk's watch, and references to some historical events have been removed, such as the battle of Kruty, when 300 students from a military lyceum tried in vain to defend Kyiv against an assault by a Bolshevik army in 1918 led by General Mikhail Muravyov, who later laid waste to the city.

Tabachnyk has also introduced a bill that would curtail the autonomy of Ukrainian universities by centralizing decision making on university curricula in the hands of the Education Ministry.

Tabachnyk's former subordinate for a brief time, Maksym Strikha, appointed deputy education minister by the previous administration of Viktor Yushchenko, said Tabachnyk's motives are as clear as they are simple: "To unite Ukraine with the 'Russian world.' "

Serhiy Kvit, president of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, which traces its roots back to a Kyiv university from the 17th century, is one of Tabachnyk's most outspoken critics. According to Kvit, Tabachnyk is a "Ukrainophobe" and Tabachnyk's policies "harm Ukraine's national interests because these are attempts to keep Ukraine in the post-Soviet space. That is, Tabachnyk's actions are addressed not to Ukrainians, but rather to an internal Russian audience, in support of the imperial policies of Putin and Medvedev."

Small wonder that Tabachnyk's policies have stirred up numerous demonstrations and protests.

In Makiyivka, a city in the Donetsk oblast in eastern Ukraine, parents staged hunger strikes earlier this year to protest the closure of three Ukrainian-language schools.

Parents also protested in other parts of eastern Ukraine over planned school closures. In February, parents in the city of Krasnyy Luch went on hunger strike and parents in another town in Donetsk oblast threatened to set themselves on fire if their Ukrainian-language school closed.

Yuriy Kolomiyets, a father Makiyivka whose son attended one of the closed schools, said in September that he and other parent-protesters were promised that the schools where their children were to be transferred would offer better conditions than the one to be closed. "[B]ut when our children got there we found the classes there to be overflowing and even the furniture there, for our kids, was taken from our old school. So we went ahead and repaired our own [school] at our own expense, we painted it, replaced equipment down to the curtains on the windows. Still we were prohibited from sending our children to this school." Kolomiyets and other parents have attempted unsuccessfully to overturn the closures in court.

During last month's summit of education ministers several hundred university students defied a court order banning demonstrations in Kyiv and organized a "counter-forum" protesting Tabachnyk's policies at which four students were arrested.

The student protesters carried signs saying "Down with the Ukrainophobe Tabachnyk," "Tabachnyk is the executioner of Ukraine's education system," and "Shame on Tabachnyk."

Even some prominent members of the governing coalition have been publicly critical of Tabachnyk. In an interview in 2008 for the news site Obozrevatel.com, Borys Kolesnikov, now a deputy prime minister, called Tabachnyk – at the time a fellow Party of Regions lawmaker – a "cheap clown" and "embezzler from the state treasury."

Yanukovych adviser and former press secretary Hanna Herman has criticized Tabachnyk for his "anti-Ukrainian statements" and called for his resignation.

Tabachnyk is not without his supporters. His promotion of the Russian language is supported by groups such as Russian-Speaking Ukraine, run by Vadym Kolesnichenko, a legislator from the ruling Party of Regions. One of Kolesnichenko's colleagues in Russian-Speaking Ukraine, Serhiy Provatorov, said, "The forced Ukrainization of the educational system carried out for all of the 20 years of Ukraine's existence as a state is, we are deeply convinced, a serious violation of the constitutional, legislative, and natural rights of the country's Russian-culture population as well as the citizenry as a whole, since it narrows their right to choose."

#10

Ukraine: time to call the IMF?

by Roman Olearchyk

Beyond Brics Blog, Financial Times, 3 October 2011

With another global slowdown unraveling and memory still fresh of the nasty economic beating Ukraine felt during the 2009 recession, urgency is building up for Kiev's government to unlock billions of dollars in fresh, low-interest rate loans by reviving talks with the International Monetary Fund.

"A rather serious crisis is on our doorstep... We don't have options and we should find understanding [with the IMF], as it is difficult to stay eyeball to eyeball with the crisis and without support of international financial organizations," Sergiy Tigipko, Ukraine's deputy prime minister said in a recent television appearance.

Tigipko is one of the strongest proponents in Ukraine's government for renewing cooperation with the IMF, and rightfully so.

With exports of steel and other commodities accounting for the lion's share of hard currency inflows and budget revenues, the nation's economy in 2009 proved heavily vulnerable to external shocks. GDP plunged by a staggering 15 per cent.

The economy has been gradually crawling out of this deep pit, with annual GDP growth expected to tally in this year at between 3.5-5 percent. But the prospects of a repeat global downturn could wipe out recently made gains. Fresh IMF funds would be crucial to cushioning the blow, rolling over external debt, covering budget gaps and protecting a domestic currency.

Billions of dollars in IMF loans kept Kiev's finances afloat during 2009. A new \$15.6bn loan program was adopted last year to shore up confidence and support austerity measures that are needed to put the national economy on more solid footing.

Elected President in 2010, Viktor Yanukovich, swiftly lured in the first \$3.4bn in tranches from this new program by biting the bullet in adopting unpopular reforms, including a 50 per cent increase on natural gas prices for households.

But reforms later stalled and Kiev's IMF program slipped off track. The nation inched closer to reviving IMF cooperation this summer by adopting pension reform that took effect this month. It gradually increases retirement ages for women from 55 to 60.

But with parliamentary elections one year away and the pro-presidential party slipping under opposition groups in the polls, officials are hesitant to adopt the last major condition sought by the IMF in return for fresh bailout cash: further increases on household gas prices to market levels.

With the prospects of another global downturn around the corner, Ukraine's government is running out of options. Serious decisions should be taken by the end of October or early November, when an IMF mission is expected to arrive.

"Government leaders are clearly concerned about finances this winter, particularly the balance of payments. Several trends pose potential threats to the Ukrainian economy and the stability of the hryvnia, including declining exports, paltry foreign direct investment (\$3.3bn in 8M11), rising demand for gas and payments, foreign debt payments due, uncollected debt (\$1.3 bln for utility bills alone in August) and tightening capital markets which limits the government's loan options," Phoenix Capital, a Kiev-based investment bank wrote in a note to investors on Monday

Kiev's government must either successfully wrap up negotiations with Russia, landing lower gas import prices (a scenario where the IMF could drop demands for another utility price hike on households); or bite the bullet once again by raising utilities for households.

"We are faced with a dilemma: try to hold successful talks with Russia and reduce the price of gas, or we achieve the same effect, which the IMF asks to do through the increase the prices of gas for households," Tigipko added.

The success or failure of such talks could become a game-changer for Yanukovich's administration economically as well as politically.

#11

Babi Yar, on the Verge of Amnesia

by Anna Colin Lebedev

Blog "L'Ukraine par le petit bout de la lorgnette", 4 October 2011-10-11

<http://zephyr-pastilla.livejournal.com/63617.html>

[translated by Ekaterina Lorye for UKL]

A Charged History, a Non-Site

Seventy years ago mass killings started at Babi Yar [Ukrainian: *Babyn Yar*], "the ravine of women", in Kyiv. For almost three years, the Nazis shot Jews, Ukrainians, Romas, prisoners of war, patients of psychiatric hospitals, and nationalist fighters... More than 30 000 Jews in the first days, and then all kinds of "undesirables" throughout the war, up to 100,000 victims in total. In 1943, aiming to erase their traces, the Germans proceeded to dig up and burn the corpses.

The official memory of the Soviet state hastened to forget the mass shootings and to fill the pit. In 1961, a deadly mudslide of the field completely transformed the topography of Babi Yar, to the point that historians still debate the exact location of the ravine and the road followed by the victims. An avenue splits the site in two parts, and the major part of what once had been the ravine is today an anonymous park where you can meet mothers walking their children, and the young drinking beer on public benches.

Baby Yar is an uncertain place, studded with monuments. The biggest one, which dates back to the 1970s, is situated in the middle of the artificial mini-ravine and commemorates Soviet victims of Nazi barbarism. All the others date back to the 1990s and 2000. Some surround the big monument, while others are located on the other side of the street, drown in the park. We can find at Babi Yar a menorah and a stone commemorating Jewish victims, a monument to murdered children, a cross to Ukrainian nationalists, crosses to Christian priests, a monument to a partisan woman, a stone to the victims of the mudslide and more that I cannot remember. Visitors usually only visit the official monument, while the better initiated go until the menorah, yet no plan or itinerary exists are available. Babi Yar is a "non-existent site" (*un non-site*).

And it is precisely at this "non-site" that the commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the massacres were intended to take place.

Each On Its Own

At the "tail" side, the official monument, to the left of Melnikova Street. At 10 o'clock, President Yanukovich, accompanied by Prime Minister Azarov and the Parliament Speaker Lytvyn, placed the wreath at the monument.

A familiar picture! Last year, same time, same place, same people, same laying of a wreath for the 69th commemoration of Babi Yar.

The only innovation this year consists of the presence of [Avigdor] Liberman, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The security line, the soldiers at attention, no discourse, no audience, except for accredited journalists. The minute of silence and that was it, by 10:30 the last military guards stood beside their cars.

Avigdor Liberman was the only person who passed to the “head” side, to the right of Melnikova Street.

While the President quickly completed the depositing of the wreath (one has to admit this experience is not always successful), on the other side of the street deep in the park, a hundred people or so gathered in front of the menorah.

There, at a usually bare and deserted place, the authorities had erected white tents, installed some rows of chairs, placed the microphones, a metal detector and camera platforms.

Around twenty soldiers in Israeli uniforms, men and women, were aligned on one side of the menorah, a string quartet wearing kippas was installed on the other side; like the soldiers, Jewish school students stood in ranks. In sum, the commemoration was well prepared.

Yet, who did prepare it and for whom? As the ceremony went on, this question, incongruous at first sight, become central to me.

Ilya Levitas, the President of the Ukrainian Jewish Congress, opened the ceremony in Ukrainian. What he was saying was very much similar to what those who succeeded him were going to state: the immensity of the tragedy, the necessity to remember and transmit. Yet, he also emphasized what most of the speakers were not going to repeat, the necessity to commemorate not only the Jews, but also the other Nazi victims.

The shadows of those “others” hovered over his speech. “We too have a right to our national tragedy”, Levitas exclaimed. It was not clear who “we” did designate, but we could guess that it was “them”, those who already had their national tragedy : the Ukrainian victims of the Great Famine.

But the “others” were not present, with the exception of Timofei Kokhan, the Deputy Minister of Culture, in charge of Babi Yar matters in the government. After his brief intervention, repeating the same necessity to remember, the Ukrainian part of the commemoration was closed.

Then came the time for Israel’s part, that had nothing to do with either Baby Yar or the Ukrainians who were present there.

In the Name of a State

From this moment on, the ceremony was entirely led by Israeli officials, to the point that I was wondering if they would ask the non-Israelis to leave. The speeches, entirely in Hebrew, were sent in advance to the translators—a beautiful blonde and a beautiful brunette—who read the brief Ukrainian versions at the end of each speech.

Liberman, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, almost talked about Babi Yar, but instead talked about the hijacking of Israeli passengers on an Air France Paris-Tel Aviv flight in 1976, as well as the courageous intervention by the Israeli army that allowed the liberation of the majority of the hostages. “At that time, they wanted once again to force the Jews to follow the Road of Death [the name that was given to the road leading to Babi Yar], but the Israeli state was there to protect them as it always will”. What Minister Liberman apparently meant was that if he had been in power in 1941, the mass killings at Babi Yar would not have taken place.

After Liberman, the Israeli Minister responsible for diaspora affairs and a female Knesset deputy spoke. "Today, Jews are threatened again within their own state", the deputy stated and it, definitely, had nothing more to do with Babi Yar.

Suddenly, the translator asked the audience to turn off their cells. This could have been for a minute of silence, but we had already had a minute of silence at the beginning of the ceremony. "The Israeli and Ukrainian national anthems are now going to be played," she specified. We had embarked on the *sacred* field. "And we will prove, brothers, that we are the descendants of the Cossacks" played a quartet wearing kippas. This sounded really strange.

A rabbi spoke while another prayed. The German ambassador was allowed to make a speech in Russian. Other ambassadors who were present, including the French one, stood close to the stage, as if they were waiting to be called. Yet, the organizers had decided that it was not their commemoration, and they therefore stood there holding flowers.

At the end, they let some Ukrainians speak: the President of the Association of Veterans from World War II, the President of the Union of the Surviving Children of the Ghettos and Concentration Camps, the President of the Ukrainian Association of the Righteous, a survivor of Babi Yar. People who had waited a long time and who were trying to speak fast, to say a lot, but time was short.

Those people could not wait to speak and strived to make their discourse fast in order to say everything, yet time was running out.

None of those speeches were translated into Hebrew. Apparently, it was of no interest to Israelis.

After that, the ceremony was completed. The officials were asked to deposit wreaths at the menorah. "Afterward, each person wishing to place flowers would be able to do so freely" Levitas reassured. Yet when the officials finished placing their wreath, the Israeli translator said at the microphone "the ceremony is over".

Old women and men, flowers in hand, were brushed off.

At the end of the ceremony, the Knesset deputy congratulated the translators, in perfect native Russian: "Well done, girls, you did great". It is at this precise moment that I really resented her for having been the cold representative of a state that had contempt for the event that it came to commemorate.

#12

International Conference "Babi Yar. History and Memory of a Massacre"

Kyiv, 24–25 October 2011

Venue: Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies named after I. Kuras (National Academy of Science of Ukraine), Kutuzova str. 8, Kyiv

Organizing parties: French Embassy in Ukraine, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, "Babi Yar" Civic Committee.

2011 marks the tragic anniversary of Nazi invasion of Ukraine and the start of persecution and mass killing of the local population.

Babi Yar is a site in Kyiv which still remains a grievous symbol of genocidal policies of the Nazi Germany and Soviet-style manipulation with memory; moreover, it is a bright example of present-day memory about the war in the modern Ukrainian society.

The conference aims to discuss and analyze not only historical aspects of implementation of the repression policies towards various population groups (Jews, Roma, OUN activists, Soviet POWs etc.) for which Babi Yar became a mass grave, but also post-war and modern issues of commemoration of the victims in the context of dubious attitude to the past events on behalf of various social groups in the modern Ukraine.

Contributors of the conference are scholars from Ukraine, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Russia. In the presentations and round-table discussions various topics of Babi Yar history will be considered, representing vision of the site as, on the one hand, a unique place of anti-human murderous policies and, on the other hand, a universal symbol the memory of which must be preserved for better understanding of the nature of totalitarian regimes and human society today.

The conference is supported by: the German Embassy in Ukraine, the Shoah Memorial (Paris), the French-Russian Center for Social Studies (Moscow) and Yad Vashem (Jerusalem).

Working languages of the conference: Ukrainian, English, Russian and French (with simultaneous translation)

Contacts: 482.23.71, 482.06.72, info@cfucus.org

Conference Program

Monday, October 24th

9.30 Babi Yar, an Epicentre of the Nazi Occupation Policies in Ukraine

Introduction by Chair: Vitalii Nakhmanovich

Keynote

Jürgen Matthäus

“Operation Barbarossa’ and the onset of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union”

10.10 A Major Stage of the “Final Solution” in the East

Kiril Feferman “With Babi Yar in the Background: Hesitations of Kievan Jews in the First Three Months of the War”

Dmytro Malakhov “The Pre-Massacre Days: Violence against Jews and non-Jews from the Storming of Kiev by the German Troops to the Beginning of the Massacre, 19-29 September 1941”

Karel Berkhoff “Babi Yar: The Largest Single Nazi Shooting of Jews in the Soviet Union”

11.50 The Other Victim Groups of Babi Yar

Serhii Kot “The Ukrainian Casualties in Babi Yar during WWII (1941-1945)”

Mikhail Tyaglyy “Babi Yar as a Place of Mass Extermination of the Ukrainian Gypsies: A Typical Pattern?”

16.30 Babi Yar, An Example of Cooperation Between the Perpetrators

Introduction by Chair: Florent Brayard

Keynote

Aleksander Kruglov "Babi Yar Tragedy in the Light of German Documents"

Ivan Dereiko "The Local Auxiliary Perpetrators in Babi Yar: A Long-Time Debate in Historiography"

Andrej Angrick "Operation 1005 in Babi Yar - Burning the Corpses, Destroying the Evidence"

Tuesday, October 25th

9.30 Traces of Babi Yar

Introduction by Chair: Annette Wieviorka

Keynote

Luba Jurgenson "The Posterity of Babi Yar in Literature: Periodization, Methods of Transmission and Literary Strategies"

Boris Czerny "Witnesses of Babi Yar: Typology Attempt"

11.10 Michael Prazan "Pictures of Babi Yar: Critical Analysis of the Visual Traces of the Massacre"

Arkadi Zeltser "The Murder of Jews in Babi Yar as it was Seen in the USSR, 1941-1945"

14.30 Babi Yar, A Political Posterity

Introduction by chair: Volodymyr Masliyчук

Keynote

Vitalii Nakhmanovich "Babi Yar in the Post-War years: Struggle for Memory and Competition of Memories"

Tanja Penter "Collaboration on Trial: The Persecution of Collaborators in the Soviet Union after World War II and Babi Yar"

Anatoly Podolskyi "Babi Yar-Related Memory in the Context of the State-Sponsored Policies of Memory in Ukraine"

Tatyana Evstafyeva "Babi Yar, a Moving Place: the History of the Place and its Memorials from 1945 to 2011"

17.20 Final Roundtable: The Future of the Site of Babi Yar

#13

Becoming Canadian: Ukrainians in Canada During the Second World War

Plans have now being finalized for "Becoming Canadian: Ukrainians in Canada During the Second World War," to be held in Winnipeg on 11-12 November. Eleven papers are scheduled to be presented on a variety of topics related to the theme of the symposium, whose goal is to stimulate research on how the Ukrainian community in Canada was affected by the war. The gathering is sponsored by the Kule Centre at CIUS and the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian

Studies at the University of Manitoba, in partnership with the Department of Germanic and Slavic Studies, University of Manitoba. It will take place at the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre (Oseredok), and be open to the public, with a \$40 registration fee for both days, and \$25 for a single day. The amounts cover the cost of lunch and coffee breaks on the two days, as well as Friday night's film screening, which will be open only to registered participants. Attached separately with this issue of *Field Notes* is the conference poster containing registration information, and following is a draft of the program:

Friday 11 November

09:00-9:20 Conference Opening

Official Greetings from Organizers and Sponsors

9:30-10:40 Session I – Resources for Studying the War

Orest Zakydalsky, Toronto

"The Participation of Ukrainians in the Canadian Armed Forces during WWII based on Interviews in the UCRDC archives."

Serge Cipko, Edmonton

"The Alberta Press on Ukrainians in Canada during World War II: Two Case Studies."

10:40-11:00 Break

11:00-11:20 Remembrance Day Ceremony

Honouring Canada's Veterans of the War

11:20-12:20 Session II – The War Before the War

Myroslav Skhandrij, Winnipeg

Preparing for the Storm: The Carpathian Ukraine Episode of 1938-39

Jars Balan, Edmonton

The Making of "Uncle Joe": How the Canadian Press Facilitated the Image Makeover of Stalin and the Soviet Union in the 1930s and its Implications for Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War

12:20-1:20 Lunch

Catered for Presenters and Registered Participants

1:20-2:20 Session III – Stories from the Front

Suzanne Holyk-Hunchuk, Ottawa

Three Brothers in Service – One at Hong Kong: A Study of William, Harold, and Nicholas Hunchuck

Peter Melnycky, Edmonton

From Farm Boy to Fly Boy: Profiles of Alberta Ukrainians awarded for distinguished service in the RCAF

2:20-2:40 Break

2:40-3:50 Session IV – The Impact of the European War on Canadian Ukrainians

Jody Perrun, Winnipeg

The War within the War: Ukrainian Nationalists and Communists in Winnipeg, 1939-45.

Andrij Makuch, Toronto

A Molotov-Ribbentrop Cocktail: The Effect of Soviet Foreign Policy Change in 1939 on the Ukrainian Pro-Communist Left in Canada

Conclusion of Academic Sessions for Day I

7:00 Educational Film Screening – Hollywood and the War in Ukraine

The North Star (aka Armored Attack).

Directed by Lewis Milestone and written by Lillian Hellman, with music by Aaron Copland, lyrics by Ira Gershwin, and cinematography by James Wong Howe. Starring Anne Baxter, Dana Andrews, Walter Huston, Walter Brennan and Erich von Stroheim, and introducing Farley Granger.

Plot summary

In June 1941 Ukrainian villagers are living in peace. As the schools break up for vacation, a group of friends decide to travel to Kiev for a holiday. To their horror they find themselves attacked by German aircraft, part of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Eventually their village itself is occupied by the Nazis. Meanwhile men and women take to the hills to form partisan militias. The full brutality of the Nazis is revealed when a German doctor (Erich von Stroheim) uses the village children as a source of blood for transfusions into wounded German soldiers. Some children lose so much blood that they die. A famous Russian doctor (Walter Huston) discovers this and informs the partisans, who prepare to strike back. They launch a cavalry assault on the village to rescue the children. The Russian doctor accuses the German doctor of being worse than the convinced Nazis, because he has used his skills to support them. He then shoots him. The peasants join together, and one girl envisions a future in which they will “make a free world for all men”. To be followed by an open discussion of the film and any issues pertinent to the conference theme.

Saturday 12 November

9:30-10:15 Session V – Developments on the Home Front

Connie Warwuck-Hemmett, Winnipeg

Rehabilitating the No-Voters: The *Winnipeg Free Press*, Francis H. Stevens and Manitoba's Ukrainian-Canadians

Roman Yereniuk, Winnipeg

The Contribution of Ukrainian Chaplains in the Canadian Armed Forces During World War II: Empowering spiritually, morally and ‘culturally’ the Canadian Forces Personnel and their Families to meet the demands of military service

10:15-10:35 Break

10:35-11:45 Session VI – A Manitoba War Story

Tom Prymak, Toronto

In the Shadow of a Political Assassination: Gabrielle Roy's 'Steven' and the Ukrainian Canadians

11:45-12:00 – Official Closing

12:00-1:00 – Lunch

Catered lunch for presenters and registered participants.

#14

Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine, 2012-2013

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa

Application Deadline: 1 February 2012

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing the establishment of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of \$20,000, plus all tuition, for a maximum of four years.

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of \$500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book *Champions of Philanthropy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments*.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields associated with the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to the Office of the Vice-Dean, Graduate Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Desmarais Building 3210, 55 Laurier East, Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.

Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on 1 February 2012 and will continue until the award is announced.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships for the academic year 2012-2013 are invited to contact Dominique Arel, Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, at darel@uottawa.ca.

#15

Fellowships at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

“Imperial Legacies and International Politics in the Post-Soviet Space”

Deadline: January 9, 2012

The Davis Center is pleased to announce the theme for its 2012-2013 Fellows Program. The Fellows Program brings together scholars at early and later stages in their careers to consider a common theme spanning the social sciences and humanities. The program is coordinated by

faculty from across Harvard University whose research interests include aspects of the selected theme. In 2012-2013, the Fellows Program will be coordinated by Professors Tim Colton (Government) and Serhii Plokhii (History).

The theme for 2012-2013 is "Imperial Legacies and International Politics in the Post-Soviet Space." Areas to be explored under this theme include history, identity issues, security, political economy, and regime building in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the region. Other topics of interest include social and cultural factors such as migration, public health, religion, organized crime, environmental degradation, popular culture, and the mass media.

In addition to pursuing their own research, Fellows will participate in a bi-weekly interdisciplinary seminar series that will explore the theme. Papers will be presented by the visiting Fellows, Harvard faculty, and invited outside speakers. For more detailed information on the Fellows Program, and opportunities to apply for regional, postdoctoral, and senior fellowships, please visit the Davis Center web site, <http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu>

Note that scholars whose work does not address the annual theme may still apply for fellowships at the Davis Center; their applications will receive full consideration.

#16

Recent Publications on Ukraine

Balaklytskyi, Maksym. 2011. *Mediatyzatsiia protestantizmu v Ukraïni, 1991-2010 rokiv*. Kharkiv: Kharkivs'ke istoryko-filolohichne tovarystvo.

Benz, Angelika. 2011. *Der Henkerskecht. Der Prozess gegen John (Iwan) Demjanjuk in München*. Berlin: Metropol Verlag.

Kas'ianov, Heorhii and Aleksei Miller. 2011. *Rossiiia-Ukraina: kak pishetsia istoriia*. Moscow: RGGU. [Includes six "dialogues" on topics ranging from Mazepa to the Holodomor and World War II] ISBN 978-5-7281-1159-7

Kolosov, V. A. and O. I. Vendina. 2011. *Rossiisko-ukrainskoe pogranich'e: dvadtsat' let razdelenogo edinstva*. Moscow: Novyi khronograf. ISBN 978-5-94881-159-8

Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2011. "The Media, History and Identity: Competing Narratives of the Past in the Ukrainian Popular Press," *National Identities*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 287-303.

Shevchuk, Yuri. 2011. *Beginners' Ukrainian with Interactive Online Workbook*. New York: Hippocrene Books. ISBN 13: 978-0-7818-1268-9

#17

Festschrift for Professor Frank E. Sysyn published

Recently the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies published volumes 33–34 (2008–2009) of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. This 628-page quadruple issue, titled *Tentorium honorum*, is a collection of thirty-three essays presented to Professor Frank E. Sysyn on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday.

Professor Sysyn is a distinguished scholar of Ukrainian and Polish history and has been a major figure in the development of Ukrainian historical studies in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, and Germany for more than three decades. He is a professor in the Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta and, since 1990, director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at CIUS and editor-in-chief of its Hrushevsky Translation Project.

Professor Sysyn is the author of *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (1985), *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Historian and National Awakener* (2001), and studies on the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Ukrainian historiography, and early modern Ukrainian political culture. He is also coauthor, with Serhii Plokyh, of *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine* (2003).

This special issue was guest-edited by Professors Olga Andriewsky, Zenon E. Kohut, Serhii Plokyh, and Larry Wolff. It includes essays written in honor of Professor Sysyn by his colleagues and former students from Canada (Olga Andriewsky, Jars Balan, John-Paul Himka, Bohdan Klid, Zenon E. Kohut, Paul R. Magocsi, David Marples, Victor Ostapchuk, Uliana Pasicznyk, Frances Swyripa); Ukraine (Yaroslav Fedoruk, Andrii Grechylo, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Yaroslav Isaievych, Volodymyr Kravchenko, Yurii Mytsyk, Oleksiy Tolochko, Natalia Yakovenko); the United States (Paul Bushkovitch, David Frick, Mark von Hagen, Leonid Heretz, Nancy Shields Kollmann, Serhii Plokyh, Roman Szporluk, Larry Wolff); Poland (Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, Danuta Poppe and Andrzej Poppe, Zbigniew Wójcik); Austria (Andreas Kappeler); England (David Saunders); Israel (Moshe Rosman); and Russia (Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva). These essays, which range from medieval to contemporary East European and Ukrainian history, reflect the breadth and impact of Professor Sysyn's scholarship. *Tentorium honorum* includes a biographical essay about Professor Sysyn and a select bibliography of his works. Thirty-four reviews of books in the field of Ukrainian studies round out the publication. The title echoes a seventeenth-century panegyric to Adam Kysil, the Ukrainian leader and Polish statesman who was the subject of Professor Sysyn's groundbreaking monograph on early modern Ukraine and Poland-Lithuania.

The price of this special issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is \$65 in Canada and U.S. \$75 elsewhere, including shipping and handling. In addition, CIUS Press has published an edition of *Tentorium honorum* without the book reviews; it is available in paperback for \$39.95 and in hardcover for \$69.95 (plus GST in Canada and shipping). Orders can be placed by contacting CIUS Press, 430 Pembina Hall, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2H8; tel.: (780) 492-2973; fax: (780) 492-4967; e-mail: cius@ualberta.ca; or via its secure on-line ordering system at www.ciuspress.com, which provides a detailed table of contents of this and all other CIUS publications. Payment is accepted by cheque, money order, VISA, or Mastercard.

#18

**CIUS PRESS offers a NEW BOOK
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The making of modern Ukrainian identity is often reduced to a choice between "Little Russia" and "Ukraine." In this collection of essays *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity*, Zenon E. Kohut shows that the process was much more complex, involving Western influences and native traditions that shaped a distinct Ukrainian political culture and historiography. The author stresses the importance of the early modern period, in which the Ukrainian elite adapted the legacy of Kyivan Rus' into its conception of Cossack Ukraine as its fatherland. The development of Ukrainian historiography, from the seventeenth-century Synopsis and the Cossack chronicles to the twentieth-century state school, is analyzed in detail. Among the topics singled out for attention are the struggle for Cossack rights and liberties, the ambiguous role of the concept of Little Russia, the development of a stereotypical image of Jews, and post-independence relations between Ukraine and Russia. The book offers a rewarding and richly nuanced treatment of a contentious subject.

About the Author

Zenon E. Kohut is professor of history and director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. Formerly a senior research analyst at the Library of Congress and editor of the American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies, Dr. Kohut is a renowned specialist in the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian-Russian relations. His monograph *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate* (1988, Ukrainian translation 1996) and subsequent articles on Ukrainian history have received international recognition and acclaim.

#19

The Ukrainian West Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv

William Jay Risch

Harvard University Press

Harvard Historical Studies 173

\$49.95•£36.95•€45.00

HARDCOVER

ISBN 9780674050013

William Jay Risch is Associate Professor of History at Georgia College and State University.

In 1990, months before crowds in Moscow and other major cities dismantled their monuments to Lenin, residents of the western Ukrainian city of Lviv toppled theirs. William Jay Risch argues that Soviet politics of empire inadvertently shaped this anti-Soviet city, and that opposition from the periphery as much as from the imperial center was instrumental in unraveling the Soviet Union.

Lviv's borderlands identity was defined by complicated relationships with its Polish neighbor, its imperial Soviet occupier, and the real and imagined West. The city's intellectuals—working through compromise rather than overt opposition—strained the limits of censorship in order to achieve greater public use of Ukrainian language and literary expression, and challenged state-sanctioned histories with their collective memory of the recent past. Lviv's post-Stalin-generation youth, to which Risch pays particular attention, forged alternative social spaces where their enthusiasm for high culture, politics, soccer, music, and film could be shared.

The Ukrainian West enriches our understanding not only of the Soviet Union's postwar evolution but also of the role urban spaces, cosmopolitan identities, and border regions play in the development of nations and empires. And it calls into question many of our assumptions about the regional divisions that have characterized politics in Ukraine. Risch shines a bright light on the political, social, and cultural history that turned this once-peripheral city into a Soviet window on the West.

UKL 454, 12 October 2011

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